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*Public  
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Review*



THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY  
FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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# Public Administration Review

THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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## *IN THIS NUMBER*

**PAUL BECKETT**, now serving as chairman of the new Department of Public Administration at the American University of Beirut, in Lebanon, is associate professor of public administration, State College of Washington (on leave). Before going to Washington State in 1947, he had been assistant professor of government and assistant director, Division of Government Research, University of New Mexico; research technician, Los Angeles County Bureau of Administrative Research; research technician, The Haynes Foundation; associate administrative analyst, U.S. Bureau of the Budget; and executive secretary, Town Hall, Los Angeles. He received a Ph.D. degree from the University of California, Los Angeles.

**FREDRICK BENT** is assistant professor of public administration, American University of Beirut. He was Washington representative, Council of State Governments, 1950-51. He is working toward a Ph.D. degree at the University of Chicago.

**ALANSON W. WILLCOX, LL.B.** Harvard Law School, 1926, practiced law in New York City 1926-34. He was assistant general counsel, U.S. Treasury Department, 1934-36; and assistant general counsel, Social Security Board, 1936-38. Since that time he has been with the Federal Security Agency—as attorney, 1939-42; assistant general counsel, 1942-47; and general counsel, 1947 to date. He is a member of the New York State bar and the U.S. Supreme Court bar.

**FREDERIC N. CLEAVELAND** has been assistant professor, Department of Political Science and Department of City and Regional Planning, University of North Carolina, and research associate, Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, since September, 1951. He was instructor in political science, Princeton University, 1948-49, and Washington Square College, New York University, 1950-51. As research assistant, Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1949-50, he was a member of research teams preparing an administrative history of the U.S. Department of the Interior and surveying headquarters-field relationships in the U.S. Department of the Interior. He was special assistant to the chief of personnel training, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1951. He received a Ph.D. degree at Princeton University, 1951.

**O. W. CAMPBELL** has been city manager, San Diego, California, since 1950. He was western representative, Public Administration Service, 1937-40; executive secretary, California Council of Defense, 1940-41; field representative, Office of Civilian Defense, 1941; associate regional coordinator, National Housing Agency, Office of Emergency Management, 1941-42; western representative, Council of State Governments, 1942-43; Lt. Col., U.S. Army, 1943-46; city manager, San Jose, California, 1946-50.

**ROY L. LOVVERN** became head of the newly organized Division of Weed Investigations, U.S. Department of Agriculture, in January, 1950. He had been a member of the Agronomy Department, North Carolina State College, since 1935, directing research in pasture management. He served briefly as a county agent and with the Soil Conservation Service before going to North Carolina State. He was a civilian adviser in agriculture to the U.S. Army in Italy following World War II. He has a Ph.D. degree from the University of Wisconsin.

**MARGUERITE GILSTRAP** has been doing government information work since 1942 when she joined the Mid-South regional office of the Farm Security Administration. A member of the staff of the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering, U.S. Department of Agriculture, since 1946, her chief concern is reporting crops research to the layman.

**ARNOLD MILES** has been with the U.S. Bureau of the Budget since 1945, where he is chief of the Government Organization Branch. Former positions have included assistant director, American Municipal Association, 1936-41; assistant to the program supervisor, Division of Defense Housing Coordination, 1941; and work with the Army Air Force, 1941-45, where he engaged in organization and program planning and control and was chief, Administrative Projects Section.

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**VICTOR JONES** has been at Wesleyan University since 1946, where he is professor of government. He was formerly a member of the faculty, University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of *Metropolitan Government* (1942) and "Local Government Organization in Metropolitan Areas: Its Relation to Urban Redevelopment" in Coleman Woodbury, ed., *The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment*, to be published by the University of Chicago Press in March, 1953.

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# Letters from Beirut

I By PAUL BECKETT

*Professor of Public Administration  
American University of Beirut\**

II By FREDRICK BENT

*Assistant Professor of Public Administration  
American University of Beirut*

I

Beirut, Lebanon  
Autumn, 1952

DEAR FELLOW MEMBERS:

Some of you have expressed a flattering interest in what we are trying to do out here, and in the problems we have encountered in setting up and operating what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first and only training program in public administration in the entire Arab world.<sup>1</sup>

\* Associate Professor of Public Administration, The State College of Washington (on leave).

Few Americans, I think, are fully aware of how big and important this world is. It is variously defined, but it certainly includes Syria, Lebanon, those parts of Palestine not held by Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Aden, Egypt, and the Sudan, plus certain oil sheikdoms on the Persian Gulf. Some modern analysts have not treated as "Arab" the Moslem, Arabic-speaking countries lying to the west of Egypt: that is, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. In view of the strong linguistic, religious, and cultural ties which bind these peoples to the Arab East, the validity of such an exclusion is at least open to question. It would not be conceded by most of the Arabs of my acquaintance. It is worth noting, in this connection, that the new state of Libya has in the months since it achieved statehood shown a clear disposition to consider itself within the Arab orbit; witness, also, the current political solidarity between the Arab states of the East and the independence-seeking peoples of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.

If the "Arab world" is defined as including all of Arabic-speaking North Africa, it embraces an area substantially greater than that of the United States and all its possessions and contains a population which can probably be safely estimated at 60,000,000. If Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are arbitrarily excluded, it still has an area larger than that of the continental

For the benefit of those who may be interested in such experiments in the export of American ideas about administration as a form of technical assistance, we propose to offer some preliminary, tentative, and purely personal observations on our first year's experience. Nothing that we report should be construed as reflecting in any way the views of the American University of Beirut or the United States Technical Cooperation Administration.

## *Origin and Basis of the Program*

A BRIEF description of the origin and basis of the program, and of the circumstances surrounding its birth, would seem to be an essential prelude to any attempt to appraise its first year of operation. For some of the problems which had to be surmounted are directly traceable to, and others were made

United States and a population of something like 40,000,000.

Arab governments, many of them still under great-power domination in varying degree, offer a case study in political evolution. In terms of freedom from foreign dominance, the range is from zero to complete independence. In terms of form of government, examples may be found of absolute monarchy, military dictatorship, constitutional monarchy, and constitutional republic. In general, Lebanon being the nearest thing to an exception because its population is not predominantly Moslem, government has a strong theocratic tinge strange to Western eyes. In general, also, the structure of society is still essentially feudal. No Arab government is as yet fully democratic, as the West understands that term. Nor could democracy have been expected to emerge full blown in such a setting.

## PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

more difficult by, the nature of the prenatal and natal environment.

The genesis of the enterprise was the signing of a contract between the American University of Beirut and the United States Technical Cooperation Administration on April 26, 1951. In this contract the TCA agreed to finance (up to a total of \$624,000), and the University agreed to establish and operate over a two-year period, a number of special training programs—in several public health specialties, in engineering agriculture and industrial chemistry, in economics, and in public administration. In all of these areas save public administration, programs would involve the expansion and strengthening of existing departments; the public administration program would have to be built from the ground up.

The portions of the contract dealing with public administration were wisely couched in general terms. The basic provisions may be summed up as follows:

1. The University undertook to create and have in operation at the opening of the 1951-52 school year a department of public administration, with a curriculum of courses in administration and related subjects leading to the Bachelor of Arts degree.

2. While much discretion was left the University in determining the precise nature of this curriculum, the contract did provide that it should include a general introductory course in public administration and courses in public personnel administration, fiscal management, organization and methods, and municipal administration.

3. The immediate and primary objective of the department was to be "the training of students who expect to become governmental officials." However, the need for and the possibility of developing facilities for in-service training were not overlooked. The University was "to prepare plans [for] and if possible initiate less advanced courses related to the general subject of public administration which will result in training of junior government officials and . . . seminars of from four to six weeks' duration for government officials in the Arab East countries covering general principles and problems of public administration."

4. Like all of the other departments covered

by the contract, the department of public administration would have a specified quota of trainee scholarships. Thus the contract had two distinct, but interdependent and complementary, aims. The first was to provide facilities; the second was to ensure their use. More will need to be said later about the problems involved in the distribution of these scholarships. Suffice it to note here that the total number of scholarships available in all fields for the year 1951-52 was fixed at 118, of which 18 were earmarked for the new department of public administration; 65 for the various public health specialties; 20 for engineering agriculture and industrial chemistry as a group; and 15 for economics.<sup>2</sup>

These scholarships were to be generous, covering tuition, board and room, textbooks and school supplies, and, indeed, all of the other necessary expenses of the recipient except purely personal expenditures and the cost of transportation to and from Beirut. Transportation cost was to be borne in each case by the sponsoring government. The estimated average cost of the scholarships was \$1,000 per year per student.

5. As has been noted, the contract was to extend over a period of two school years (1951-52 and 1952-53); it provided a total of \$69,000 for the establishment and operation of the public administration program during this period. Of this amount, not more than \$30,000 might be expended by the University for the employment of new teaching personnel;<sup>3</sup> \$36,000 was allocated to student scholarships; and up to \$3,000 might be spent for equipment, supplies, and library materials.

### *Conditions Surrounding the Department's Birth*

**L**EAT me admit promptly that ours was a messy delivery. It could not have been otherwise under the circumstances prevailing.

Knowing what I now know about the diffi-

<sup>2</sup> Funds were also provided for a total of 10 unallocated, "extra-quota" scholarships which might be used during either of the two years covered by the contract to care for special needs and situations.

<sup>3</sup> Three new positions were envisaged, but it was understood that one of them would be used primarily to strengthen the existing Department of Political Science, which would be furnishing indispensable support to the new public administration program.

culties under which the University must have labored during the summer of 1951, I do not think that blame can fairly be ascribed to anyone for the situation that confronted the appointed midwives of the new department of public administration (i.e., Messrs. Beckett and Bent) when they finally arrived in Beirut.<sup>4</sup> It was, however, a situation which might have taxed the ingenuity of more experienced *accoucheurs* of new enterprises.

We landed in Beirut Wednesday morning, October 10. Registration week at the University was in its third day, and classes were scheduled to begin on the following Monday. Pending our delayed arrival, the University authorities had been compelled to make some decisions concerning a first-semester curriculum in public administration; a few students had been registered in courses tentatively labeled "administration." It was understood, however, that these were purely stopgap arrangements, subject to change by the staff of the new department. It had, of course, been impossible to order any textbooks or other materials under the circumstances.

I doubt that I shall ever again receive so warm a welcome. With an almost audible sigh of relief, those who had been saddled with stand-by responsibility for the public administration program (none of them professing any

\*If anything, I think, those who had to attempt to get the five programs ready for operation in a single summer deserve a word of commendation for doing the job as well as they did. Only after I had been here for some time could I begin to appreciate fully the complexity and difficulty of their task. The problem of personnel recruitment alone was staggering in view of the distances involved (most of the needed people would have to be brought from the United States), the resultant obstacles to communication and coordination, the variety of specializations involved, and the unique complications associated with moving whole families abroad.

I gained some insight into this problem in the course of the negotiations preceding and following my own employment, and special enlightenment from my subsequent effort to aid in finding another man in public administration (in the midst of the hurly-burly of pulling up stakes and preparing to move a family half way around the world). I have since come to realize that the task of selecting the first group of TCA scholars must have involved difficulties of almost comparable magnitude. Nor could it have been easy to find physical space for the programs on an already over-crowded campus, or the housing and other facilities needed for TCA scholars and new teaching personnel.

special competence in the field) unloaded their burden on the newly-arrived "experts." I can testify that the senior "expert" felt anything but expert at this moment.

I could not, if I wished, describe in logical sequence the events of the next four days, nor is it necessary to attempt to do so. In such a situation, one keys oneself up to the essential pitch, wades in, and hopes for the best. By noon of the day following our arrival, the new department had a firm curriculum for the first semester, a tentatively approved program for the year as a whole, and a quasi-final framework of prerequisites and requirements; registration for courses in the new field could now proceed on more than a tentative basis. Sketchy but viable working relationships had been established with related departments and the University administration. The situation was further clarified and stabilized in the days that followed, and at 7:30 A.M. on Monday the first class met.

#### *The Postnatal Situation*

WE HAD surmounted the initial crisis, by dint of furious effort and hasty improvisation—and the unstinting cooperation of our colleagues and superiors. But an enterprise born under such circumstances could hardly have been expected to emerge in robust condition. Our real education in the problems involved in launching such a program in a foreign setting was now to begin.

The situation as classes opened may be briefly summarized as follows:

**Curriculum.** The initial course offering was necessarily very limited in scope. First-semester courses specifically labeled "public administration" consisted of an introductory course in basic theories; public personnel administration (set up on a two-semester basis); political parties and pressure groups; and a graduate seminar. This seemingly rather strange assortment reflects some of the difficulties which confronted us. None of our students had had any previous work in public administration; it was necessary to start with courses in which this lack would not constitute too great a handicap. On the other hand, 5 TCA scholars had been accepted as graduate students, on the basis of previous work in political science or law; for them we had to try to provide both founda-

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tional background and some work a cut above the undergraduate level. We were to be plagued throughout the first year by such contradictions.

Students who had not yet done so were required to take a year course in comparative government (in the Political Science Department) and semester courses in public finance and statistics (in the Department of Economics). Our initiation of a course in political parties and pressure groups, which no one was required to take, should not be interpreted as reflecting a belief on our part that an offering of this nature is an essential component of a public administration curriculum. It so happened that the Department of Political Science was offering no work in this field, and with the blessing of that department we undertook to plug the gap. We believed, and still believe, that such a course has great value for students of public administration. However, it has been understood from the beginning that it is essentially a political science offering for which the Political Science Department may assume responsibility any time it wishes to do so.

*Enrollment.* Students we had in abundance, numerically speaking at least. The core of our student clientele consisted of 20 holders of TCA scholarships, who had been chosen prior to our arrival.<sup>5</sup> We also had a rather surprising number of voluntary, unsubsidized enrollees, in view of the fact that the department had existed only on paper until the middle of the registration period, and that consequently there had been nothing like a normal opportunity to publicize its offerings. Six non-TCA students (2 seniors and 4 juniors) indicated that they intended to major in the new field. A larger number (majors in political science, law, or economics) had chosen to take one or more of our courses as electives—principally the introductory course and the course in political parties.<sup>6</sup> Total enrollment in the four courses, after the usual post-registration shakedown, stood at 73, distributed as follows: introductory course—31; parties and pressure groups—20; personnel administration—16; seminar—6.

These figures do not include 7 holders of

TCA scholarships who could not be fitted initially into our program. In 6 of the 7 cases, the problem was lack of previous academic training. Two boys sent from Ethiopia could qualify only as freshmen; 3 Eritreans and 1 Lebanese could qualify only as sophomores. Our curriculum had been designed for upperclassmen; we had felt (and still feel) that specialization in administration cannot profitably be begun below the junior level. However, we were willing, and the University administration was willing, to make special allowances in the case of the 6 students and to tailor programs for them in administration and related subjects if they would renounce the idea of working toward a degree. They could not, of course, expect to bypass the usual freshman and/or sophomore requirements as degree candidates. Not one of them, it soon developed, could bring himself to forsake the notion of seeking a degree;<sup>7</sup> we were compelled, therefore, to place them in the regular freshman and sophomore courses leading toward a subsequent major in administration. We would try to give the sophomores at least an introductory course in the field during the second semester.

The remaining case was one of language difficulty. Our one appointee from Iraq was forced to confess, after a week or two of brave endeavor, that he was making neither head nor tail of what went on in the courses to which he had been assigned because he knew too little English. He asked for and received permission to transfer, for the first semester at least, to what is known here as "special form"—an intensive, full-time training program in English communication skills. It was hoped that he would be able to resume his work in administration during the second semester.

To the reader who may be disposed to wonder why 7 inadequately qualified students had been brought here on scholarship, I suggest that he withhold judgment until I have had a chance to describe some of the awe-inspiring difficulties involved in the selection process. I was to receive a liberal education along this line during the summer of 1952. I shall hope to discuss this problem, some other unsolved

<sup>5</sup> Two of these were "extra-quota" scholarships.

<sup>6</sup> The Political Science Department had volunteered to recognize these two courses as counting toward a major in political science.

<sup>7</sup> No one can appreciate until he has been here the importance attached to degrees, diplomas, and certificates in this part of the world.

problems, the status of the program as it began its second year of operation, and what seem to be its prospects, in a subsequent letter.

Of the other 13 TCA appointees with whom we began the first year, 5, as has been noted, were classified as graduate students; 4 were juniors; and 4 were seniors. One (a graduate student who had been both a teacher and a practicing lawyer) was a Palestinian refugee;<sup>8</sup> the others were drawn: 6 from Lebanon, 2 from Syria, 2 from Jordan, and 2 from Liberia. A quota of 2 scholarships each had also been assigned to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, but these governments had presented no candidates. Of our 6 volunteer majors, 3 were Palestinians, 1 was Lebanese, 1 was a Jordanian, and 1 came from the Sudan.

We had, in other words, majors or prospective majors from no fewer than 9 different countries scattered from Syria to the western bulge of Africa. Obviously one of our most difficult and challenging problems would be to adapt ourselves and our methods as rapidly as possible to students having such varied, and to us completely unfamiliar, backgrounds. Fred Bent will comment on this aspect of our experience in his letter.

*Teaching Materials.* Bent proposes also to comment on some of the inadequacies of a Western and predominantly American literature of public administration as a medium for the instruction of students having a sketchy understanding, at best, of Western institutions and ideas. Suffice it to note here that as the department began its operation the crucial problem was not lack of a suitable literature but lack of any literature which we could use. Considering the other factors working against effective teaching, we would probably have found the going difficult enough had we had the Library of Congress at our disposal. Ac-

tually, there were no textbooks for students, and we were forced to rely throughout much of the first semester on a scattering handful of usable books and periodicals in the University library and the library of the U.S. Information Service, plus our scant personal collections and a few items scrounged from members of the political science staff. It was a test in patience and ingenuity for both teachers and students.

#### *The Crucial First Months*

IT is one thing to dream up a program in three or four days under the circumstances just described; it is quite another to make it viable in such an environment. The sharp crisis of the birth merged without interval into a less dramatic but infinitely more wearing struggle for survival.

Everything that needed to be done needed to be done immediately. Lectures had to be prepared and delivered; background reading needed to be done on the history, politics, economy, and sociology of the region; materials had to be selected and ordered for the library; curriculum, standards, and requirements had to be stabilized; relations with the University administration and with other departments had to be regularized and solidified; problems raised by individual students had to be solved. And somehow, in the midst of all this, we must manage to develop an effective working rapport with the students as a group, and win their cooperation, confidence, and respect.

I will not attempt to tell you how busy we were during this period. Suffice it to note that I had been here at least six weeks, and I think two months, before I found time to take a look at downtown Beirut, which is less than two miles from the University campus. Sufficient unto each day was the evil thereof.

On most of the matters mentioned above I need make no further comment at this point. Bent proposes to discuss in his letter some of the difficulties involved in adapting our teaching to the necessities of our new environment. I will describe in the next section what ultimately evolved in the way of curriculum and requirements. And you can imagine without my telling you that we found all too little time for background reading and research, and were compelled to devote a great deal of time

\*The bulk of the refugees being stateless persons, the task of making nominations from this group had been assigned to what is locally known as the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees). This was one of the extra-quota scholarships. Unlike the other departments covered by the contract, we had no refugee quota—probably, it seems fair to surmise, because of the inherent contradiction involved in subsidizing the training of stateless persons specifically for public employment.

to the selection and ordering of reference materials. I would like to comment briefly here on the problems of student morale and of dealing with pressures from individual students.

I believe I can safely say that student morale would have been something of a problem had we been able to get the program under way in much more orderly fashion. Few if any of our students, I am sure, had had any clear idea of what they were getting into when they had volunteered to enter the new field or had accepted a TCA scholarship. It rapidly became apparent, as we grew to know them, that most of them, at least, tended to be highly oversanguine about what could be accomplished in a year of specialized training. We would, then, have had to contend with some disillusionment in any case, but it goes without saying that the problem was greatly accentuated by the conditions I have described. Nor could the students be blamed for being discouraged by what they sensed and saw, or for being skeptical concerning the ultimate outcome of our efforts.

It is also safe to say that under the best circumstances we should have had some difficulties with students who sought to secure special dispensations in matters of prerequisites, course requirements, and grades. There are always some students who will test a new teacher's resistance to cajolery and argument; we soon discovered that students in this part of the world are even more inclined than American students to wish to be dealt with on a personal basis. It is not unfair to say that the Arab is more subjective than the Anglo-Saxon. He has virtues that the Anglo-Saxon does not possess, but he is certainly less likely to view any problem with dispassionate objectivity. And the habit of bargaining is deeply embedded in the local folkways.

Obviously, we were greatly handicapped in attempting to deal with this problem, not only by our ignorance of the way our students' minds worked, but also by our inability to point to any firm policies, standards, or precedents to justify our decisions. And there can be no doubt that the number of such pressures with which we had to contend was greater than it would have been had our status and the status and policies of the department been more solidly established. Gradually, not with-

out making some mistakes, we began to learn when absolute firmness was essential.

Our struggle to develop a stable and reasonably effective pattern of operation was not the kind of struggle in which there could be a single decisive turning point. We could only inch forward day by day. It seems now, in retrospect, that we had probably put the worst behind us by the end of the second month, but I am sure we felt no inclination to assume that we had at that time. The one certain gain to which we could point was the availability of textbooks, which had begun to arrive during the sixth and seventh weeks. This had been just cause for celebration on the part of both staff and students and had obliterated almost overnight one primary source of student complaint and rationalization.

Other materials we had been ordering began to trickle into the library soon after, and the size of the flow gradually increased. After the Christmas holidays, even the most skeptical observer would have been forced to admit that the enterprise was beginning to acquire a look of solidity and health, though it would carry throughout the year some of the scars of its birth and weaknesses inherited from its infancy.

To anyone who may be offered the opportunity of initiating such a program elsewhere, I say: "By all means, accept. You are due for a tremendously stimulating and educational experience. But make it one of the primary conditions of your acceptance that you be enabled to be on the scene of operations for at least three months (six will be better) before the teaching of the first class." We proved here, having no choice in the matter, that the job can be done the hard way. But I do not recommend to anyone that he attempt to follow our example; particularly I do not recommend it to anyone having a weak heart, a tendency toward ulcers, or an aversion to playing by ear.

#### *The Latter Half of the Year*

DURING the second semester we were able to schedule, in addition to a repetition of the introductory course\* and the second half of personnel administration, courses in organi-

\* This course was repeated primarily for the benefit of the sophomore TCA students mentioned above and the young man from Iraq, whose English had by now

zation and methods analysis, public administration and administrative laws of the Middle East (taught by Professor Cecil Hourani),<sup>10</sup> international organization and administration (also taught by Hourani), and two seminars—one for the graduate students and one for seniors. Registration in these offerings totaled 89, making our total enrollment for the first year 162. Almost half of the registration (48.8 per cent) was attributable to non-TCA students.

The department's total course program, as finally settled upon for publication in the University catalog, consisted (and still consists) of those courses and seminars already mentioned, plus a course in public fiscal management, one in comparative local government and administration,<sup>11</sup> a graduate tutorial course (for possible use in special situations), and thesis. No theses were required of the first year's graduate students, for a variety of practical reasons, including our own uncertainty as to whether such a policy would be desirable, lack of proper materials (especially during the first semester), and the fact that the students had been led to believe in the process of their selection that an M.A. degree would be obtainable in one year. The fairest statement I can make about our handling of this first crop of graduate students is that we did the best job of which we were capable under the conditions obtaining.

Departmental requirements, as finally approved, may be briefly described. Entering undergraduate majors are required to have had the basic sophomore courses in political science and economics, or their equivalent.

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substantially improved. There were also a few new volunteer enrollees.

<sup>10</sup> Professor Hourani, an Oxford-trained Arab with previous teaching and United Nations experience, fills the position in our budget which was to be used primarily to strengthen the Department of Political Science.

<sup>11</sup> While it did not prove to be practicable under the conditions then existing to offer either a course in fiscal management or a course in local government during the second semester of the first year, we attempted to do the next best thing with respect to our graduate students and seniors by centering the second-semester graduate seminar on problems of fiscal management and putting the seniors to work, in their seminar, on the study of local government in the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Middle East.

Under general University regulations, they must take in their junior and senior years at least 24 hours of work in the major field and (at present) 18 hours in an approved minor field.<sup>12</sup> The department requires that work in the major include the introductory course, personnel administration, fiscal management, organization and methods analysis, public administration and administrative laws of the Middle East, and at least one semester of seminar. It also requires constitutional law of the Middle Eastern countries (a law department offering), and, as has been noted, comparative government, statistics, and public finance. Seniors in all departments are required to pass a comprehensive examination, written and oral, before graduation.

Graduate student programs and requirements are, of course, to a considerable extent tailored to fit the backgrounds and needs of the individual student. I shall have something to say in a later letter about our current thinking in this regard.

On the whole, we led a much more pleasant existence during the second semester than we had during the first. Problems still arose which gave us some bad hours; and we were under no illusion that we knew all that we should know or were doing all that we should do. But there was no comparison between our situation now and the conditions under which we had been compelled to operate in October and November. The department was now unquestionably a going concern, with a solid core of interested and reasonably competent students (with a few of exceptional promise), a curriculum as extensive as it was feasible to develop with existing staff, established prerequisites and requirements for graduation, and a fairly adequate and still growing accumulation of usable teaching materials. There was every reason to believe that we would be able to do a much better job with considerably less effort in the year to come.

On June 23, 1952, we had the pleasure of watching our first products march across a platform to receive diplomas. We knew, and

<sup>12</sup> Students scheduled to graduate after 1953 will be required to have only 18 hours in the minor, though they may have as many as 18. This minimum and the minimum requirement for a major are both low, in my opinion.

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we had tried to instill in them the realization, that they were semifinished products. We would have much preferred to be able to work with them for another year. But we had been compelled for nine months to operate on the principle of doing the best we could with what we had and under the conditions imposed. The turning loose of these not quite finished graduates was merely the logical capstone of what had gone before. We would do better in the future.

Of those graduating, 3 were granted M.A. degrees in public administration<sup>13</sup> and 6 received B.A.'s. At no other place I know would one's first graduates be likely to consist of 1 Syrian, 2 Palestinians, 1 Jordanian, 2 Liberians, 1 Sudanese, and 2 Lebanese.<sup>14</sup> It had been an interesting year.

Sincerely,  
PAUL BECKETT

### II

Beirut, Lebanon  
Autumn, 1952

#### DEAR FELLOW MEMBERS:

Paul Beckett has described some of the birth pangs which accompanied the establishment of our department. As the department was the first of its kind to be set up in this part of the world, we had no blueprint or established

<sup>13</sup> One of the original 5 graduate students had been compelled to drop out at midyear by reason of his appointment (by the Lebanese government) to a diplomatic post abroad; another had failed to complete his work because of illness during the last weeks of the second semester. This second student is now in the process of doing the work left undone.

<sup>14</sup> Three of these young men (the Syrian and the 2 Liberians) were scheduled to return to government posts from which they were on leave. The young man from the Sudan secured government work there soon after his return from Beirut. The two Lebanese have since mid-summer been employed in the personnel office of the TCA in Beirut. The Jordanian is taking law at the London School of Economics; and 1 of the Palestinians is now a graduate student in this department. The only man unemployed, at last report, was the other Palestinian—he who had previously been a lawyer and teacher. However, he has declined at least one job offer, in Libya, and seemed at the time I last talked to him to have a reasonably good chance of securing a good post in the personnel field in one of the American oil companies operating locally. Of these first graduates, 2 (the Sudanese and the Palestinian now doing graduate work) did not hold TCA scholarships.

precedents to guide us, and little way of identifying in October the problems we would be facing in November and December. Looking back on our first year here it seems to me that three major difficulties confronted us. The first stemmed from the haste in which the department had been established; this has been already discussed by Beckett. The second difficulty was caused by the language and cultural barrier which hindered easy communication between us and the students. The third resulted from the limitations of available material. Let us look briefly at these obstacles.

#### *Lack of Opportunity for Student Orientation*

**I**N VIEW of the newness of the staff, not to say the newness of the program itself, the students adopted an attitude of "watchful waiting." Very few of them knew exactly what they were getting into when they were granted a fellowship to study public administration or chose voluntarily to enter the field. The subject matter of the courses was almost completely strange to them. While some of them were on leaves of absence from government posts and presumably had had some practical experience in public administration, others had been studying at the University prior to their appointment and it seems not unfair to assume that in some cases their interest in public administration stemmed more from a desire to get a liberal fellowship than from an ambition to go into government work.

In retrospect, I think it would have been eminently worth while if we had been able to talk leisurely with the students, both individually and collectively, about public administration in general and our program in particular, to help them orient themselves to their new work. As the semester gradually got under way, it became quite clear that they tended to look upon each course as a watertight compartment, having but a casual relationship to the other courses in the curriculum. A well-planned orientation program would have helped immensely, not only to introduce the entire field to the students, but also to give us an opportunity to find out what their specific interests were and to stimulate them along these lines as quickly as possible.

Orienting the students to the new program was complicated by the wide variation in their

educational backgrounds. Many of them had taken work at American University; however, the amount of completed work varied. Differences in background were even more marked among those fellows coming from elsewhere. Some, as Beckett has noted, had been accepted as TCA fellows in public administration with the equivalent of a high school diploma; others were lawyers and teachers. A few even arrived without any scholastic records, and it was anybody's guess where they belonged. However distressing this may appear to well-ordered minds, it would not have been so serious if we had been able to spend a year experimenting to find the academic niche of each student, permitting him to proceed with his education at his own speed. Unfortunately, there was no guarantee that anyone's fellowship would be renewed, or that those on leave would be granted another leave of absence by their governments. Theoretically, at least, we were expected in nine months' time to turn the whole motley crew into full-fledged "public administrators."

Despite considerable pressure from the students, we felt it advisable to require those whose academic background had been too sketchy to take a certain number of basic courses in political science and economics before beginning work in public administration. While this limited the number of courses in public administration available to them in a year's time, we hoped that both the TCA and their governments could be prevailed upon to allow these students a second year. In most cases this hope was destined to be fulfilled.

#### *The Language Problem*

A CONTINUING problem confronting any English-speaking educational institution on foreign soil is the degree of proficiency in English. The situation at American University of Beirut is no exception. While it is somewhat remarkable that most A.U.B. students speak and write English as well as they do, especially when English is their second or third language, it cannot be said that the over-all quality compares favorably with American standards. Some students, especially those whose primary and secondary training was received in Palestine, are able to write and speak English on a par with the average American college stu-

dent. Unfortunately, this standard of excellence is exceptional, so that we have been constantly confronted by the necessity of tailoring our courses to the student's speed of comprehension. In the absence of any proved formula to determine the amount of reading which they can absorb, we have had to go by rule of thumb, adjusting and readjusting our assignments, trying to find a rational balance between what we think is a normal work load and what the students, whose typical complaint is overwork, think. So long as students differ so markedly in language ability within the same class and it is impractical to treat each one individually, the problem will continue.

#### *The Cultural Barrier*

THE newness of the subject matter and the difficulties stemming from the language barrier introduced a third obstacle to the overall problem of communication between staff and students. One can assume in teaching public administration in the United States that concepts such as political neutrality and the merit system, and institutions such as the Civil Service Commission, will have a familiar ring to his students. While they may not be able to discuss these concepts and institutions adequately, at least they are not mysteries. These assumptions cannot be made in the Middle East. Only very gradually did we begin to learn what can and what cannot be taken for granted in this respect and to be able to identify ahead of time those concepts which would mean one thing to us and something entirely different to the students. Only by a process of trial and error were we able to discover the topics which because of the students' background would have little relevance to them and therefore should be culled out of our discussions. As an obvious example, take the role of trade unions in the public service. This is a realistic problem to American students interested in personnel administration. It is considerably less meaningful to students from lands where trade unions are either nonexistent or very weak. Just as it has been necessary to make continuing re-evaluations as to the amount of work expected of the students, so it has been necessary to strike a happy medium between presenting topics which are currently meaningful to the students and alerting them

to new ideas which could profitably be implemented at some future date.

It can be seen that teaching public administration in the Middle East presents unique problems. The unoriented teacher lacking rudimentary knowledge of the area and its governments, and of its history, economy, and religion, is hard put to relate his own experience, often exclusively American, in terms which are significant to Arab students. I know of no short cut to secure the necessary awareness other than by reading extensively in the ever-expanding literature about the Middle East, by being willing to adapt oneself to the area, and by refraining from making value judgments based upon an American frame of reference.

#### *Limitations of Available Materials*

IMPLICIT in what has been said above are the limitations on the use of American texts in public administration. As our training had been secured entirely in the United States, it was inevitable that we initially relied upon materials with which we were already familiar. One thing our experience in the past year has taught us is that those references which describe a well-developed administrative organization and the problems which accompany it are apt to be quite inappropriate to students coming from countries whose governments are considerably less complicated. Employment and fiscal problems in the countries of this region differ both in degree and kind from those described in conventional American texts. The contrast is equally apparent when a comparison is drawn between the limited public service functions which these governments perform and those discussed in American and English references. The sheer variety and volume of services rendered by American executive departments are a source of amazement to Arab students. Texts which describe the administrative problems of a vast bureaucracy performing or regulating services which affect intimately every individual citizen are simply unrealistic to Arab students.

The use of American texts has a second serious disadvantage of assuming considerable knowledge of the American government and its federal form. While all of our students are re-

quired to take a year's course in comparative government, the study of the American system is at best summary and does not furnish them with the necessary background to read with understanding about the administrative problems of the United States. In view of the preponderance of American literature in the field of administration, perhaps the only solution in the long run will be to offer or require a course in American government. But such an additional requirement might not be easy to sell the students, who incline to be sensitive not only about the amount of required work piled upon them, but also about anything which smacks of American chauvinism.

Our instruction has been further handicapped by a lack of reliable information about the current practices of the Arab governments in the various fields of administration. The gap between what we now know and what we need to know is being filled to some extent by student research assignments, term papers, and theses. However, it will be many years before we will be as well informed as we should be. There are, of course, practical limitations on the amount and quality of the information which can be secured by students. Not only are they inexperienced in research techniques, but the governments themselves are not always cooperative in furnishing information. Nevertheless, until we are able to gather more first-hand data about the area and the policies and practices of its governments, our instruction cannot be fully effective. The governments of the Middle East have their own administrative problems which can only be fully analyzed by references having this area in mind. We would not expect students in the United States to understand American administrative law by studying the administrative law of France. Our situation is roughly comparable.

Three types of texts appear to be essential for our program at A.U.B. First, there is a critical need for references in comparative administration. These references would be especially valuable to us because the governments of this area have been heavily influenced in the past by both French and British administrative theories; and if the TCA program continues, they will not be immune to American ideas. It is needless to add that references of this type would be useful to any public admin-

istration program whether in the United States, or in India, or elsewhere.

Second, we would have immediate use for references in public administration geared to the general problems of small governments, operating within a stringent budget, needing a relatively small public service, and lacking highly specialized personnel.

Third, simply written training manuals need to be prepared, both in English and in Arabic, for public officials interested in finance, personnel, or budgeting, but lacking specialized schooling in these subjects. The need for in-service training can hardly be overstated. It will be years before the governments of the Middle East will be adequately supplied with what we would call personnel or fiscal experts. What is immediately needed are men acquainted with the basic essential tools, leaving for a future date extensive training in these areas. This will require the development of training manuals in Arabic.

#### *A Student Society of Public Administration*

THROUGHOUT our first year in Beirut, our time was largely taken up with the business of teaching. Nevertheless, high on our priority list was the formation of a public administration club. Despite our interest in the project, we were hesitant to move too rapidly. We felt that the students rather than the staff should initiate the idea. And, in view of the rather touchy political situation in the Middle East, we were reluctant to suggest the formation of a club affiliated with the American Society for Public Administration unless the students themselves were thoroughly in favor of it.

The students did take the initiative, and about the middle of the spring semester a first organizational meeting was held, at which they decided not only to form a student club, but to affiliate with ASPA. Before the semester ended, two speakers addressed the club: one

an American TCA official, and the other the director general of the Lebanese Ministry of Finance. This year an earlier start has been made and we expect to offer a rather complete lecture series, featuring United Nations, American, Lebanese, British, and possibly French public officials. We are encouraged by the fact that approximately one-third of our majors have become members of ASPA (a few at some financial sacrifice), and we hope that more will take out student memberships before the end of the year. Continued membership in the Society will be especially important to Middle East students because, with the exception of the University library, collections of public administration materials are virtually nonexistent. The *Public Administration Review*, therefore, will be a vital source of stimulation and current information.

#### *Conclusion*

ALL in all, we feel that the Department of Public Administration is now on sound footing and that the probationary period is about over. Much, of course, remains to be done. Closer cooperative arrangements need to be made with the Arab governments if an in-service training program is to be initiated: the surface has barely been scratched here. The development of adequate teaching materials will not be completed overnight, nor will the gathering of data about the policies and practices of the governments of the Middle East. The problems which we faced last year coupled with the ones which will confront us this year emphasize one salient fact: teaching public administration in the Middle East is definitely a challenge. However formidable it may appear, we can only hope that it has been as stimulating and rewarding for the students as it has been for us.

Sincerely,

FREDRICK BENT

# The Lawyer in the Administration of Nonregulatory Programs

By ALANSON W. WILLCOX

*General Counsel  
Federal Security Agency*

WE ARE wont to boast that ours is a government of laws, which is true, and not of men, which is only partly true. The men who administer our laws have, collectively, a great deal of responsibility for the fulfillment of this aspiration. They are, to be sure, bounded on the one side by the statutory framework within which they operate, and on the other by the mandates of courts that review their acts. But between these boundaries are wide areas in which a government of laws can be maintained only as administrators are imbued with the will and equipped with the skill to maintain it. Only administrators can maintain from day to day consistency and equality of governmental action in all the myriad situations to which it must apply, treating alike situations that are like, differentiating rationally situations that differ. Legislatures on the one hand and courts on the other can promote this objective, but only administrators can fully achieve it. Only they can make a government of laws an everyday reality.

My thesis is, not that lawyers have a monopoly of the will or (except in a few specific areas) of the skill to attain these ends, but rather that a certain admixture of legal thinking is an essential element of the administrative process if we are to make good the substance of our boast. The need for legal thinking, indeed, is apt to be the most pressing where it is the least apparent. If an agency engaged in the enforcement of law through the courts lacks adequate legal staff, its work will suffer, but the courts will hardly permit it to stray far from the paths of legal righteousness. The nature of their job makes the administrators of almost any regulatory agency con-

stantly aware of the importance of legal considerations as an ingredient of administration itself. It is in agencies which are rarely involved in litigation that these considerations are most readily lost sight of. Such agencies are usually able to get on with their jobs without the luxury, or the nuisance, of having lawyers around. The loss, being of quality rather than of quantity, is not always easy to see. But the loss is apt to include something of those qualities of administration that distinguish a government of laws from a government of men.

I repeat that lawyers have no monopoly of either the desire or the ability to promote the consistency and rationality of administration, the evenhandedness and objectivity, which are of the essence of our concept of government. But there can be no dispute, I think, that the training and experience of lawyers makes them, as a group, more alert than most laymen to the need for constant testing of administration against these criteria, against the applicable statutes, and even against such fundamental principles as due process and equal protection of the law.

## I

BEFORE considering the several kinds of contribution lawyers can make to the processes of government, it will be well to discuss their relationship with other members of the administrative organization. For only as that relationship is sound can their contribution be effective.

It should be observed, first, that the role of law in administration does not differ essentially from the role of other professions, ex-

cept that the law is undoubtedly the most pervasive, unless administration itself be classed as a profession.<sup>1</sup> Each professional group can claim certain areas of governmental activity as a preserve in which its voice is entitled to special weight—the professional aspects of a medical care program afford a nonlegal illustration, just as litigation affords a legal one—but on an over-all basis it is the function of each profession to feed into the sum total of administrative thinking those ingredients which that profession is best equipped to contribute. Administrative decision is normally and properly the product of many minds, an aggregate or a reconciliation of many strains of thought. An appreciable bit of the art of administration is the ability to draw upon, and to utilize effectively, all of the pertinent skills.

Like other professional groups, I believe that lawyers should occupy an essentially advisory role in government. I am convinced that by and large lawyers can make a more effective contribution if they are not possessed of authority, even the authority to veto a proposed course of action.<sup>2</sup> If administrative decisions turned entirely on points of law, perhaps they ought to be made by lawyers, but in most non-regulatory agencies that is rarely the case. In

<sup>1</sup> President Roosevelt's distinguished Committee on Civil Service Improvement stated in 1941: "The lawyer, in contrast with the ordinary professional employee of the Government, is inevitably thrown into the heart of the policy-making process and of necessity has an important, and often a controlling, voice in the major issues of his department or agency." (House Doc. No. 118, 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 31).

<sup>2</sup> When the federal government is viewed as a whole, it is undoubtedly true that lawyers play a larger part in policy formulation than any other one profession, perhaps than all other professions combined. Yet it is easy to think of nonregulatory agencies where the case is reversed. Among federal agencies, the National Institutes of Health (the chief research arm of the Public Health Service), the Bureau of the Census, and the Council of Economic Advisers come to mind. Similar examples could doubtless be found in any state or local government.

I would qualify this statement to the extent that action contrary to specific legal advice, because of the responsibility it involves, ought not to be taken in the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy. In a sense, this qualification does give the lawyers a power of veto at the lower levels. But assuming free and easy access to the officer empowered to decide the issue, as there ought to be, I prefer to describe it as a power merely "to take the question upstairs."

the typical situation, decision results from a blending of many different elements, and I see no more reason to extract the legal points for separate decision by a lawyer than to extract the medical or economic points for decision by a doctor or an economist. A responsible administrator takes account of all professional considerations that are laid before him, and if occasionally he finds them less compelling than do their sponsors, it may happen that he is nearer right than they.

This point will bear a little further thought, for it necessarily means that a responsible administrative officer, even though not himself a lawyer, may on occasion take action contrary to the legal advice that is given him. The conclusion is less startling than it may seem. Legal advice in the difficult areas, as every lawyer knows, can seldom label one course black and the other white. A proposal that plainly violates the law will ordinarily be stopped long before it reaches the level where major policy decision is made, and if perchance it does reach that level we can rely on the fact that the official empowered to decide it has taken the same oath of office as the rest of us.

In the situations that call for high-level decision, if issues of legal authority are involved, they are likely to be issues that have no clear-cut answer. Here the deciding official must still take account of his lawyer's opinion, but here, I would maintain, he need not always be constrained to follow it. It is plain that a serious legal doubt, even though falling short of an adverse legal opinion, may properly dissuade the official from an otherwise desirable course of action. He takes a graver responsibility in acting where his lawyers think the odds are against legality, but at appropriate levels of administration I believe an absolute prohibition of such action would be a mistake. It does not seem wise to subordinate all other considerations, automatically and in all cases, to the lawyer's precise reading of the legal probabilities. It is, after all, the administering agency as such, and not merely its lawyers, whose role in shaping the interpretation of a doubtful statute is given heed by the courts.

Turning to other facets of the relationship of lawyers to administrators, I should place first in order of importance a close and informal day-to-day contact. The lawyer should

meet freely with other professional and administrative personnel at the levels where policy begins to take shape, and should meet with them on the terms of equality that comport with his advisory role. Only so can the lawyer be sufficiently aware of what is going on and why; only so can legal thinking be brought to bear on policy in its formative stages, and thus make a constructive rather than a purely negative contribution. There are occasions for formal requests and formal opinions, but the lawyer who confines himself to such arm's-length relationship will have little influence on administration, and too often will wind up by saying "no" to something the administrators have already decided they want to do.

The desirability of such a close relationship bespeaks a certain minimum numerical adequacy of legal staffing, since if an individual lawyer has to spread his services over large or numerous administrative units his contacts with administrative staff are apt to become attenuated or infrequent. I suspect that in many state agencies this difficulty may be even more acute than it has yet become in the federal government. A further obstacle to such working relationship may perhaps stem from the organizational pattern in those states that attach all lawyers to the attorney general's staff, but I see no reason that this should necessarily be so.

One consequence of practicing law in this informal way is that jurisdictional lines are blurred, since discussion is most fruitful only if each participant is free to comment where and as he will, subject to his own self-restraint rather than to a set of rules. This I think a desirable consequence, and not merely because jurisdictional lines lead so often to jurisdictional disputes wasteful of time as well as of morale. A lawyer familiar with a program can often make useful suggestions or offer useful criticism in matters that have little or nothing to do with the law, and by the same token can derive much help from non-lawyers familiar with the legal pattern of the program. Indeed, the lawyer must know his program if he is to give it sound legal advice. He must know all the things that he would want to tell a court if the question were before it, and those things commonly include facts and factors that he did not learn in law school.

**Jurisdictional lines not only breed trouble,**

but they also curtail a valuable cross-fertilization of thinking.

Another consequence of this method of operation is to belie the definition of a profession as a conspiracy to fool the laity. As we expose our thinking day in and day out to nonmembers of the guild, we enable them to meet us on ever more even ground—which is perhaps another way of saying that we teach them a bit of law. And the process works also in reverse and enables us to penetrate the fringes of other professional mysteries. The most important concession we make is to destroy the illusion of certainty, to let others in on the secret that in giving a legal opinion we are hazarding a guess—what some other person, real or hypothetical, will decide. We properly maintain that our training, and our familiarity with the tools and the mode of thought the judge will employ, give us a chance which the layman does not share to prophesy correctly, but we have to admit that we can rarely say with conviction that this answer is completely right and that completely wrong. We have yielded the right to issue pronouncements as though from the bench.

## II

LET US TURN NOW TO A MORE PARTICULAR CONSIDERATION of some of the contributions lawyers can make to the processes of administration.

The first of these is negative, helping to prevent actions that ought not to be taken. The lawyer must be alert to warn, not only of such obvious hazards as the adverse judgment of a court, but of those subtler dangers which also lie especially within his ken. He must be on guard against proposed action which would accord someone less than his full legal right or full equality of treatment, or would in other ways run counter to some principle of the law, even—I would say, especially—where there is no likelihood of judicial review. He must remember, and from time to time point out, that hard cases make bad law; he must look to the consequences of a seemingly harmless precedent. It is his duty to warn, and to support his warning in such measure as the occasion warrants.

Since a legal staff is often, as in the Federal Security Agency, attached to the office of the head of the agency, emphasis on the lawyer's

duty to warn of danger may suggest a function of overseeing the bureaus and other units of the agency on behalf of the agency's chief. That function I would emphatically disclaim. Nothing, not even a frankly delegated veto power, could be more disruptive of an effective working relationship between lawyers and administrators than for the lawyers to be charged with, or to assume, any such duty of surveillance.<sup>3</sup>

Turning now to the affirmative contributions which the lawyer can make to the administrative process, I would mention first his part in what I may call the machinery of governmental operation. He is trained to use language with precision, if not always with elegance; and since papers are so largely the stuff of which government is made, the lawyer's part in framing them covers pretty much the whole gamut of administration, from the drafting of letters to the drafting of laws. In his day-to-day advice he can do much to strengthen the consistency of administrative action by measuring today's interpretation against both yesterday's ruling and tomorrow's expected problem. His experience as a negotiator is called into play on a great variety of occasions, particularly in programs that involve continuing relationships between governments—federal-state, state-local, or interstate relationships, for example—or even involve dealings with other agencies of the same government. He may act as advocate, not only before the courts, but in administrative proceedings within his own agency or elsewhere, or perhaps before a legislative committee. Then, too, his training in the analysis of problems gives him a special usefulness in those situations, often in the preliminary stages of policy formulation, where the issues are still

to be defined or the ramifications of a proposed line of action are still to be explored. In all these ways the lawyer can help to forward the normal day-to-day operations merely by virtue of being one member of the administrative team with training and experience different from that of the others.

It has lately been charged by a member of the United States Senate that lawyers in the federal government devote themselves, not to the forwarding of normal day-to-day operation as I have said, but rather to finding ways and means to defeat the will of Congress, or otherwise to do those things that ought not to be done. This charge deserves a word of comment. No one could deny that lawyers, like economists, statisticians, or other groups, may on occasion be subjected to pressures by the people who employ them, whether in public or in private life; or that lawyers, like others, may at times have yielded to such pressures. But I think that anyone with experience in the government would disagree with the Senator's view that such things are a common occurrence, and would deny that either administrators or lawyers merit his disparagement of their intellectual and moral integrity.

What is not always recognized as a function of lawyers, at least in nonregulatory programs, yet may well be the most important of all, lies in the making of a substantive contribution to administrative policy itself. In a regulatory agency, as I have said, this process is likely to occur automatically or unconsciously, as a result of the agency's constant concern with the courts. In a nonregulatory agency it is less obvious, but in broad areas it is hardly less true, that lawyers should play a part in shaping policy.

When the Social Security Act was passed its public assistance titles were designed to bring about, for the population groups to which they applied, important changes in the manner of dispensing aid to the needy. The public almoner had been prone to assume the prerogatives of the giver of private charity, to grant or withhold according to his judgment of the deserts of the applicant, and often to assume a paternalistic control over the lives of those he aided. The Social Security Act sought to introduce into this field a government of laws, and to that end, among others, attached

\* This particular danger may be eliminated or reduced by distributing the lawyers and putting them on the staffs of bureaus or other units. Other dangers arise from such an organizational arrangement, however. The opposite extreme, of attaching all lawyers to the attorney general's office, as is done in some states, probably also avoids the danger that the legal staff will become the "eyes and ears" of the agency head, since the attorney general is presumably almost as remote from him as from the bureaus. Here again, however, other risks are run. While the question is surely debatable, I believe that the best balance is struck, at least in an agency of substantial size, by making the legal staff responsible directly to the agency head.

a series of conditions to its proffer of federal grants-in-aid to the states. One of the conditions requires that the state grant a fair hearing to any applicant who is denied assistance; others look to uniform application of the plan throughout the state, to equitable treatment of persons in differing economic situations, and to the safeguarding of information about applicants and recipients; while the definition of assistance as "money payments" calls for the giving of cash with no strings attached.

"Fair hearing" is essentially a legal concept. Equity among recipients and their freedom from the almoner's control, as well as some of the other principles expressed in the federal act, have a strong legal flavor. In the evolution of all these provisions legal thinking has necessarily played an important part, and not merely in determining what interpretations and what courses of action are legally open to the administrators. Within the range of their discretion the Social Security Board and the Commissioner for Social Security have been developing and applying policies of which the law and legal policy are an integral part, and in the shaping of which legal thinking has been an essential ingredient. By the same token, state and local agencies administering public assistance have had need of lawyers to help them put these and other new concepts into practice.

Few other nonregulatory programs, perhaps, lean quite so heavily on the law as public assistance. Yet the difference is usually one of degree, and it may be less than appears on the surface.

The Children's Bureau, for example, because of limitations on financing and fewer statutory conditions of its grants, cannot go nearly so far in insisting on legal principles in state administration. Yet the very limitations of these programs are a challenge to do all that can be done toward the rule of law. Then, too, in its advisory role on such problems as adoption, guardianship, and juvenile delinquency, the Children's Bureau is constantly dealing with matters of which law is the warp and social policy the woof. Legal thinking plays a different part in the work of the Children's

Bureau from its part in public assistance, but hardly a less important one.

The field of public health is one where it might seem that the law has little to contribute to the development of substantive policies. But the policies of the Public Health Service now include, for example, the development of a draft state bill for the hospitalization of the mentally ill, the development of draft state legislation for the control of water pollution, and the promotion of fluoridation of public water supplies; these call for consideration, and sometimes delicate adjustment, of the competing interests in the promotion of the public health and in the safeguarding of the legal and constitutional rights of private citizens. The impact of these problems upon state and local governments, both as matters of health and as matters of law, must be even sharper than their impact upon the federal government.

Wise policies in areas such as these, and in many others in the field of health, can properly be shaped, even in their broadest outlines, only by a fusion of all the pertinent skills, among which those of the lawyer are not the least.

I could multiply examples. I could also cite programs where the role of the lawyer is less than it is in those I have mentioned. Yet I would say of the Federal Security Agency, and would suggest of other agencies of federal, state, or local government, that any program which deals extensively in any fashion with members of the public, or with other units of government, can profit from the infusion into its policy councils of some measure of legal thinking. Basic legal concepts should always be placed before the administrators to be weighed by them with other, and it may be competing, factors. No matter how broad the range of administrative discretion granted by Congress or a state legislature, or how dominant the non-legal considerations of policy, I believe that lawyers can contribute something toward sound exercise of the discretion and equitable treatment of the people it affects.

A government of laws should never be sacrificed unwittingly.

# Administrative Decentralization in the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation

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**I**N RECENT years Americans have become increasingly concerned with the greater concentration of power in Washington. More than a few ballots were marked for the candidate of the "challenger" party on last November 4 for no more specific reason than that the party in power had become identified with centralization. Yet there is considerable evidence of an important trend over the last decade toward the decentralization of administration in federal departments and agencies. Whether this trend came because of or in spite of the party in power is not the concern of this article. Its purpose is to consider briefly how one agency, the Bureau of Reclamation, moved during this period from a highly centralized to a decentralized and regionalized organization, and then to analyze and discuss some of its experiences with administrative decentralization.

There are several points to be made at the beginning by way of delimitation. First, this discussion will not be concerned with political decentralization, with the virtues and defects of a federal structure of government, but only with administrative decentralization within a government agency. Second, the unwary must be forewarned lest they assume that decentralization is synonymous with the existence of a large force of field officials. No more poignantly conclusive evidence to the contrary can be offered than the case of the New England postmaster who, following a severe snow storm which had catapulted a tree branch through the roof of his post office, sat the next day amidst a snow drift within the building and penned a note to Washington requesting permission to use money from his service fund to

have the hole in the roof repaired.<sup>1</sup> The Post Office Department has headquarters in Washington and a far-flung field force, but this postmaster knew only too well that the Post Office Department is not decentralized. Delegation of authority to the field is the stuff of which decentralization is made. Third, this article is concerned primarily with decentralization by area rather than along functional lines.<sup>2</sup>

## *Balance in Administrative Decentralization*

**T**HREE are clearly important values to be attained by centralization just as there are equally important, although sometimes competing, values to be gained by decentralization. Losing the values of centralization can be considered one of the costs of administrative decentralization. The problem, then, can be posed as one of weighing values and costs in

<sup>1</sup> C. Lester Walker, "So They're Re-doing the Post Office," 202 *Harper's* 39 (June, 1951).

<sup>2</sup> Decentralization along functional lines implies that each functional division in the organization maintains its own field service, staffed and directed by specialists, carrying on their own activities independent of the field staffs of other functional divisions in the same agency. Decentralization by area calls for reproducing in each major field-service area a miniature of the central headquarters. The head of this "regional" office is usually charged with directing and coordinating the same functions that the bureau chief is responsible for, but the regional head's authority applies only within his limited geographic area. Macmahon, Millett, and Ogden in their study of federal work relief used the terms decentralization by specialty and decentralization by hierarchy, respectively. Arthur W. Macmahon, John D. Millett, and Gladys Ogden, *The Administration of Federal Work Relief* (Published for the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council by Public Administration Service, 1941), pp. 244-45.

order to strike the "right" balance. One mark of the competent executive is his ability to perceive this optimum equilibrium between decentralization and centralization where maximum values are attained at minimum costs. Clearly, centralization and decentralization in public administration are matters of degree and not absolutes. As James W. Fesler has remarked: "The task is one of statesmanship in achieving the proper balance . . . , not one of standing up to be counted either for centralization or for decentralization."<sup>3</sup>

Many different aspects of the search for this balance in headquarters-field relations are worthy of investigation. Only three important aspects will be considered here: finding balance in the formulation and adaptation of policy, in the supervision of operations, and in improving administrative efficiency.<sup>4</sup> In each of these areas the values and costs of decentralization can be stated as a troublesome dilemma confronting the administrator. The job of finding effective equilibrium among the alternatives in these dilemmas cannot be left to chance, or to the natural wisdom and good will of the participants. There is bound to be a "headquarters" point of view and a "field" point of view, each sincerely and ardently held, and generally in conflict. Effective equilibrium is likely to grow out of accommodation of both points of view.

The three critical dilemmas to be considered in this discussion may be defined briefly as follows:

<sup>3</sup> *Area and Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1949), p. 62.

<sup>4</sup> There is a considerable body of literature on administrative decentralization, including a number of efforts to describe its advantages and disadvantages. The following have proved particularly useful in this discussion: George C. S. Benson, "A Plea for Administrative Decentralization," 7 *Public Administration Review* 170-78 (Summer, 1947); James W. Fesler, "Field Organization" in Fritz Morstein Marx, *Elements of Public Administration* (Prentice-Hall, 1946), pp. 264-93; James W. Fesler, *Area and Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1949), especially pp. 49-72; M. George Goodrick, "Integration vs. Decentralization in the Federal Field Service," 9 *Public Administration Review* 272-77 (Autumn, 1949); John D. Millett, "Field Organization and Staff Supervision" in L. D. White and Others, *New Horizons in Public Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1945), pp. 96-118; and David B. Truman, *Administrative Decentralization* (University of Chicago Press, 1940), especially pp. 1-20.

**The Policy Dilemma: flexible adjustment to local conditions vs. national uniformity.** Decentralization ensures that important decisions will be made close to the area directly affected. John Gaus has long pleaded for such "an ecological approach to public administration," emphasizing the logic of the situation, building "quite literally from the ground up."<sup>5</sup> While it encourages experimentation to meet local needs more adequately, it also challenges national uniformity in the interpretation and application of policy. The influence of local pressures may force decisions contrary to national interests. Headquarters personnel are still fully responsible for the consequences of decisions made in the field; therefore, there must be controls over the exercise of discretionary authority by field officials. Yet, can controls be designed consistent with the goals of decentralization?

**The Dilemma of Supervision: area integration vs. technical control.** Decentralizing along areal lines provides a sound basis for integrating field activities under a regional generalist with the same kind of management responsibility for his limited area that the bureau chief carries for the whole national program. Such integration makes for more effective teamwork, economy in housekeeping staff, and better co-ordination in service to the public, but it weakens the control and influence of functional specialists. It is absurd to say that the soils technician in the field should look to a regional general administrator for direction of his work rather than to the soils specialists at headquarters. The only guarantee for high quality performance lies in direct supervision and control exercised by outstanding specialists at headquarters.

**The Efficiency Dilemma: simplified channels and speed vs. the avoidance of administrative errors.** An agency, through decentralization, can greatly simplify its administrative procedures, cutting down the volume of headquarters-field communication and speeding up the process of decision-making. Headquarters can then concentrate upon its major responsibility of formulating top policy and maintaining liaison with the Congress, while field officials can experiment with field organization

<sup>5</sup> John M. Gaus, *Reflections on Public Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1947), p. 9.

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and administrative techniques, finding ways to use their resources more efficiently. But such decentralization opens the floodgates to local abuses and errors of judgment. Favoritism in appointments and promotions, illegal purchases, substandard work performance, and waste may all be occurring without detection. The only way to avoid such evils is to multiply controls—have more inspections, detailed manuals for field guidance, conferences, and a stream of reports from the field. But such devices subvert the meaning of decentralization, greatly increase the work load on headquarters, and destroy field initiative.

These three dilemmas encompass many of the most serious difficulties the Bureau of Reclamation has encountered in its search for balance in decentralization. This search in recent years has been significantly conditioned by the program heritage and organizational traditions of the Bureau personnel. The following paragraphs sketch briefly some highlights in Reclamation's past and the factual story of its transition to regional decentralization.

### *Formative Years for Reclamation's Program and Organization, 1902-1942*

FEDERAL reclamation of arid western lands gained acceptance as sound public policy around the turn of the century in an era of contagious optimism. Sponsors and supporters of the Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Stat. 388) were in large part farsighted conservationists and sincere democrats caught up in the enthusiasm of the Progressive Movement. To many the program was first an extension of the homestead policy, designed to recover vast acres of the public domain for settlement by homesteaders. The legislation created a revolving fund out of proceeds to be derived from the sale of western public lands and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to use this fund in locating and constructing irrigation works in the seventeen western states and territories. Settlers on reclamation projects could purchase no more than 160 acres and were to repay into the fund the proportionate cost of developing their acreage.

From 1902 to 1924 major attention was given to the trial-and-error process of perfecting an organization for carrying out the new

program.<sup>6</sup> The Reclamation Service, as it was called, experimented briefly with a field organization built on separate "districts" for the major river basins, then moved to five large regions each under a single supervising engineer. At the headquarters level, the Service tried single leadership and board leadership with first a five-man commission and then a three-member group. The commission provided broader consideration of policy matters but failed to furnish the essential unified direction for an active construction program. In 1915, therefore, a central field office was established in Denver, Colorado, to direct operations within policies established by the commission sitting in Washington. At the same time the regional structure was abandoned and all project engineers and other field officials (except district counsel) were required to report to the director of the reclamation service through the chief of construction, as the head of the Denver office was designated. Denver thus became the real operational headquarters of the organization. In time there was a return to single leadership, and in 1923 the Service was redesignated the Bureau of Reclamation and its head, the commissioner of reclamation.

During these two decades of organizational experimentation, major emphasis in operations had been given to the engineering aspects of the program. The immediate job in 1902 was to build dams and dig canals. These engineering structures tended to become ends in themselves in the minds of many on the Bureau's staff. Indeed it required the near exhaustion of the reclamation fund and acute distress among the settlers to bring the Bureau and the Congress to grips with the economic and social aspects of the reclamation program. The Bureau obtained its first nonengineer commissioner (an Idaho businessman) in 1923 in order to place more emphasis on working out the economic problems, and a few weeks later the Secretary set up a Committee of Special Advisers to study Bureau policies and operations. The so-called "Fact Finders' Report"<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup>See Murray L. Cross, *Organization and Development of Bureau Organization* (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Office of the Chief Counsel, undated). This typewritten manuscript contains an excellent account of the Bureau's organizational development in the early years.

<sup>7</sup>*Federal Reclamation by Irrigation, A Report Sub-*

issued by this committee led to the establishment of a director of farm economics at Denver and to the extension of the authority of the director of finance over all "business operations" at the project level. The objective was to work more closely with project settlers on agricultural problems and also to try to improve their repayment record. Conflict developed almost at once over the confused and overlapping relationship between the chief engineer and director of finance in their supervision of project personnel. Within a year the Finance Division was moved from Denver to Washington, its nonaccounting functions transferred to the chief engineer. All employees at the project level were made responsible to a project superintendent who reported directly to the chief engineer.

It is significant that through all these organizational permutations the stature of the chief engineer grew steadily. His responsibility for directing project activities was a natural outgrowth of the initial concentration upon construction work and the lessons learned from experiments with multiheaded leadership. By 1924 there was a clear division of function between Denver and Washington. While the commissioner formulated policy, exercised over-all guidance throughout the Bureau, and maintained necessary liaison with the Congress, the President, and other executive agencies, the chief engineer really controlled execution of the program. Gradually over the years the chief engineer built up a high *esprit de corps* among Reclamation engineers. These men became in a sense the elite among Bureau employees. As they developed their skills they were frequently moved about from one construction job to another, progressing to more and more responsible posts. A great majority of the Bureau's employees thus continued to look to Denver as their headquarters and the chief engineer as the one and only "chief." To many the commissioner seemed like a Washington representative of the "chief" attending to the troublesome details of financing the construction program.

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mitted to the Secretary of the Interior by the Committee of Special Advisers on Reclamation (S. Doc. No. 92, 68th Cong., 1st sess.). This outstanding report is generally recognized as a major turning point in the evolution of reclamation policy.

From 1924 to the end of the 1930's the Bureau enjoyed considerable organizational stability, but the reclamation program, by contrast, was in a state of constant ferment. The Fact Finders' Report in 1924 launched major efforts to resolve some of the critical social and economic problems which had received only sporadic, stopgap attention earlier. At the same time the Bureau faced the possibility of working itself out of a job. Most of the relatively simple irrigation projects were already under construction and the Bureau's engineers were finding it increasingly difficult to locate areas where development was economically feasible.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the reclamation fund was largely exhausted.

Reclamation's engineers found the way out of this dilemma of diminishing financial resources and shrinking opportunities for development when they pushed ahead in their investigation of the Boulder Canyon Project on the lower Colorado River. The answer was multiple-purpose planning—the harnessing of rivers for flood control, for irrigation, and for the production of hydroelectric power. Revenues from leasing power production rights or from direct sale of power would reduce the repayment obligation of the irrigators enough to make the project economically feasible. Multiple-purpose planning thus opened a whole new frontier for development. Hydroelectric power became known in Bureau circles as the "paying partner" of irrigation; project investigations abandoned earlier as lacking in feasibility were resurrected and revised to follow the multiple-purpose pattern.

Economic depression and the dramatic ef-

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\* The Reclamation Act itself had been made more restrictive by amendment. Originally the Secretary of the Interior was given authority to determine the economic feasibility of proposed projects, to authorize them for construction, and to make expenditures from the reclamation fund for this work. When settlers on the first projects began to default on their construction payments and petition for relief, the Congress undertook belatedly to curb the tendency of the Bureau to spread itself too thin, attempting too many new projects before completing any. Thus, in 1910 Congress provided that henceforth new projects must be approved by the President before construction could begin (36 Stat. 835). Four years later Congress set up another control, this time in its own hands, requiring that in the future expenditures for the reclamation program should be made only out of annual appropriations by the Congress from the reclamation fund (38 Stat. 686).

forts of the Roosevelt Administration to deal positively with its problems also produced major changes in the reclamation program. With passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Reclamation suddenly found at its disposal a total of \$220,000,000. This sum was roughly equivalent to the aggregate expenditure made on federal reclamation of arid lands during the first thirty-one years of the program (1902-1933). For the next several years the Bureau continued to receive large sums from the Public Works Administration, and in 1938 the Congress restored the reclamation fund to solvency by diverting into it certain money accrued from the income of the naval petroleum reserves (*52 Stat.* 291, 318).

Multiple-purpose planning struck a responsive note in the philosophy of more positive government articulated by President Franklin Roosevelt. Comprehensive resource development through federal leadership was recognized as a means of obtaining two major national objectives: (1) the conservation and utilization of natural resources for the benefit of the people, and (2) expanding employment and business to lift the economy out of depression. The National Resources Board, and its successors, gave great encouragement to comprehensive resource planning, refining the multiple-purpose approach by adding the emphasis upon regionalism, stressing the importance of planning water resource development along drainage basin lines. All through the 1930's the Bureau of Reclamation pursued the development of multiple-purpose projects. Studies begun a decade earlier culminated in a whole series of major regional projects: the Columbia Basin Project, the Central Valley (California) Project, and the Colorado-Big Thompson transmountain diversion, all authorized between 1935 and 1940. Finally, in 1939 the Congress acted to write the general principle of multiple-purpose development into reclamation law.<sup>9</sup>

These substantive developments in the reclamation program are significant in this ex-

amination of administrative decentralization because to a considerable extent they forced the Bureau into a pattern of decentralization. The plight of project settlers demanded more and more attention to land classification, irrigation practices, farm demonstration activities—indeed to the whole economy of irrigated agriculture. Multiple-purpose projects proved more difficult to design and construct; they required more basic data. Furthermore, basin-wide planning inevitably meant closer contact (and sometimes conflict) with countless other governmental activities, federal, state, and local. Nor did the administrative and management aspects lag far behind in growing complexity. The Bureau's job in 1940 was infinitely bigger than it had been in 1924: bigger in scope—basin-wide, even region-wide—bigger in cost, more diversified in nature, and far more complicated technically. But the Bureau was still trying to carry on under its straight-line organization with authority centralized in the chief engineer. Finally, the Bureau's program was fast becoming political "dynamite." Its comprehensive projects made their impact felt upon the economy of entire regions. It was harder and harder to remain aloof from political controversy, yet Reclamation's field staff was ill trained to "build political fences," uninterested in public relations, and unaccustomed to developing local support.

#### *The Bureau Adopts Administrative Decentralization to Meet Its Expanding Responsibilities*

BY THE early 1940's, Secretary of the Interior Ickes and his Under Secretary had become convinced that the Bureau of Reclamation should be fundamentally reorganized to enable it to meet its expanding responsibilities. The reorganization effort they initiated is difficult to describe for it extended over several years and the proposed changes were installed piecemeal. Despite this halting approach, there were at least three fundamental objectives running through all the changes made: (1) to decentralize authority for work execution along regional lines; (2) to limit the authority of the chief engineer and his staff to the design and construction of new projects and major repairs or additions to existing projects;

\**53 Stat.* 1187. See especially Sec. 9(a). One observer has called this legislation "... a clearer expression of the essentially coordinated nature of all water control objectives than almost any other legislative expression of the Congress." Joseph S. Ransmeier, *The Tennessee Valley Authority* (Vanderbilt University Press, 1942), p. 27.

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and (3) to establish a functional type of organization operating on staff and line principles with direct line authority running from the commissioner to the regional directors.

Considerable opposition developed within the Bureau to all three of these basic objectives.<sup>10</sup> Many both inside and outside the Denver office evidenced understandable loyalty to the existing institutional pattern. Partisan supporters of the chief engineer looked upon the whole affair as an effort to "dehorn" their "chief." One member of the chief engineer's staff later testified that there was a widespread feeling that "the engineers have been pushed back in the corner."<sup>11</sup> For his part Chief Engineer S. O. Harper strongly supported regionalization but only within a straight-line organization centering in the Chief Engineer's Office. Shortly before retirement in 1944 he expressed his feelings openly:

. . . I think it [regionalization] is a fine step forward. . . . I must say, however, that I have been and always will be unalterably opposed to the change made in Denver in splitting up the single-headed organization . . . and substituting for it a five- or six-headed group with no directing head.<sup>12</sup>

Commissioner of Reclamation Page for his part was reluctant to carry through any reorganization calling for decentralization and the chief engineer's vigorous opposition to the proposals strengthened his convictions. But the pressure from the top was strong. When the

first tentative plan did not go into the question of regional decentralization, the Secretary and his departmental advisers insisted that the Bureau "should proceed immediately to regionalize its activities, leaving in Denver only service functions such as design and construction, and perhaps some central accounting or auditing duties."<sup>13</sup>

A plan of reorganization was finally agreed upon and approved by Secretary Ickes on December 24, 1942. It provided for (1) three major branches—investigations and planning, design and construction, and operation and maintenance; and (2) five (later six) regional offices to be established in the seventeen western states. The regional offices were to concentrate on planning and development activity and supervise the operation and maintenance of completed projects. The Chief Engineer's Office, renamed Branch of Design and Construction, was responsible for designing works; and for directing, coordinating, and supervising construction and power operation and maintenance activities.

Implementing the reorganization proposals proved to be a long and difficult job requiring constant effort by the many in the Bureau who really wanted to see decentralization succeed. The commissioner in his *Annual Reports* frequently called attention to the difficulty in wartime of obtaining qualified personnel for the important regional jobs created. Yet decentralization demanded regional directors and regional staffs fully competent to carry out the heavy responsibilities assigned to them. An Office of Management Planning was established to provide technical guidance in setting up new organizational units and devising procedures. Patterns of cooperative activity had to be worked out to knit together the more complicated line and staff structure. The functional branches, except Design and Construction, were moved to Washington under the watchful eyes of the commissioner and his management staff.

In carrying out the reorganization, the Bureau made certain additional adjustments toward greater decentralization and a further narrowing of the chief engineer's authority. A

<sup>10</sup> Much of this controversy was later reported in hearings held by the Harness Investigating Committee of the 80th Congress. *Investigation of Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior*, Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Subcommittee . . . on Publicity and Propaganda of Federal Officials (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948). Secretary Ickes' position is candidly revealed in a speech he made in 1946 at the Bureau of Reclamation Conference of Regional and Branch Directors with the Commissioner's Staff. He described his attitude as follows: "However, among other things, I found that the Bureau of Reclamation [in 1940] while it was supposed to be set up here in Washington was, in effect, operating from Denver . . . it struck me that we had a case of the tail wagging the dog. . . . I had two objectives in mind: One, to get away from Denver; and two, to give a localization to the operations of the Bureau which I thought would be of advantage to the Bureau and would get us better results." Quoted in the Harness Committee Hearings, pp. 651-52.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 681.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 655-66.

<sup>13</sup> This statement is contained in a *Memorandum* (untitled) from Under Secretary Fortas to Secretary Ickes, dated October 26, 1942.

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separate Branch of Power Utilization was provided, taking over responsibility for the power program, except for design and construction. The regional director's responsibilities for basic program planning and budgeting were gradually clarified. As a result he had more tools with which to formulate and execute a comprehensive reclamation program in his region, for the annual budget and program plans encompassed design and construction activities. But the chief engineer was still responsible for directing these phases of the program.

As late as March, 1945, the Secretary's staff management advisers were still sharply critical of what they called "two basically different organizational proposals being currently developed within the bureau."<sup>14</sup> One was the regional organization, and the other "an effort to maintain the previous status quo wherein all field work would be handled under the direction and control of the Chief Engineer." Despite this penetrating criticism, however, the commissioner was able to win secretarial support for his position "that the responsibility for the technical aspects of design and construction work should remain in the Chief Engineer, and therefore, authority for this work should also be vested in the Chief Engineer."<sup>15</sup> Secretary Ickes in approving this policy charged the commissioner and the chief engineer with joint responsibility to see that wherever practicable design and construction authority would be delegated to regional directors. This decision set the pattern and confirmed for the chief engineer the dual role of staff and line official which he fills today.

Pressure for reorganization had been set off by the significant growth of reclamation policy during depression years. This growth was basically a reaffirmation of the fundamental objectives established in the Reclamation Act of 1902—to conserve water resources for full utilization in the public interest, promoting

the stability of the family farm, building and safeguarding homes. Multiple-purpose planning was a new technique developed to serve those goals. Administrative decentralization has been conceived of in the Bureau as another technique to serve those goals by relating the reclamation program more closely to the people it serves. The soundness of this conception depends very considerably on the success of Reclamation's continuing search for equilibrium in decentralization.

### *Reclamation's Search for Balance in Administrative Decentralization*

THE Bureau's experience over the past ten years provides ample evidence of the dynamic character of the process of reorganization. The significant developments have come slowly, often involving change in the attitudes of large numbers of Bureau personnel and the development of new working patterns. Recharting the formal structure is only the beginning of reorganization. The heart of reorganization lies in the process of adjustment as individuals and working groups search out a new position of equilibrium to accommodate the alterations in formal organizational environment around them. But, how has the Bureau fared in working out its adjustment to the three dilemmas of decentralized administration identified earlier? The Reclamation staff at all levels is alive with ideas on this score; it is possible here to consider only a few of them briefly, attempting to give some impressions of the search for balance.

*The Policy Dilemma.* Reorganization has accomplished two major changes in the division of responsibility for formulating policy: (1) responsibility for top policy decisions has been moved from Denver to Washington (for all but design and construction); and (2) major authority has been delegated to regional directors for making operating policy decisions, particularly in project planning, in scheduling and accomplishing construction, and in operating and maintaining projects. But this division of responsibility has been flexible in application; any danger of a gulf developing to separate headquarters and top policy-making from those who plan and carry out the program has been avoided by bringing the re-

<sup>14</sup> *Appraisal of the Organization and Staff Proposed by the Bureau of Reclamation.* This undated and unsigned report is attached to *Organization Charts and Staffing Plan—Bureau of Reclamation*, a memorandum from Vernon D. Northrop, director, Division of Budget and Administrative Management, to Secretary Ickes, dated March 27, 1945.

<sup>15</sup> This information is contained in a *Memorandum* (untitled) from Under Secretary Fortas to Secretary Ickes, dated April 3, 1945.

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gional directors increasingly into policy discussions at headquarters. Thus the broad policy framework within which the Bureau functions has become progressively more sensitive to the needs of those responsible for program execution. Not only the functional specialists, but also men informed on regional resources, conversant with regional political pressures, and aware of regional needs and desires join in advising the commissioner on policy.

The annual policy conference illustrates the kind of machinery which makes this possible. This conference brings together a group of some fifteen to eighteen persons—regional directors, functional division heads, and the commissioner's immediate staff—to meet in executive session for several days thrashing out major policy problems and reaching realistic conclusions. At the first such conference in 1950, regional directors and division heads submitted items for the agenda in advance. The Office of Management Planning prepared the agenda, setting up separate committees of three or four persons (including both regional officials and division heads) to consider each of the more complex problems and to lead the discussions on it. Following the conference, "study assignment groups" were set up to continue working on certain problems. Their recommendations were later circulated to all who had attended the conference with instructions to review them carefully with their staffs and submit comments.

This participation by regional and functional leaders in basic policy discussions out of which decisions come demonstrates the Bureau's continuing effort to develop its pattern of regional policies and programs within the over-all framework of national policy and a national program. In this scene the regional director is the key figure, for he is at once a regional official *and* a national official (as a member of the commissioner's "board of directors"). He contributes the knowledge of his region and the practical insights of the responsible operating official. He derives from these discussions something of the Bureau-wide perspective, the consciousness of a national program into which he must fit his regional program.

It is instructive, too, to examine the relationship of regional and headquarters officials in

operating policy decisions. Here the pattern varies somewhat among the Bureau's three fields of activity (project planning, design and construction, and operation and maintenance). While major authority has been delegated to the field in all three areas the positions of the functional divisions differ. Thus the head of the functional Division of Design and Construction also has major line responsibility which circumscribes the regional director's authority in this area. Perhaps the clearest relationship has been worked out in the area of project planning investigations. Here the regional director is primarily responsible for initiating, conducting, and completing the investigation; headquarters participates most actively in the review and revision of the final report.

In most cases these investigations are begun in answer to some strong local request, frequently accompanied by funds advanced by local interests. In this situation decentralization of authority to initiate field studies ensures that local needs will receive attention in the investigation stage. The regional director must also plan the regional program of investigation work, determining priorities among studies to be made. The actual field investigation work is carried on by project planning personnel at district and area planning offices under rather close supervision by the regional planning engineer and his staff. Upon completion of the study a report is prepared for the regional director to submit to headquarters, containing the considered judgment of the regional staff as to the feasibility of the project. Before acceptance, this project plan report must "run the gauntlet" of all the other regional directors, functional division heads, and the commissioner's immediate staff.

This clearance process accomplishes several important things. First, it ensures that projects recommended for authorization have been fitted into the national reclamation program. If the regional director has succumbed to strong local pressures in initiating an investigation, this requirement of clearance at least delays action and may lift him and the Bureau "off the hook." Second, clearance makes possible better coordination within the Bureau itself. For example, the commissioner's top adviser in project operations has a chance to re-

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view the adequacy of arrangements for land classification or the calculation of repayment ability. Third, clearance provides a way for evaluating performance of an important segment of the Bureau's field staff and determining whether fundamental Bureau policies in the area of project planning are being applied properly.

On the negative side there are still complaints from some, particularly in the field, that headquarters specialists are guilty of "over-reviewing," going into too many details, and even rechecking routine mathematical calculations. This kind of review adds to the lengthy period of time required to "clear" a report through headquarters. More serious is the occasional charge that Washington officials sometimes actually redraft the substance of project plan reports in the course of reviewing them. Much of this criticism may be considered the natural resentment of field personnel to headquarters control. But even so, it suggests one area that will bear watching if the Bureau is to achieve further progress toward balance in the making of operating policy decisions.

*The Supervision Dilemma.* The Bureau has openly and clearly taken a stand for the principle of dual supervision. Official policy as expressed in Volume I of the *Bureau of Reclamation Manual* conceives of line responsibility in the following terms:

A. Line officers are those officials who are charged with all the responsibilities of one organizational level (or sublevel) of the Bureau, including the direction of a lower level or sublevel, if any. . . .<sup>28</sup>

The concept of the role of staff officers is revealed in the *Manual* statement on technical supervision:

Technical supervision . . . is the responsibility of a staff officer to see that his functional specialty is carried out properly at lower organizational levels. It is the authority to observe, appraise, interpret, and advise. It does not include the authority to issue orders or to direct any officer, line or staff, in a lower organizational level. If a staff officer believes it necessary to have orders issued, he recommends the issuance of the order by his line officer.

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Department of the Interior, *Bureau of Reclamation Manual*, Vol. I, Organization and Administration, Chap. 2.3.2.

Thus, technical supervision does not conflict with the chain of command, while at the same time it enables specialized knowledge to be transmitted readily throughout the Bureau.<sup>29</sup>

The effective operation of such a complicated system depends upon the good will of line and staff officials at all levels, and their continued willingness to give and take in day-to-day personal relations. There remains the confusing "twilight zone" between line and staff functions. The *Manual* hardly helps to clarify the situation when, after stating clearly that staff officers have no authority to issue orders or direct anyone at a lower organizational level, it goes on to put some teeth into staff advice, providing:

Technical advice rendered by a staff officer to a lower level of organization may not be disregarded by the line officer (or his staff representative) to whom the advice is given. The line officer must either follow the technical advice or refer the matter with his objections to a common superior for resolution. However, a staff officer may give informal advice with the understanding that it may be disregarded; it need not be specifically labeled as such so long as it is otherwise clear that the advice was rendered on that basis.<sup>30</sup>

Despite these difficulties in defining the staff-line relationship in meaningful terms, the Bureau has made definite progress in integrating line supervision and staff supervision. Several factors have helped in the slow process of changing the ingrained habits of the many functional specialists who were previously line officials under the chief engineer: (1) the growing stature of regional directors as demonstrated by their increasing role in major policy decisions; (2) the movement of functional divisions from Denver to Washington; and (3) the continued pressure which the commissioner, his assistant commissioners, and his management advisers have exerted upon staff officers to confine their activities to functional supervision. Rough spots still exist as, for example, the staff tendency to "over-review" field reports, or occasional cases of a headquarters division head bypassing the regional director to deal directly with a project official. There is even some evidence of similar tendencies

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Chap. 2.3.3.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. I, Chap. 2.3.3c.

among regional staff personnel. Nevertheless, for the most part Reclamation has moved ahead toward finding a satisfactory balance that assures basic integration of field activities through decentralization to regional directors, yet maintains uniform high standards of technical performance through expert supervision.

The same degree of progress cannot be reported, however, in fitting the chief engineer and his Division of Design and Construction effectively into this line and staff organization. Since 1943 the chief engineer has been both the commissioner's top staff specialist on engineering design and construction and the line officer responsible for directing major design work and for representing the commissioner in contract negotiations and contract administration. These dual responsibilities have three serious consequences.

First, the project construction engineer has two line bosses. He answers to the regional director for keeping work on schedule and administering routine project affairs; he is the chief engineer's representative for dealing with the contractors and thus responsible to him for supervising construction. On occasion these project heads find themselves trapped between conflicting instructions from their two bosses. They must continually fret over the practical necessity of clearing proposals with both Denver and the regional office "just to be on the safe side." Even where no overt incidents develop, the uncertainty of the situation impairs morale and saps the efficiency of the whole organization.

Second, the regional director, a responsible operating official, is denied control over a major operation for which he is still held responsible. He must live with the project and with the water users, who are in a real sense his clients; yet he cannot control the design of major engineering works or their construction. He is seriously handicapped in his efforts to hold down project costs and yet ensure adequate and sound structures. If the Denver office is guilty of "over-designing" a project now and then, as some have claimed, he still does not have clear authority to require modification of the "fancy extras."

Third, the Division of Design and Construction is forced by necessity to concern itself almost entirely with operating functions—de-

signing specific structures and administering construction contracts. One of its primary responsibilities, according to official Bureau policy, should be to serve as the commissioner's expert staff on design, working out design standards and exercising technical supervision over field design work to improve compliance with these standards; but there is little time for such activities. Indeed, one of the explanations offered by Design and Construction officials for failure to delegate more design authority to the regions is that not enough work has yet been done on developing standard designs for reclamation structures.

The Bureau is making some progress in working toward a better balance in this situation. Much credit goes to the present chief engineer who has probably made the present system work more effectively than could any other engineer in the Bureau. His willingness to work closely with regional directors, to negotiate and compromise where necessary, has opened the way gradually to increasing delegations of design authority to the regions. The development of some design standards, particularly for the simpler and less costly items, has also helped; and some regions have aided their own cause by building up better field design staffs.

There remains the problem of stabilizing the work load of the centralized design staff. As long as the decision to delegate or not is made in Denver, there will be a great temptation to use this authority to ensure a steady work load for the Denver office. This often means fluctuation in the design work load at the regional level, making it all the more difficult to build up a staff warranting the confidence of the chief engineer's office. This design delegation issue indicates clearly that there are thorny problems yet to be resolved before an effective balance is attained between regional integration and functional supervision.

*The Efficiency Dilemma.* In discussing the Bureau's search for balance in administrative management there are three particular areas to be surveyed: flexibility in organizational structure, efforts to encourage self-improvement, and control techniques.

The Bureau of Reclamation has developed a rather happy balance between uniformity

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and flexibility in organizational structure. Regional office organization is largely standardized, reflecting rather closely the headquarters pattern. Staffing, however, tends to vary according to the characteristics of the regional program. Below the regional level neither the organizational pattern nor the number of sub-regional levels is uniform. Regions with a heavy construction program (for example, Regions 6 and 7 directing the Bureau's program in the Missouri Valley) tend to set up district offices between the projects and the regional office. Regions with a major investigation program and little construction activity are not likely to create districts; instead, the regional office deals directly with project offices and perhaps sets up area planning offices in the field to carry on the investigations. Some regions have established river control offices to conduct research in stream flow, sedimentation, and related problems of water control; other regions carry on such activities out of the regional headquarters. Certain regions have merged the operation and maintenance staff with the project planning staff at the project level to form a division of operation and development. By permitting this flexibility the Bureau has encouraged experimentation in structural arrangements. The resulting field organizations are designed to fit the specific needs of the area, not the "chart drafters" in Washington.

The Bureau has put on a major drive over the last few years to encourage regional self-improvement through systematic self-analysis.<sup>19</sup> Freedom to experiment with different patterns of organization is a worth-while policy only if the regions are continually studying their work, their structure, and their performance with a constant eye to self-improvement. A number of interesting techniques for self-evaluation through management audits have been developed.

Region 2 (Central Valley) has experimented with joint technical-administrative reviews of field offices, initiated and conducted by the

technical supervisory personnel in the regional divisions. By systematically interviewing the field office staff, the audit team of regional supervisors attempts to assess the quality of supervision and assistance given by its own division and at the same time evaluate operating performance in the field office. The audit is focused upon identifying and solving problems, but perhaps its most important result is greater management consciousness among the technical specialists conducting the survey and those being interviewed. During the first trial year eleven such reviews were conducted in Region 2 with significant progress toward improving supervisory techniques as well as operating methods.

In Region 5 another type of audit, the "self-analysis survey," has proved very useful in examining in detail the total performance of a project staff from top management to the ditch riders. The total job to be done on the project is analyzed and broken down into its component parts or "activity factors." These factors become the units of measurement and evaluation. For top management the list might include such items as planning, organization, and public relations. With the help of the project head and his advisers, the activity factors are weighted to show their importance to the total job. Next, each factor is analyzed in consultation with those responsible for carrying it on. Check points, or indicators, reflecting quality of performance are identified and measured to disclose strengths and weaknesses in performance. The ratio between these strengths and weaknesses, and the relative weight of the factor, are combined to give a rough quantitative indication of how well the activity is performed. This process is valuable not because it produces a precise score evaluating performance, but because it forces project officials to think systematically and analytically about their work. Weaknesses are disclosed and ways to overcome them can be identified more readily. The whole staff is afforded a comprehensive view of project operation leading to better coordination. Such self-analysis, if undertaken conscientiously, is almost certain to yield dividends in greater efficiency.

The Bureau also employs what it calls "staffing standards analysis" as a tool of self-

<sup>19</sup> See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Office of Management Planning, *Good Management; A Report on Improvement of Operations and Administration in the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, FY'51*, (September 4, 1951) and *Report on Management Improvement in the Bureau of Reclamation for Fiscal Years 1952 and 1953*, (undated).

evaluation. Each operating office and regional office is arranged on a master staffing analysis chart, showing for each type of work performed the present staff and its ratio to total employees in each office and to average work load. The line official in charge of an office can read the chart horizontally to find the staffing pattern in each functional unit throughout his organization. The staff officer by reading vertically can analyze staffing patterns for personnel engaged in his special function throughout the Bureau or any particular region. While the work-staff analysis chart does not pretend to present more than an over-simplified picture that ignores exceptional local conditions, it does provide kinds of comparative data tremendously valuable to every manager in his self-appraisal.

The other side of this coin of field initiative in self-improvement is the maintenance of Bureau-wide controls to guard against administrative errors. The heart of the Bureau's system of control is the machinery for program planning, designed to produce annually a six-year program setting forth the work to be done, the funds required to do it, and the dates for beginning and completing each phase. Field officers, under direct supervision from the regional staff, develop the data and lay out the program plan. Though it is reviewed carefully in the regional office and at headquarters, it remains primarily a field product. Once set up and approved, this program document becomes the standard used by region and headquarters to evaluate field performance. Where actions are not taken on schedule, this fact serves as evidence of potential trouble, calling for careful study either by the local office (self-analysis and trouble-shooting) or by the regional or headquarters staff. There is fairly general agreement throughout the field that this six-year program is probably the most useful single report or document developed in the Bureau of Reclamation.

In addition to control through programming, the Bureau relies upon conferences of all kinds, upon the *Manual*, and upon a system of field inspections and audits as control devices.

Conferences of functional staff personnel are used to clarify and interpret official policy,

to concentrate attention upon the development of performance standards, and, of course, to encourage a sharing of ideas and techniques. During the fiscal year 1951, seven divisions conducted conferences attended by headquarters personnel, their regional staffs, and sometimes by representatives from certain district and project offices.

The Bureau of Reclamation *Manual* is now in better shape to serve as a control device than heretofore. Credit goes to the Office of Management Planning for the job of reducing the former "twelve-foot bookshelf" of printed administrative regulations to comprehensible size. Today's *Manual* is only one-sixth as large, a real achievement in condensation. Of course, any codification of standing orders, accepted practices, and procedures has its limitations. It is not difficult to find criticism, especially in the field, that the *Manual* has been written by unrealistic technicians and has led to the substitution of "official" procedure for common-sense judgment. Such criticism is valuable as a constant spur to keep the *Manual* simple and direct. It must be written in language which means something to field personnel if it is to be an effective guide for and control over their activities.

There is an ever-present danger of overemphasizing control machinery in a decentralized organization. The Bureau has already built up an elaborate structure of review and clearance procedures, field inspections, and audits of various kinds which reduce the time and energy resources of field, regional, and headquarters personnel. It is easy for controls to become ends in themselves, especially to those who design the control machinery or make the inspections and audits. There is only one criterion to measure the worth of any control device: what does it contribute to the accomplishment of the organization's primary mission? And those who judge its worth should be the line officials directly responsible for accomplishing that mission, and not functional specialists. The control structure in any organization, Reclamation included, requires continuing attention from top management. The Bureau appears to have found a satisfactory balance, but controls can quickly mushroom unless watched closely.

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### Conclusion

RECLAMATION'S progress since 1943 toward workable decentralization has been noteworthy. Many Bureau officials believe the expanded program of the postwar years could not possibly have been planned and carried out successfully by the highly centralized organization of 1940.

Regional decentralization has distributed the supervisory work load; it has located planning authority in the hands of regional directors sensitive to the needs of their regions and in a position to develop balanced development programs based on priorities within those regions. Yet broad policy is still within national control and that control is made more flexible by the active participation of both regional and functional leadership in the development of basic policy. Major headway has been made in reconciling field integration of Bureau activities and adequate technical control, except

in the area of project design and construction. Here, although working relationships have improved steadily, there remain seeds of conflict and confusion constituting a continual drag on effective performance. It is to be hoped that the search for a solution to this problem will be pushed aggressively. Finally, in the area of administrative efficiency the Bureau has shown considerable originality. The regions and field offices have responded constructively to encouragement from headquarters, experimenting in organizational forms and techniques of self-criticism and self-improvement. This vitality of regional and field personnel is the best safeguard against "over-building" control machinery.

In short, the experience of the Bureau of Reclamation in seeking effective equilibrium in decentralized administration should prove a valuable guide to other agencies contemplating decentralization.

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### A View of the Whole

. . . the American public service is not a closed system. Government service is not an asylum. One moves from public service to private, or vice versa, with extreme ease. The state of mind and methods remain fresh; there is nothing that suggests the ivory tower. . . . The public service is certainly less isolated from the rest of the country than in Europe. . . .

On the other hand, there are few administrators who are trained to take the broader view of governmental problems. Their education does not contribute to that spirit necessary for planning, organizing, directing, and coordinating the public business. . . .

The dangers of such a situation . . . are evident to those who have had contact with the American bureaucracy. The presence of so many small "cogs" in such a gigantic machine makes it extremely unwieldy and sluggish. Americans try to find in "coordination" a way to mitigate the absence of personnel with a view of the whole. But it is doubtful whether such persons are possible without the guarantees of a career service.

—Roger Grégoire, "The American Public Service: A French View," 13 *Public Personnel Review* 58 (April, 1952).

# San Diego's 1951 Annual Report

By O. W. CAMPBELL

*City Manager  
City of San Diego*

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**T**HE city of San Diego has found a motion picture annual report a highly effective method for reaching a large audience. By conservative estimate the motion picture annual report of 1951 will reach at least ten times as many residents of the San Diego area as did the attractively illustrated printed annual report of 1950.

Several factors contributed to the decision to produce the 1951 annual report as a moving picture. It has been the custom for the city to have an exhibit each year at the San Diego County Fair, a colorful affair featured by many outstanding exhibits and events. City officials had become increasingly aware that static exhibits could cover only three or four of the city's many important activities; also, static exhibits make less impact on typical county fair crowds than some other forms of presentation. At the time officials were considering what might be done to enliven the county fair exhibit they were also exploring possibilities for making the city's next annual report more attractive. These circumstances combined to produce the idea of a motion picture annual report which would have its first showing at the county fair.

In view of San Diego's successful experience with a motion picture annual report, it may be of interest to describe some of the steps and problems in its production. When ideas for the report had been worked out, the city manager presented them to the city council for approval and the council passed a formal resolution authorizing the manager to enter into a contract for its production. The next step was to locate a competent producer. Anyone could shoot a half-hour of film; the problem was to secure an attractive production which would tell the city's story well, and to secure it at a reasonable cost.

The city manager's staff doubted that they would secure the talents they wanted in a producer through competitive bidding. They therefore secured suggestions of possible producers from local citizens engaged in advertising and public relations work who had had experience with moving picture productions. The San Diego representative of the Fox West Coast Theatres also made suggestions. The staff followed up on all suggestions, describing to the various producers the kind of film the city desired, viewing samples of documentary films they had produced, and evaluating the ability of each to deliver a finished package, including script-writing and professional narrating.

It was also important to secure the film at a reasonable cost. Proposals ranged from \$5,500 to \$18,000. Fortunately, a local resident with excellent qualifications was found who would produce the film for \$7,500—a low cost for a high-quality production. The fact that the producer could live at home while producing the film helped keep costs down. The producer was also versatile—he wrote the script, shot the film, and did his own editing. His staff was one part-time boy to handle equipment. Additional costs to the city were \$956 for the time devoted to the film by staff in the Office of the Budget who were responsible for liaison work and details in conjunction with the production of the film, and \$476 for four prints of the film. Thus, for a total expenditure of \$8,932 the city had a motion picture annual report in color which runs twenty-seven minutes and carries narration.

The general scope of the film was worked out by the city manager's staff and outlined in oral discussions with the producer. It was their purpose to reach as many citizens as possible with a straightforward, factual, nonpolitical

story of the city's government in order to promote a better understanding and appreciation of its problems and work. They prepared an outline of the activities they were especially anxious to have shown in the film. The picture was to include everyday scenes, such as the work of the fire and police departments and the job of refuse collection. It should also take citizens behind the scenes to view some of the little-known, but important, activities of the city.

On the basis of these discussions and his review of previous annual reports, the producer prepared a tentative script. This script was re-worked in conferences between the producer and the manager's staff and the resulting semi-final script was then reviewed by the city manager. The producer then prepared the final script and the "shooting" of scenes began.

In order that the picture would not be "dated" and so that it would be free of "political implications" it was decided to use actors rather than top city officials in the film. The actors who were used as stand-ins for the city council members and the city manager were local citizens of widely varying occupations who shared the hobby of acting in plays at the community "Old Globe" theater. The film also contains a number of "shots" of citizens enjoying city facilities or going about their daily business—people strolling in the park, children dipping their bare feet in a lily pool while sketching and girls riding on horseback through a city park, a change of the shift at the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Plant. A scene of a burning building and the work of the fire department was obtained from an amateur photographer who had taken a considerable footage of San Diego's worst fire of the year.

The picture does not employ the charts, graphs, and statistics common to annual reports, but it is believed that it makes the points usually presented by such devices in a more effective manner. Also, because the city's activities are closely identified with the lives of its citizens, the film gives a good idea of life in San Diego. Its title is "The City You Live In."

It cost \$2,450 more to produce the 1951 annual report in motion picture and show it at the county fair than to print and distribute 3,000 copies of the 1950 annual report and to

assemble a static exhibit for the county fair. Cost of producing the film was \$8,932. Cost of showing at the fair was \$1,232, which included rental of a tent, the hiring of three "beauty queen" attendants to usher and announce the time of showing outside the tent, and the printing of souvenir leaflets that contained some typical annual report facts and figures for distribution to the audience. Cost of producing and distributing the rather elaborate 1950 annual report which commemorated the centennial of San Diego's founding was \$4,776—printing and envelopes \$2,660 and salaries \$2,116.

On the basis of the cost per person reached by the two reports, the moving picture has been a bargain. It is estimated that the 3,000 copies of the 1950 printed report may have been read by something over 5,000 persons. The report received good newspaper publicity. It was available to the public upon request until the supply was exhausted. Copies were automatically mailed to a list of citizens who had requested copies of earlier annual reports or who were known to have a keen interest in governmental affairs. A number of copies were made available to the schools for classroom use. On the other hand, 28,000 persons viewed the 1951 film during the period of the county fair, June 26 to July 6. The film had been shown to 11,700 pupils in the public schools by the end of the year. Requests from civic clubs and various other groups had provided an adult audience of 4,170 in the four months immediately following the county fair and requests for showings indicated that the adult audience would more than double in the twelve-month period from the time of the county fair showing.

An effort has been made to sound out public opinion on the film. Questionnaires were distributed to persons viewing the film at the fair: of the 656 who deposited them, 4 registered adverse opinions. The verdict of 299 persons was "excellent"; 137 comments were so complimentary that the motion picture industry might call them "rave" notices. Verbal comments were to the effect that "now I have a better understanding about my taxes"; "all newcomers should have an opportunity to see the picture"; and "this should be shown in the

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schools." Current showings are drawing the same favorable comment.

The city has made no special effort to promote showings of the film, but spontaneous requests have kept all copies of the film busy. A good cross-section of the people of the city saw the picture at the fair and they have, in turn, initiated requests from service clubs, PTA groups, and other organizations. The U.S. Naval Air Station in San Diego borrowed a print of the film for two weeks and showed it daily to training groups. A city representative frequently is a member of an audience and may offer a few comments on the background and purposes of the film and answer questions.

The film has been shown in many places outside the city of San Diego. A number of government classes in California and other universities have viewed the film and it has gone to places as far away as Auckland, New Zealand. Any group, organization, or citizen who has a legitimate purpose may borrow the film. To date no request has been refused.

No charge is made for use of a print. When a print is sent outside the city, the city usually pays shipping cost to the destination and the

user pays the return cost. In a very few instances the city has furnished a projector and an operator for showing of the film, but the general arrangement is for the city to lend the film and the club or other group to furnish the projector, screen, and projectionist. Requests for the film may be made either to the Secretary of the City Council or to the City Manager's Office.

The San Diego City and the San Diego County school systems have purchased prints of the film for their visual aids libraries and other film libraries are currently considering acquiring a print. The firm that did the laboratory work on the original film produces additional prints at a current cost of \$149.00 each.

The idea of the San Diego city officials to produce the city's annual report as a film has proved most successful—it has told the city's story to more of its citizens than have prior printed reports, it is available to groups throughout the country to tell San Diego's story, and it promises to be useful for years to come.

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### The Trivia of Administration

In retrospect the controversy [over the payment for forage taken for the horses of the French and Continental forces in the American Revolution] is mildly amusing and without great consequence. But it illustrates one cardinal truth about government and administration. The apparent importance of an issue is no measure of the level of authority to which it may have to rise before it can be resolved. There is no method of delegation or ordering of responsibilities that can free the highest levels of authority from a certain share of the trivia of which much of life is composed. If we would free top levels of government from other than considerations of highest policy we will have to make some unprecedented changes in human nature. And we will have to discover some objective and unfailing method to equate for every issue its "importance."

—Lynton K. Caldwell, "A Battle of Bureaucrats—1781," *New York History*, April, 1952.

# Evolution of a Research Program on Weed Control

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**A**RICULTURAL losses from weeds, which have now reached an estimated five billion dollars annually, are equal to those from both insects and plant diseases.

This article reviews the factors that led to a recent expansion in federal-state weed research, the thinking behind the choice of a division in a research bureau as the proper administrative level for the work, and some of the concepts of the present program. It also examines certain administrative problems that are arising as the program moves forward.

## *Background*

**C**ROP losses from weeds first began to show up strikingly during World War I. They were especially alarming in the Grain Region and the Cotton Belt where big farm holdings were being increasingly mechanized and where persistent species of noxious annual and herbaceous perennial weeds had become established.

Many of these weed species were brought to this country during the nineteenth century by immigrants who carried their own crop seed for planting the new land. By 1900 the major weeds of Europe and many from Asia and other continents had gained a foothold in areas favorable for their growth. During the same period exploitative farming had paved

the way for aggressive native species to invade millions of acres of cropland.

An infestation of bindweed brought the problem to a head in the thirties. As often is the case the first solution attempted was through legislation. Several states in the Grain Belt passed laws requiring individual farmers to control the bindweed on their land and assessing penalties on those who failed to do so. Unfortunately, farmers did not know how to control the weed, and officials soon found the regulations could not be enforced. Their recognition of the seriousness of the problem led them to ask for research assistance.

A federal-state research program to find measures for the control of bindweed was initiated in 1935. The project, for which there was an appropriation of \$40,000, was placed under the direction of an agronomist in the Division of Cereal Crops and Diseases in the Bureau of Plant Industry of the United States Department of Agriculture. The small amount of weed research previously carried on in the Bureau had been in connection with studies in the Office of Botany designed to improve the grazing areas of public lands. In moving weed investigations to the Division of Cereal Crops and Diseases, Bureau officials were influenced by the fact that bindweed was most serious on land formerly planted to grains and that methods of control must be tied in with

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grain production. Possibly another factor was the effective pattern of cooperative work with the state agricultural experiment stations pioneered by leaders in the Division.

Eight states—California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Washington—joined with the USDA in organizing regional research to tackle bindweed. Preliminary conferences considered the work already in progress and mapped plans for strengthening it and initiating new investigations.

Cooperative arrangements between the USDA and the states followed a well-established pattern. Each cooperator agreed to a memorandum of understanding which defined objectives of the study and responsibilities of the participants. Specific operating procedures and lines of supervision were set up for the various work units.

There is no set pattern for the separate work units of a project. Each is designed to fit in with the facilities and personnel of the cooperating experiment station. In some cases they are manned by USDA scientists for whom the state provides office and laboratory space, land for field plots, and machinery for working them. The state's responsibility may also include professional, clerical, laboratory, and field assistants or the USDA may pay for part or all of the personnel in the unit. In some states, the USDA pays a part of the salary of a scientist on the station staff assigned to the cooperative work.

The administrative framework of a project was adequate for the combined studies on bindweed, and within five years the researchers had some satisfactory control methods for it. By that time, however, other weeds had gained headway and in some areas were responsible for greater crop losses than bindweed.

Increasingly aware of the difficulties of the weed problem and of the need to discuss it and endeavors of common interest, state regulatory officials took the leadership in setting up the first weed control conference organized in the United States. Federal-state scientists, representatives of chemical and farm machinery companies, and farmers assisting in the regulatory programs were asked to join the Western Weed Control Conference inaugurated in 1939. Annual meetings enabled workers to get

a clearer picture of the size and complexity of weed problems in the region, to enlist public interest in them, and to compare techniques and jointly plan cooperative projects in federal-state research to overcome weed infestations. In 1944 a similar conference was formed in the North Central States. The Northeastern Conference was organized in 1947 and the Southern Conference got under way the following year.

The first increase in funds came in 1947 when the USDA appropriation of \$46,000 was boosted to a little more than \$90,000. An important factor in the expansion was a dramatic new herbicide—2,4-D. Scientists working on fundamental studies of plant physiology at the Plant Industry Station, Beltsville, Maryland, during the war had first suggested its use. While researchers in the weed project were still making tests to determine the extent of its value the compound was placed on the market. Farmers did not wait for the tests to be completed. Thousands of them bought the powerful compound, and some suffered losses because research had not developed principles for its use.

The immediate task facing the researchers was to work out safe and effective methods for using potent compounds on a wide scale. Beyond that, the discovery that growth regulators could be used to control weeds opened up a wide avenue of study. The need for a broader structure of research was apparent.

### *Establishment of the Division of Weed Investigations*

IN ADDITION to the original bindweed project—gradually expanded over the years to include studies on other weeds in grains and on the new herbicides—a number of smaller research investigations had been initiated in the Bureau. These were concerned with the control of certain weeds in other crops—for example, alligator weeds in sugar cane, and grassy weeds in cotton. The studies were limited in scope in most cases, claiming the attention of a researcher who divided his time between the weed study and other duties. Neither he nor the division head who supervised him was interested in weeds primarily. The work was incidental to other crop re-

search. There was no formal arrangement by which the men giving part time to weed studies could discuss their common experiences and compare their findings with those of others working on related weed problems.

The situation called for a new administrative framework for weed investigations, in which several lines of scattered research could be brought together and weed research could be given the recognition its importance warranted. It should be a part of the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering since the study of weeds is essentially a plant subject. To dovetail into the organization, the expanded structure should be a division, since 1934 the Bureau's major administrative unit. At the time the decision on weed investigations was in the making there were ten plant divisions set up for the most part on commodity lines, three divisions of soils, and four of agricultural engineering. Plans for combined research are worked out by heads of the divisions. For the work in weeds to receive proper emphasis, it was necessary that it be represented by a leader on a par with the division heads. He must be in a position to view the whole function of weed research, to recognize problems in the order of their importance, and to give priority to the more serious ones.

Interested agricultural groups in the Grain Belt and the West made the first move to obtain a division of research. At their request a bill proposing the establishment of a weed division in the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering was introduced in Congress in June, 1947. The measure was opposed by Department officials on the grounds that the necessary authorization was already available, that this would be the only division in the Bureau established by specific legislation, and that the action might cause administrative difficulties in the future. They said the division would be organized as plans could be worked out and funds were available.

Beginning in 1948, additional funds for weed studies were included in appropriations under the Research and Marketing Act of 1946. In that year an RMA sum of \$60,500 was added to the regular appropriation of \$93,490. The following year an RMA appropriation of \$76,500 was added to the regular appropriation of \$98,930; and in 1950 RMA funds total-

ing \$116,700 were made available in addition to the regular appropriation of \$91,310.

The Division of Weed Investigations was inaugurated in January, 1950. In announcing the administrative decision to establish the Division, Dr. R. M. Salter, then chief of the Bureau said, "Reorganization does not mean any immediate marked expansion in resources. It does emphasize, however, that the importance and scope of weed research has progressed to a point where the interests of the program can now be handled most satisfactorily through a responsible organization on a par in all respects with other units handling functions similar in degree of importance."

#### *Administration of the Program*

TODAY we know that control of many of the persistent noxious weeds encroaching on our land is too big a job for individual farmers. Even so, the research program is based on the concept that good farming is the first step toward weed control, that it is cheaper to prevent weeds than to control them, and that much can be done to prevent weeds through seed certification, crop rotation, and other well-established practices.

Research on weeds can be done most effectively by pooling resources of the Division with those of other agencies in the USDA, with other federal agencies, with the state agricultural experiment stations, and with industry. A large body of fundamental studies in plant physiology, ecology, and chemistry must be carried on continuously if scientists are to come up with long-term answers to the weed problem.

Work in the Division is set up in seven projects. They are concerned with research on (1) weeds in field crops; (2) weeds in horticultural crops; (3) weeds on grasslands and range; (4) weeds associated with irrigated farming; (5) perennial weeds; (6) physiological characteristics of weeds; and (7) the evaluation of chemical herbicides.

Weed researchers work closely with the crop specialists. In approaching a number of problems the crop specialist has selected the varieties to be grown and the methods of culture, the weed man has chosen the chemicals or other controls to be evaluated. Experience has

shown that these relations must be developed cooperatively in man-to-man encounter and that they must be based on mutual confidence.

In addition to conducting basic research on plant physiology and the ecology of weeds, the Division works closely with the Bureau researchers who carry on fundamental studies of plant growth regulators and related compounds and with farm machinery specialists who are concerned with the design principles of new tools for applying herbicides and for other methods of weed control.

Departmentwise, weed research is coordinated through a departmental committee in which a representative of the Division meets with men from the Soil Conservation Service, the Forest Service, and the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine. The Division is responsible for reviewing all manuscripts prepared by USDA researchers on brush control. It cooperates in an advisory way with the Production and Marketing Administration, which is responsible for issuing labels when products have been thoroughly tested for approval under the pesticide regulatory act.

Cooperation with the Department of the Interior on research to control weeds in irrigation waters dates back to 1947 and provides an excellent example of harmonious working relationships between government agencies. An interdepartmental committee on weeds serves as a clearinghouse on subject matter and legislative proposals.

In evaluating new chemicals for herbicidal purposes, the Division obtains compounds from other agencies in the USDA and from the National Research Council, the Department of Defense, and many industries. Out of the screening studies are coming suggestions for synthesizing new compounds that may be of even greater value than those under study. Even more important may be the better understanding of the relationship between chemical structure and plant toxicity in families of compounds. The Division conducts these studies in cooperation with industry.

Following a long tradition of federal-state research, the Division has cooperative work in progress with eighteen state experiment stations. Although the work of the states must be directed primarily toward the solution of weed problems within their geographic boundaries,

findings may be applicable in other states. The Division assists the states in planning and co-ordinating research and in defining regional and national limitations of results. It helps in assembling annual data accumulated by all cooperators, summarizing the findings, and making them available to everyone concerned.

Several states are cooperating with the Division and with the Department of the Interior in the search for methods of controlling halogent, a poisonous weed now infesting 2 million acres of range land in the Inter-Mountain States.

To keep up with the rapidly growing literature on weeds and related subjects, the Division compiles a quarterly bibliography covering publications in this country and other parts of the world to which it has access. The compilation issued in July, 1952, listed 335 articles. The greatest number—69—dealt with physiological investigations. The bibliography is published in the new magazine *Weeds*, initiated in 1951 by members of the regional weed control conferences and others interested in weed research.

#### *Problems and Achievements*

AS ONE would expect, the more serious difficulties in administering weed research arise out of the size and scope of the weed problem itself. As the public becomes more aware of present losses and potential threats, great pressure is brought to bear for research to find immediate solutions. The fact that chemical herbicides are being developed at a phenomenal rate and that new ones are continually coming into the picture has intensified this pressure. On the surface it appears that we have wonderfully effective tools. All that is needed are practical measures for using them.

One of the major tasks is to get the time, manpower, and money to build up a reservoir of fundamental research, out of which may come the practical applications. The time element must be stressed. Basic studies cannot be hurried.

As L. M. Stahler pointed out at the 1951 North Central Weed Conference, "We have had neither time nor manpower to inquire into and to establish the underlying or basic reactions, causes, and principles associated with the discovery or development of new ma-

terials or new practices that we have fitted to practical field use. This is a real weakness in our research."

There is now considerable evidence that the chemical approach to weed control will require continuous research. As research gets the upper hand over one noxious pest, another moves in to dominate the scene. This has been strikingly demonstrated in the Ohio River Valley where wild cucumber, somewhat resistant to 2,4-D, replaced giant ragweed as the number one pest at the end of a two-year spraying program.

As in many other areas today, the big problem is getting and keeping trained personnel. The Division must compete with a rapidly expanding industry that wants men with the same broad training in agronomy, horticulture, botany, and chemistry.

The size of the job already calls for more travel—and more funds for travel—than are provided at this time. Mounting costs for re-

search make it necessary continually to revise plans to cope with them.

On the credit side of the ledger, weed research is now well established in the federal-state pattern. It is supported by a large group of well-informed men—regulatory officials, crop specialists, farm leaders, and people in the chemical and farm machinery industries. An example of the broad cooperative approach to the problem may be found in the remarkably uniform recommendations for field applications of herbicides prepared by research extension and regulatory agencies in the North Central Conference and used in some twenty states and Canadian provinces. This uniformity is particularly impressive in view of the fact that none of the compounds now most widely used were known to the weed specialists ten years ago. Today they help to control the weeds on more than 20 million acres of rich cropland.

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#### Administration Is Leadership

The notion was understandably prevalent that Mountin [Dr. Joseph W. Mountin, chief, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service, who died April 26, 1952] lacked the qualities of a practical administrator. He appeared largely indifferent to the mechanics of administration, a cause for complaint among those who supervised him and those whom he directed. Moreover, his administrative techniques often were far from the conventional mold. But if administration is defined as the ability to work with people on a problem and to bring out the best in them, he was an administrator of high order.

An uncompromising intellectual, Mountin attached himself to ideas more than to people. And yet he was able, through the sheer power of his ideas, to stimulate and fuse the interests of whole groups of people in getting a job done. He had the knack of recognizing a good idea when he saw one, of testing its validity, and of putting his own judgment and influence behind the sound idea and the person who conceived it.

Administration is leadership, and Joe Mountin was a real leader. Although he left more unfinished business on my desk than any two score of his contemporaries, we were helped to translate his ideas into action programs by the many restless spirits whom he had inspired. Many Public Health Service officers who themselves have become leaders bear the mark of his thinking and philosophy. He left a heritage of leadership.

—Thomas Parran, M.D., "A Career in Public Health," *67 Public Health Reports* 939 (October, 1952).

# Improvement of Management in the Federal Government

## Report to the President of the President's Advisory Committee on Management

### *Letter of Transmittal*

DECEMBER 18, 1952

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Although the functions you have assigned to this committee have not required the making of periodic reports, we should like to take the occasion of our final meeting to offer a few comments on the Government's management program. In carrying out the assignment you gave it 3 years ago this committee has enjoyed a unique opportunity to observe Government management and to appraise its quality. In this report we briefly summarize the Federal management problem as we have come to see it, describe recent steps that have been taken toward im-

NOTE. This is a reprint of the *Report to the President* of the President's Advisory Committee on Management December, 1952. Copies of the *Report* may be ordered from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Price 15 cents.

Members of the Committee making this *Report* were Thomas A. Morgan, Chairman; Lawrence A. Appley, President, American Management Association; Vincent Burke, Deputy Postmaster General; Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman of the Board, Tennessee Valley Authority; Herbert Emmerich, Executive Director, Public Administration Clearing House; James R. Killian, Jr., President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Edward S. Mason, Dean, Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration; Clarence J. McCormick, Under Secretary of Agriculture; Otto L. Nelson, Vice-President, New York Life Insurance Company; Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army; C. R. Palmer, Former President, Cluett, Peabody and Co., Inc.; Marcellus C. Sheild, Former Clerk, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives; James E. Webb, Former Under Secretary of State.

Former members were Oscar L. Chapman (1949 to 1951), Under Secretary, then Secretary of the Interior; Stephen Early (1949 deceased), Under Secretary of Defense; Gordon Gray (1950), Secretary of the Army; James L. Palmer (1949 to 1951), President, Marshall Field and Company.

William F. Finan, Assistant Director for Management and Organization, Bureau of the Budget, served as Executive Secretary to the Committee.

provement, and offer recommendations as a guide toward further strengthening of Federal management.

The period during which this committee has functioned has been one in which Government management has been taxed to the utmost. It is a remarkable achievement that, in a period when unusually great burdens have been imposed upon Federal administrators, significant progress in the organization and management of the Government has been made.

The committee has met periodically in Washington with most Cabinet Members and heads of major agencies. We have construed literally our assignment as an advisory committee. We have tried to stimulate action for better management and believe that our efforts have had some effect.

Throughout our work the Director of the Bureau of the Budget has been a tower of strength. We have been deeply impressed with the knowledge, devotion, and persistent pursuit of efficiency and management improvement by the Bureau under the leadership of its Office of Management and Organization. Our experience emphasizes the importance of the conclusion of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch (Hoover Commission), which stated with respect to the Bureau in its Report on General Management of the Executive Branch, "Its functions go far beyond strictly budgetary matters. It is the President's main reliance as an instrumentality for the improvement of management and the attainment of economy and efficiency throughout the executive branch."

The centering of responsibility for management improvement in the same agency which performs Presidential staff work on legislative and budgetary matters has proved to be a wise provision over the years since the Budget and Accounting Act was passed in 1921. The effec-

tiveness of this grouping of functions in a staff directly under the leadership of the President has been particularly apparent during and since World War II.

We have appreciated the privilege of assisting you in your efforts to strengthen Federal management. Your leadership and active support have been outstanding factors in making our role effective and in encouraging improve-

ments in the management of the Federal establishment.

Respectfully yours,

THOS. A. MORGAN

Chairman,  
President's Advisory Committee  
on Management.

THE PRESIDENT,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

#### *The Federal Management Problem*

The orderly and economical use of the resources at the disposal of the Federal Government poses a problem of management that rivals in long-run importance any of the great policy issues of the day.

The Federal Government's growth parallels the trends in municipal and State governments, and in large businesses, but its scale is unique. Regarded as a whole, its size and complexity stretch the imagination and reflect the diversity and richness of American civilization. Federal employment now consists of some 2.6 million civilians and another 3.6 million men and women in uniform. Roughly, 1 in 25 of the total population, or 1 in 10 of the total labor force, draw their livelihood directly from Federal civilian or military service. Between a fifth and a quarter of the Nation's gross output of goods and services is produced in immediate response to Federal expenditures.

The forces that led to this growth have persisted with irregular strength but with few interruptions since the early days of the Republic. They can be traced in the main to the industrialization and urbanization of the country at home and to the rise of the United States to a leading position among world powers abroad. Demands upon government by the people, usually acting in groups, rather than demands on the people by government, account in the main for its growth. So long as the citizens still look to their Government to secure the great objects for which the Union was created—to insure domestic tranquillity, to provide for the common defense, and to promote the general welfare—it appears unlikely that in the kind of world we live in our Government will cease to be huge.

This is not to say that selective reductions in the number of employees and in the financial requirements of specific programs cannot be achieved. Indeed, this aim must always be a part of the larger challenge of Federal management.

The tests of good management are lumped in the various meanings of the term "efficiency"—promptness in the dispatch of business where time is of the essence; economy in total outlay where cost is the controlling consideration; customer or clientele satisfaction where that is the chief object; orderliness and good cheer where, as in the military forces, large numbers of men must often be kept in idle readiness. It must be apparent that there is no single formula for adapting means to ends.

Great advances in the technology of management have been made in the past generation, in business and in government. Tools have been invented, adapted and refined in the processes of budgeting and personnel administration, of accounting and record-keeping, in methods of forecasting and scheduling, in systems for work simplification and quality controls, in the design, lay-out and mechanization of activities, and in the techniques for analyzing operations.

Many of these have a common application. Just as a Sears Roebuck manager, for instance, may estimate the day's work for his several departments from the weight of the morning mail, so the New York customs collector may gage from the season and the morning Weather Bureau reports whether his inspectors at the international airports in his district will have a busy day or whether inland airport collectors must be alerted to handle the incoming transatlantic plane traffic. Yet there are

limits to the applicability of business methods; it is doubtful whether any existing concepts furnish an adequate basis for the direction and control of operations in an organization of such dimensions as our Federal Government.

The reasons for this lie not only in the size of the Federal establishment, staggering as that is. For one thing, no other organization, even such a giant as General Motors, is called upon to engage in such a diverse variety of undertakings all at once—rehabilitating mentally shattered veterans, teaching Indian children to draw, incarcerating hardened criminals, rescuing ships in distress at sea, manufacturing A-bombs, building airstrips in North Africa and weather stations in Greenland, blockading the coast of Korea, and fixing a ceiling price on hamburger, to mention a random selection.

For another, no business organization has its governing authority so divided and diffused and, consequently, its policies and program objectives so difficult of interpretation by its managerial officials. The Congress legislates copiously on a myriad of procedural and organizational details, in contrast to the usual practice of boards of directors of private corporations. Independent commissions go their autonomous ways. Congressional committees and private interest groups are accustomed to deal directly with fragmented units of the administration. No single central authority can impose its will on this mosaic.

This means that leadership, persuasion, and consent are key factors in obtaining management improvement, within the confines of innumerable statutory and other prescriptions and limitations on methods and procedures and money. In sum, inflexible regulation of procedural detail, however beneficial in intent, has a paralyzing and costly effect on administration. A travel fund limitation may cost three times the apparent saving by necessitating the opening of new field stations. A year's patient investment in employee training may be thrown away by the sudden imposition of a personnel ceiling. A prohibition on cost-plus contracts may result in the acceptance of extravagant bids in order to get firm commitments for work in an uncharted field. Executive agencies do a grave disservice to the entire executive branch when by any laxity on their

part they furnish plausible grounds for statutory and other limits on their freedom of action to employ their full resources to the best advantage.

Again, no other organization has to adapt itself to such violent swings in the main orientation of its goals within short spans of time. Heavy bodies change direction slowly. The full name of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company is a reminder that that company once focussed on a much smaller objective than its present vast range of food processing and distribution operations; but it has had a half century or more to accommodate the adjustments. By contrast, within only the past two decades the Federal Government has swung its main emphasis and energies successively from policies of disarmament, neutrality and prohibition enforcement to combatting the depression, then to mobilization and full-scale fighting in World War II, next to reconversion, disarmament and foreign economic aid and most recently to remobilization, limited fighting and the assembly and support of a world-wide network of foreign alliances. The high turn-over rate among top executives normal in American political office has accompanied these rapid-fire shifts in major objectives. These circumstances do not encourage sustained and concentrated attention to management problems.

Finally there is a basic difference in incentives between business and Government. Material rewards cannot provide the basic motivation for responsible Government executives; instead, the satisfactions of public service must ordinarily be found in public esteem and personal gratification. The necessity of showing a profit for the organization is another type of compulsion to the development of effective management that is lacking in most operations of the Federal Government.

All this is not to say that good management of the Federal Government is too much to expect, or that its essential ingredients are radically different. It is only to recognize that in the Federal Government the means of achieving good management must be suited to the conditions under which the Government must operate, and that the benefits to be gained by the best management outweigh the efforts to overcome all obstacles in its path.

Good management requires a continuing supply of capable people and provision for their training, development, and advancement to positions of larger responsibility. It requires an organization that allocates responsibilities clearly and that identifies and fosters major purposes by appropriate linking of closely related activities necessary to their accomplishment. It requires management as well as program staff support for executives and a readiness to invest money to that end in what is too often a target for economizers complaining of "unnecessary overhead." It requires the conscious attention of executives up and down the line, and sustained effort by their aides, to develop specific programs for management improvement and a system of inspection and review of results, and to reward progress when it is made. It requires a close integration of program and housekeeping activities. It requires a progressive spirit as well as form and system; lip service is not enough. Energy by itself is no substitute for an understanding comprehension of problems to be met, or for personal dedication to their solution. Given all three, plus some skill in organizing things and leading men, good management is the result.

This is a large order. But our Committee believes it is not too much to ask. We find grounds for optimism in a review of recent experience.

#### *Recent Forward Steps Toward Federal Management Improvement*

It is familiar doctrine today that the organization and procedure of the executive branch of the Federal Government are not static, but rather should be continually reviewed and modernized whenever and wherever potential improvements can be identified. These are noncontroversial assumptions, but it was not always so. Nor has there been, until the last few years, general recognition that the President, in addition to his other duties, is the chief of administrative management in the Federal Government and general agreement that he has to organize to execute this responsibility even as any other. This doctrine was perhaps the most important recommendation of the President's Committee on Administrative Management in 1937.

That Committee was the sixth major attempt in a 40-year period to grapple in a comprehensive manner with the problems of organization and management of the executive branch. President Taft's Commission on Efficiency and Economy was the first such effort; and in spite of the fact that its recommendations were not immediately adopted, the ground work was laid for the eventual establishment in 1921 of the General Accounting Office and the Bureau of the Budget. Other bodies made subsequent studies, but often with little result when measured in terms of recommendations adopted and put into operation.

So long as improvements in organization and management were determined by detailed statutes which could be revised only by the ordinary processes of legislation, all attempts at comprehensive reorganization failed. The combined obstacles of public apathy, internal resistance to unwelcome change among the executive agencies affected, the normal differences existing between the executive and legislative branches and between the two Houses of Congress, and the disinclination of outside clienteles to see disturbed their relationships with particular agencies were simply too much for conventional methods to overcome.

#### *A workable method of reorganization*

By contrast a number of significant recommendations of the President's Committee on Administrative Management were quickly installed—notably the enlargement of the Executive Office of the President (including the transfer to it of the Bureau of the Budget), and the creation of the Federal Security, Federal Works, and Federal Loan Agencies. These results were achieved chiefly because the proposals could be acted upon one at a time under the reorganization plan device. Continued use of that device was unanimously recommended by the (Hoover) Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch, and has greatly facilitated the adoption during the last 4 years of many of the recommendations of that Commission.

We therefore think there is good reason to regard the invention and acceptance of this tool for reorganization as the greatest single enabling step toward management improve-

ment in the Federal Government in this generation. It consists essentially of the principle, embodied in successive recent reorganization acts, of a Presidential proposal to Congress of a specific plan, which takes effect after a stipulated time unless in the meantime a veto resolution has been adopted in one or both houses; an opportunity to vote on such a resolution within the time limit being guaranteed in both houses by special rules of procedure enacted for the purpose. This permits a plan to be voted up or down, but not to be subjected to the vicissitudes of ordinary legislation, or to crippling amendments. The reorganization plan device has provided an acceptable formula for reconciling conflicts over questions of organization and delegation that in the usual operation of the separation of powers might otherwise end in deadlock. The reorganization plan procedure has produced results in part because it puts squarely on the President the initiative for recommending improvements in the organization of the executive branch.

This device, invented before the war, was incorporated in the Reorganization Act of 1939, and was used sparingly but significantly then. It was renewed in 1945, and after a lapse was renewed in 1949. Under the act currently in force, no reorganization plans may be transmitted after March 31, 1953. The reorganization plan device has been the main implement of postwar action in this field.

#### *Forces and obstacles*

For the purposes of this review it is unnecessary to catalog here all the actions taken since the war in the direction of management improvement. Some have been in the form of statutes; more have been effected through reorganization plans, executive orders, and interagency agreements; and still more have been adopted by internal agency action. They have derived their stimulus from three separate but related sources, chiefly: (1) the surveys and recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch, (2) the active interest of the President personally and the staff help of the Bureau of the Budget in his behalf, and (3) the growing and widening spirit of self-improvement observable among executives and employees of the various operating agencies themselves.

Of these sources the most widely and deservedly publicized has been, of course, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch. By virtue of its composition its recommendations carried a great weight of prestige, and the scope and volume of its studies outdid any previous efforts. In the long run, however, its most significant contribution may well turn out to have been not so much the direct recommendations it made as the secondary consequences—a general change in the climate of opinion in the Congress and in the executive branch which converted apathy into interest. This released constructive imagination and energy; it enabled and encouraged the other two influences just mentioned to translate talk into action, with far-reaching results.

Progress along these lines was interrupted and on balance delayed, however, by the effects of the fighting in Korea and the mobilization program that followed, although these events had salutary consequences too in highlighting weaknesses, e.g., in the Department of Defense, that might otherwise have remained unappreciated until an hour of greater need. Over the past 2 years remobilization has nearly doubled the level of Federal expenditures; it has caused major shifts in the emphasis and attention of the agencies and people affected; it has piled up new problems and complicated old ones. Along with this must be mentioned the costly and retarding effects of special security arrangements instituted for the custody and use of a greatly increased volume of classified materials and communications, necessary as those steps have been. Partly for these reasons, the full benefits of the postwar impetus toward management improvement are still to be recognized and realized.

#### *Immediate goals*

The improvements actually made during the past half-dozen years are nevertheless both considerable and creditable. In terms of their immediate objectives they may for discussion be conveniently classified as follows:

Improvements in the organizational framework by a more consistent application of the principle of grouping functions according to major purpose, Government-wide and within agencies.

Strengthening of the position of top execu-

tives so as to make them more fully accountable for results—

By redefining their powers.

By furnishing them more adequate staff support.

Improvements in the performance of common Government-wide processes—in personnel administration, budgeting, accounting, and other housekeeping services.

Systematic stimulation of improvements in agency operations and management practices—

By enlisting employee suggestions more effectively, working from the bottom up.

By providing strong central leadership, working from the top down.

Evidently, more than one of these ends may be served by a particular change or related series.

#### *Organizational changes*

In the direction of strengthening the organizational framework, the most notable step has been the progress toward unification of the defense establishment, already noted, and the realignment of civil-military relationships within it. With the aid of a statute, and after comprehensive studies from within and without, the Secretary of State also put through a thoroughgoing reorganization of his department, except for the integration of the Foreign Service. The Central Intelligence Agency was founded with a view to strengthening and improving the coordination of intelligence activities throughout the Government. In more prosaic areas, jurisdiction over space, building, property, procurement and records activities was brought together in the new General Services Administration. The Department of Commerce has absorbed maritime and public roads functions and has been reorganized internally. The Post Office has reorganized its headquarters and now operates its own accounting system, formerly lodged with the General Accounting Office. A consolidated Housing and Home Finance Agency has been established. Steps to modernize several parts of the Treasury Department's organization and procedure have been initiated. Even the Commissioners

of the District of Columbia, under a reorganization plan they formulated, have been given a substantial measure of control over the internal organization of the District of Columbia Government.

The general rationale underlying all of these moves has been to try to insure, so far as organizational lines can do it, that, while the advantages of specialization are kept, the broadest possible view of all the applicable considerations in any decision is also retained at the lowest point in the hierarchy where that decision can be finally reached—and so to minimize interagency coordination problems. However, the Congress has disapproved some of the moves proposed, including a twice-rejected proposal for a Department of Welfare.

#### *Strengthened executives*

The position of top executives in the Federal establishment has been strengthened nearly across the board. One cardinal principle to this end was embodied in a sweeping series of reorganization plans submitted in 1950; namely, to vest in the head of each department and agency, rather than in the bureaus or other subordinate units supposedly under his control, all the legal powers entrusted to that agency. The Congress disapproved of this in the case of the Secretary of Agriculture, and approved as to the Secretary of the Treasury only after the Comptroller of the Currency was exempted; the position of the Secretary of Defense was fixed by legislation in 1947, and although the powers of that official were enlarged in 1949 he remains in something less than full control of his department. Otherwise, the plans went through.

To the same general end, four plans were submitted in 1952, aimed at vesting in department heads, rather than in the President with the consent of the Senate, the responsibility for appointments of key subordinates, especially in field offices. One of these, dealing with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, survived; those affecting collectors of customs, postmasters and United States marshals, were disapproved by Senate resolution.

In the case of the independent regulatory commissions, the approach has been to center responsibility for internal administration on the chairman and to lodge the designation of

the chairman with the President, leaving adjudication and rule-making to the full commission. This has been carried out with respect to four of the regulatory commissions and to the Civil Service Commission. Similar reorganization plans for the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Communications Commission were recommended by the President but rejected by the Congress.

As legal power counts for little without the practical means of bringing it to bear effectively, we attach great importance to another series of steps that have strengthened the staff support for key executives. Here the first point of concern is naturally with the development of the Executive Office of the President, which was greatly strengthened by a reorganization plan in 1939. To its original components there have since the war been added, by statutes, executive orders and reorganization plans, the National Security Council, the National Security Resources Board, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Office of the Director for Mutual Security. No doubt the particular form in which these offices are cast, and the relationships among them, are susceptible of improvement. An important weakness, in the view of this Committee, is the lack of adequate staff assistance on broad personnel policies and problems.

The immediate staffs of the secretaries of all departments except Agriculture have also been reinforced by the authorization of additional assistant secretaries, and by raising pay levels, particularly in the upper positions, to enable agency heads to attract and retain talents commensurate with departmental staff responsibilities. Despite these steps, this Committee regards the further strengthening of departmental managerial staffs as a necessary prerequisite to satisfactory performance by department heads.

#### *Better performance of common services*

Experience with prewar efforts to improve the professional quality of housekeeping services auxiliary to all Government operations, by consolidating each of the main services under single jurisdictions, led to disillusion. The congestion of paper work at the center in as large an establishment as the Federal Govern-

ment—and even in the small fraction of it located in Washington—proved unworkable. Partial exception may be justified for a few types of transactions, such as disbursing, examining candidates for clerical positions (both highly mechanized), and large-scale procurement of common items (where wholesale discounts pay off). But the general conclusion of well informed observers was that delays and remote controls cost more than the advantages of centralized services were worth, and during the war many of them broke down.

The guiding postwar principle in this field has therefore been to decentralize the common service processes to the site of the operations they are intended to serve, by delegating them to agency heads and major subordinate units, while centralizing the authority to fix—and a staff adequate to review and enforce—the standards and policies by which they are carried out. Nearly all the common services have benefited materially from the application of this principle.

In personnel administration, for instance, with the help of the Classification Act of 1949, the agencies have been delegated authority to classify and reclassify positions in a simplified classification structure, and in a large proportion of cases they now take a greater part in examining candidates and determining eligibles, subject to Civil Service Commission standards and inspection. There is now little ground for the traditional agency complaints about the centrally imposed red tape involved in recruitment. The Civil Service Commission has taken the initiative in securing the increases in salary levels provided in successive recent pay acts. It has also taken steps to improve promotion policies, separation practices, reduction-in-force procedures, training of employees for more responsible positions, and recruitment of well trained young people for Government careers, but much remains to be done in these fields.

In budgeting, the main lines of progress have been in the direction of performance budgeting, as recommended by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch and begun in the budget for the fiscal year 1951, and of a revision and great simplification of the appropriation structure. The latter has proceeded to the point where there are now

fewer than 400 appropriation heads for executive branch agencies in the regular budget, in contrast with more than a thousand a few years ago. The General Appropriation Act of 1951 took another forward step in clarifying the authority of the Bureau of the Budget to establish budgetary reserves so that full advantage can be taken of developments which diminish program requirements below appropriations.

In accounting and the audit and settlement of public accounts, perhaps the most drastic changes in traditional procedures have occurred. The General Accounting Office, the Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget have since 1947 collaborated in a joint program that led to the passage of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, a landmark. A wide range of improvements has followed. The General Accounting Office, on the basis of its successful experience with the business-type audits prescribed in the Government Corporation Control Act, has begun the extension of similar principles to the audit of departmental accounts, notably by conducting on-the-site audits instead of requiring all vouchers to be shipped to Washington. Consistent with this action, the General Accounting Office has eliminated the keeping of numerous central fiscal records, and agency accounts have been established as the official accounting records from which financial reports for the Government as a whole will be derived. Within the terms of centrally established standards each agency in the executive branch has been given the primary responsibility of establishing and maintaining systems of accounting designed to meet its own needs. Budgeting and accounting classifications and procedures are being integrated with a view to providing better support for budget estimates in accounting results. Throughout this joint program the basic aims have been to minimize the ambiguities and conflicts of jurisdiction that used to abound in this field, and in their place to unite the efforts of all the agencies concerned in a common endeavor to make Federal accounting a servant of management, a tool for its improvement, and a source of factual reports for the Congress and the public.

In general services, progress in rationalizing many aspects of procurement was temporarily interrupted by the rush of buying that fol-

lowed the Korean invasion. Nevertheless, the establishment of the General Services Administration and the opening of its regional offices and supply depots have begun to pay off in a variety of supply and property-management operations. Lines of civilian and military jurisdiction over procurement are being clarified. Inventory controls and property accounting are being instituted. The National Archives is well along in its new role as a records management, storage and disposal agency. In all this, the General Services Administration has wide latitude as to when to perform operations itself and when to decentralize operations to the agencies under central standards and controls.

#### *Agency management improvement*

The end products of Government—services to and for the people—issue from the operating agencies, rather than from the top echelons. The virtue of a good organizational framework and of well-managed auxiliary services is therefore to enable operating agencies to better their operating performance of Federal programs, for the benefits of most improvements are realized at this point. The search for the best available methods of conducting its programs is consequently an intrinsic part of every operating agency's primary responsibility. It is a continuing search, beginning when the function is first authorized. In the nature of things the roll of any central program or mechanism for agency management improvement is that of stimulus, advice, inspection, and review.

*Employee Recognition.* One approach to the goal is from the bottom up. If suitable rewards are offered, the enterprise and inventiveness of employees in all ranks may be enlisted to the benefit of the organization's performance. This is the thought behind such familiar methods of cultivating employee participation as suggestion systems and meritorious service awards. Starting in a small way in the Army's ordnance shops in 1912 these methods have been gradually introduced and expanded in the Federal Government; they were not used on a large scale until World War II. Legislation enacted in 1946 and 1949 now provides limited cash awards or in-grade salary increases, both for beneficial suggestions and for

superior accomplishment, by individuals or by groups.

The results of this approach have been spotty. During the fiscal year 1952, some \$1,110,000 was paid in awards, for suggestions or in recognition of outstanding efficiency, to 35,000 employees whose actions resulted in savings to the Federal Government of \$36 million. In addition, some 1,800 salary increases were made for superior accomplishment. The Defense Department has been the most active in promoting suggestion systems; Agriculture, the Federal Security Agency, and the Veterans' Administration appear to have made the most use of the efficiency and superior accomplishment awards, with Agriculture dignifying the grants by a public ceremony at which the President has spoken. Less enthusiasm has been shown elsewhere.

Some of the difficulties encountered in this approach may be attributed to limitations and ambiguities in the several authorizing statutes. Even if these are cleared up, however, it remains to be demonstrated whether devices such as these are the best that can be designed to bring the essential ingredient of employee participation into the management improvement process.

*Central Leadership.* Another approach is from the top down. This views leadership in management improvement as a function of management itself; it has been the basis of the President's program since the war.

Following the reports of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch, the President in July 1949 promulgated Executive Order 10072 to institute a systematic endeavor not only for realizing the benefits of the Commission's specific recommendations but also for capitalizing on the generally favorable climate for further and continuing progress. Legislative support was given the order in Title X of the Classification Act of that year (Public Law 429, 81st Cong.), and also by appropriation of a \$1 million fund to be used during the ensuing fiscal year for special studies in areas left open by the Commission's work.

Executive Order 10072 directs each department and agency head to make systematic reviews of his programs and operations with the object of identifying opportunities for increas-

ing their effectiveness and economy; to schedule action for achieving such improvements; and to report periodically to the Bureau of the Budget.

The Bureau of the Budget in turn is directed to review the agency plans and reports; to assist agencies in developing effective improvement programs; to take up interagency managerial problems; to interchange information; and to report to the President.

Finally, the order established the President's Advisory Committee on Management—consisting of Government officials and of others, selected on a nonpartisan basis, broadly representative of managerial interests in private life—to assist the President in creating a Government-wide program for management improvement, developing a framework for the conduct of management activities, reviewing the progress of agency management efforts, and promoting a better understanding of measures taken to these ends.

In simpler terms this meant that the President was interested in the subject himself, and expected his department heads to be; and that he looked to the Bureau of the Budget and the Advisory Committee to find ways and means of pushing ahead and getting results. Any sustained drive of this sort depends on Presidential support, and this was forthcoming. In meetings with his department heads, in correspondence and in conferences, the President repeatedly showed his continuous interest in encouraging the program, holding up examples of what he approved, as they came to his attention, for others to emulate.

Necessarily, the key role fell to the Bureau of the Budget, which had prepared the order and was in the logical spot to make something of it. The Bureau, indeed, from its earliest days had been assigned a special responsibility to the President for the improvement of Federal management practices, though these were on a very limited scale until the reorganization of the Bureau in 1939 and the establishment of its Division of Administrative Management. With growing experience through the years the Bureau's role came to be defined as one dealing with Presidential administrative leadership in a much broader sense. In its relations with other agencies it shied away from rigid controls and emphasized, through inquiry,

stimulus and advice, an attitude of common concern for common goals.

So in this case, the Bureau began by pointing out methods by which every agency should take a fresh look at its own operations to see how they might be done better and by asking each agency to tell the Bureau what it found, what it proposed to do about the findings, and what system of follow-up it had. When the returns came in, the Bureau looked them over and assigned individual staff members to go and live with some of the agencies for extended periods; some months later, when the budget hearings were held, the agencies' management systems were among the topics of questioning. As evidence of its continuing interest the Bureau also asked the agencies to submit with their budget estimates annual reports on their progress in solving current management problems.

In the meantime the Bureau had parceled out about two-thirds of the President's Management Improvement Fund for a group of studies, among others, of Federal retirement systems and of overseas administration, both studies recommended by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch; of the problems facing the newly created General Services Administration; and of various special problems confronting the Interior Department, the Coast Guard, and the Office of Education. In the meantime, too, the 1950 series of reorganization plans already referred to, over two dozen in all, were laid before the Congress by the President. Here also the Bureau served as the clearing house.

At an early stage in this round of activity the Advisory Committee assembled for its first meeting with the President, in October 1949. Thereafter, and for the next 2 years it met, somewhat more often than bimonthly, with the heads of departments and agencies in turn; the Bureau of the Budget arranged the appointments for 17 sessions at which over 50 top executives in all were heard.

The Committee's general procedure at each of these sessions followed a consistent pattern. After a preliminary briefing on the agency's work, the Committee asked each executive to speak to three main points:

- (1) His own understanding of the man-

agement improvement program and his own attitude toward it.

(2) The organization of his agency and its staff dispositions for assistance to him in carrying out his management responsibilities.

(3) The specific programs for management improvement under way in his agency, and his appraisal of the results being obtained.

At the President's suggestion, the Committee started off with the three central staff agencies—the Bureau of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the General Services Administration—focusing discussion on the proper relationships to be observed between them and the operating agencies, and on Government-wide management problems. Representatives of the component parts of the Executive Office were interviewed next, in an exploration of staff needs of the President, the full extent of which is not sufficiently appreciated.

Against this background the sessions with operating agency heads began. As might be expected, some were informed and informative, displaying a broad grasp of the affairs committed to their hands, while others revealed a concept of management as in a pigeonhole apart, concerned only with housekeeping details. Regardless of how each particular case turned out, however, the fact that a responsible outside group appointed for the purpose by the President was made a forum for an accounting of management stewardship had a marked stimulative effect on the agency heads. The sessions served also to underline the importance of capable management staffs, in the agencies and Government-wide.

After Korea, at the President's request, the Committee turned its attention chiefly to problems of domestic economic mobilization and the management of military procurement.

After Korea, also, the demands of the Government's emergency programs and personnel reductions in the staff of the Bureau of the Budget forced the recall and reassignment of much of the staff previously detailed to the management improvement program. Annual reports have continued to flow in from the agencies, and they have been reviewed, but existing resources do not permit much more

than a paper review of many of them. This is enough to disclose, however, that too many of the recent reports are devoted to trivia accumulated from bureau reports, and that some are evidently the products of departmental staff report writers rather than the unburdenings of operators concerned with the future of their operations.

One test of a good departmental system is whether it makes the bureaus responsible to the agency head, and the current reports indicate the frequent inadequacy of agency evaluation and review systems, handicapped by the lack of inspection teams. Lower echelons of management do what upper echelons inspect. In recent months discussions within the executive branch, including meetings of this Committee, have explored the possibility of instituting a system of management appraisals under the leadership of the Bureau of the Budget as a means of giving new vitality to management improvement efforts at operating levels, and of strengthening departmental management.

This account of the management improvement program is enough to show two things at least: First, a very impressive record of accomplishment can be established through systematic, determined, and comprehensive effort; and second, the system must have sufficient inherent strength to meet the problems of agencies primarily concerned with emergency activities and to retain full impetus in those agencies not so directly involved. No doubt there must always be some ebb and flow in the tides of progress in any field. But it is evident that means and resources must be found to build up a system that provides a margin of reserve strength against diversionary influences.

#### *An Emerging Pattern*

In all the variety of Federal experience we have observed there is no single, sure-fire, and practicable panacea to guarantee the improvement of management in the Federal Government. The Federal establishment is so varied that no uniform program would be feasible or desirable. Rather, the aim should be to keep unrelenting pressure on administrators to devise and adopt programs suited to the tasks under their jurisdictions.

The question of how much improvement has been made is in the long view not so significant today as the question of what proportion of Federal administrators are imbued with a determination to make more of it. But we have seen so many conscious and definite improvements made in recent years that we cannot think it impossible for men and women in any organization to add two cubits to the organization's stature by thinking about it.

The Federal establishment is so huge that the stakes involved in realizing the improvements potentially available are almost beyond calculation. They are well worth the deliberate investment of whatever is needed to assemble the best brains on the subject for a long-range project aimed at developing concepts adequate to bring the machinery of administration within the control of administrators.

In the stream of postwar experience reviewed in this report, it is possible that the outlines of an emerging pattern of conscious action can be discerned. In our view the essential conditions for successful future programs can be set down in the form of conclusions as follows:

*First, a declaration of policy.*—In every part of the Federal establishment it must be made plain to those below him that their chief really cares about getting a better job done. This may be done through a statement of policy and intent, but standing alone that is not enough. There is no substitute for sincerity and continuity of purpose on this score, and actions speak louder than words—lip service above makes for hypocrites below, too.

*Second, staff assistance.*—Executives need management staff help and formal machinery if continuity of effort is to match continuity of purpose. This will cost time and money. The effort cannot be simply superimposed on subordinates who already have their hands full, and it cannot ordinarily be had for nothing. The form this machinery should take cannot be prescribed in the abstract; some thought will be required to adapt it to the conditions of the particular time and place. In the past, staff for this purpose has sometimes been misused or neglected by operating chiefs, and it is often made the first target in the application of budget cuts. This is neither good business nor

good government. Government must learn, as business has, that funds spent on managerial aides are funds well spent, and that the full exploitation of the contributions of such aides is the principal key to success.

*Third, a program of improvements.*—The function of the management system is to produce results; its role is not passive. Whether in particular situations management should appropriately be missionary or inventive or judicious, its task is to see that concrete and realizable programs are in fact devised, set in motion, and carried to completion. This too will cost time and money.

*Fourth, systematic review and appraisal.*—Whether through this same machinery or otherwise, some systematic form of realistic review, inspection, or other check-up is needed, both for the measure of performance it gives top management and for the impetus it supplies to those below.

These are the common denominators of success as we have seen it.

#### *Recommendations*

In the light of these findings we offer the following recommendations:

1. The President should be granted permanent reorganization authority, since the need for it is continuing.
2. A policy and systematic procedure and machinery should be maintained to give continuous encouragement and to keep up unrelenting executive pressure so that administra-

tors at all levels will carry out management improvement programs within their own areas of responsibility. This policy and system should include also a constant review and appraisal of results. As a part of that system, although a better device than a Presidential advisory committee may be found, it is recommended that this Committee's functions be continued. Among other goals, the policy and system should point toward the development, by the Bureau of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, the General Services Administration, the Treasury Department and other central facilities, of better means than inflexible limitations and detailed statutory procedures, on which the Congress may reasonably be asked to rely for economic and responsible administration.

3. The permanent management staff facilities of the President, of the heads of departments and agencies, and of their principal operating subordinates, should be strengthened. A Presidential fund should also be available for financing special management improvement activities not provided for by other means.

4. High priority should be given by the President and the Congress to the development of a program for (a) assuring an adequate supply of well-prepared and competent administrators at all levels; and (b) providing opportunities, encouragement and incentives to administrators to improve their methods and practices and to prepare themselves for posts of greater responsibility.

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It is important for a man's self-respect to know what is expected of him, what his responsibilities are. If organization charts and job specifications help toward this end, they can be useful. But they are flat, in two dimensions, and they never record the third dimension of "common-sense" in human contacts. . . .

We are involved in a seamless web of human relationships in public administration—between the group and the chief, between the organization and its constituents, between the organization and its controllers. Every strand in this web should be woven of regard for the worth of the individual, of recognition of his human needs. . . . An understanding of these basic elements is the beginning of wisdom in the art of administration.

—From a talk on "Human Relations in Administration" by Charles S. Ascher before the New Jersey Chapter, American Society for Public Administration, May 27, 1952, printed in *33 Public Health News* 902 (November, 1952) issued by the New Jersey State Department of Health.

# Reviews of Books and Documents

## The Transfer of Technical Know-how

By Arnold Miles, U. S. Bureau of the Budget

**INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: PROGRAMS AND ORGANIZATION**, by Walter R. Sharp. Public Administration Service, 1952. Pp. 146. \$2.50. Publication No. 108.

**STANDARDS AND TECHNIQUES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES**. Report by the Special Committee on Public Administration Problems, Technical Assistance Administration, United Nations, 1951. Pp. 65. \$0.50. UN Publications Sales No. 1951.II.B.7.

### I

WITHIN the federal government, Point Four has a particular program and organizational connotation; but elsewhere, it is a simple, understandable way of identifying an otherwise hard-to-describe concept.

As a phrase, Point Four is only three years old; but as a concept, it is known and understood in every country in the world. Walter Sharp's excellent summary of technical assistance antedating Point Four is proof positive that this is not a new idea; yet there is much that is new about Point Four, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Successes there have been in the previous transfer of technical know-how among countries; yet today the urgency and the scale of the entire enterprise have raised and highlighted problems to such an extent that success, to some, seems improbable; to others, impossible.

Let the discouraged take heart. During World War II, it became necessary for industrial processes to be simplified if we were to meet our own requirements and those of our allies for gasoline, synthetic rubber, and other critically short products. Where pilot plants were built before, there was now no time, and mass production facilities were constructed di-

rectly. Mistakes were made, but mistakes were anticipated in calculating the risk. None defied remedy.

So it is and will be with Point Four. It is too late for lengthy experiment, for technical assistance is one of the weapons in an immense battle for freedom that is already well under way. What must be done now is to reduce the risks of error even as we undertake the job of transferring technical assistance and to read the gauges of success and failure as the product is being made. In short, the utmost amount of technical know-how must be applied to the very task itself of providing technical assistance.

### II

IN LARGE measure, *International Technical Assistance* is testimony to the complexity of the program and above all to its fast-moving nature. As Herbert Emmerich has indicated in his foreword, this is in part an inventory—an organizational who's-who of technical assistance; and this reader, situated advantageously as he is, found much that was new in Walter Sharp's status report. That some of the statistical data are already out of date in no way detracts from the value of the first edition of what ought to be a periodic catalog.

Nor can one quarrel with Professor Sharp because he might, after his recent experience in Indo-China, alter certain judgments as the result of what he has aptly termed the "corrective of field work at the 'country' level." His citation of the hazards of conducting U.S. technical assistance programs when the organizational arrangements, the restrictions on funds and personnel, and the relationships to economic and military assistance change from year to year, and sometimes more often, is current and impressive. He stresses also the problem—characteristic of both bilateral and mul-

tilateral assistance—of obtaining geographic and functional coordination, and of doing so in circumstances in which powerful organizational forces are pulling for each at the expense of the other. He cites the concern over program priorities, and the difficulties in the way of program balance. None of these and other problems noted are either out of date or likely to be so soon, and the same may be said for many of Professor Sharp's tentative judgments.

Others might stress problems more personal or more intimately experienced from any of many points of relationship with Point Four programs and organizations. Still others would assign widely divergent weights to pending issues and would render other judgments about alternative solutions.

The significant point is that Professor Sharp has not only inventoried, but appraised as well, even though the ink is hardly dry on travel vouchers and organization charts. This is a healthy sign—very healthy, indeed. It accords with the pace with which the whole technical assistance program has developed in the last few years.

In striving for better administration of all technical assistance, the greatest single danger is premature rigidity of means and methods. Inflexibility in the organization of either bilateral or multilateral country missions is a great temptation, for a uniform pattern makes for easier administration at headquarters in circumstances where there is tremendous pressure to "get the show on the road." A standard pattern of service, whether it be a year, two years, or any other fixed period, is likewise inviting to harassed personnel officers with recruiting quotas to meet. A method of operation like the *servicio* may be seized upon and widely adopted primarily because it is already in use, even though particular circumstances call for another approach.

There is nothing alarming in these and other evidences of early rigidities, for it is hard to visualize any other manner in which the whole program could have unfolded so broadly in so short a time. The script has now been chosen, the play has been cast, and the show is definitely on the road. Phase II, the shakedown tour, is coming up.

This period of adjustment, even more than

the initial period of organization, will put technical assistance to severe tests. Many of them will have to be met by the administrators, for the basic contributions of the researchers and educators may take longer to show results. It should not be too much to hope, even though the odds may still be great, that the administrators will conduct systematic and searching appraisals of their work to date; and that their accent, as they count their successes and failures, will be on sufficient organizational and operating flexibility so that the requirements of technical assistance can be assessed more penetratingly, and the resources utilized more unerringly.

### III

CERTAINLY one of the essentials of successful technical assistance, be it provided through bilateral or multilateral arrangements, is doctrine. It is the lack of doctrine which is felt most keenly among front-line Point Four personnel.

Thus, for example, there is perhaps no single active or potentially active technical assistant in public administration who would not rejoice if, for the country wherein his interest lies, there had been answered recently, fully, and accurately all of the questions propounded in Part II of *Standards and Techniques of Public Administration*. Here is an admirable checklist, an "outline for a survey of administrative conditions." After emphasizing the importance of environment and background and indicating some of the major aspects of each which should be known, this outline groups a multitude of pertinent questions under five headings—governmental organization, public finance, public personnel, administrative management, and planning and development. Each of these major segments is in turn subdivided into major components—public finance, for example, into revenue administration, budgeting, accounting and auditing, and procurement and property control.

It is almost safe to say that there is at present no country receiving technical assistance for which such a range of information is yet available—whether that range be, as in this case, in the area of public administration, or in some other field of technical assistance. Bits and pieces there are—large for some countries,

fragmentary for others. How the task of accelerating the gathering of such data is to be organized, and how the data are to be maintained in reasonably current and available condition; once the original task is completed, are urgent problems.

Lacking the product at present, the work of the Special Committee on Public Administration Problems permits the technical assistant in public administration to approach the problems of a given country with an attitude of what Herman Finer has perceptively termed "classified alertness."

But this is only a first step, though highly useful. Needed as much or more by the technical assistant of today is *comparative* information. It is primarily through information on comparative administration—or comparable information in any field of technical assistance—that the practitioner obtains a useful framework of reference in his work on the problems of any given country. A far-seeing, organized beginning in the development of such materials has been made by the Committee on Administrative Practices of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, under contract, for the United Nations.<sup>1</sup> But its resources are limited, and fall far short of the need. Somehow, well-organized means must be found to advance the comparability of information necessary for technical assistance, and to do so simultaneously with the collection of the information itself. Again, the lead time between design and production must be shortened through the application of the resourcefulness and determination that underlies all technical assistance.

#### IV

**I**T PROFITS little to assess all of the reasons why our colleges and universities have not been able, and are not yet able, to produce the type and quantity of trained personnel for technical

<sup>1</sup> See 11 *Public Administration Review* 290 for publishing information about the first eight studies. Additional studies issued in 1952 are: 9. *Comment Humaniser les Relations de l'Administration avec le Public*, by R.-Ch. Leblanc, 107 pp.; 10. *Guide Pratique pour l'Analyse et la Classification des Fonctions*, by Lucienne Talleon, 62 pp.; 11. *The Mechanics of Committee Work*, by E. H. Simpson, 30 pp.; 12. *Presenting O and M Recommendations*, by K. S. Jefferies, 23 pp.; 13. *Taking Over a New Executive Post*, by John D. Young, 26 pp.

assistance assignments that we now need. But it matters much that there is a real shortage of personnel trained and ready to undertake such assignments, and it is of first importance that constructive steps be taken to bring resources and requirements into balance without delay.

Others, like Sayre and Thurber,<sup>2</sup> have explored many of the problems inherent in this task. Nevertheless, a few deserve reemphasis. First of all, such is the shortage of information and so few are the research resources that the latter, to the maximum possible extent, ought to be channeled to produce what is needed. It is not that research should in any way be regimented, but rather that research is more useful if related to a purpose—if it is part of a larger plan. That plan is the provision of the best quality of technical assistance in the shortest possible time.

Second, new attention needs to be paid to the transfer and translation of doctrine among the curriculums of the specialties. This is an old problem, raised anew by the needs of technical assistance programs, and pointedly illustrated by the public administration specialty. "In every country," says the Special Committee, "whether it is new or long-established, whether it is under-developed or highly developed, any programme of economic or fiscal development, of improvement in education, health, labour and social conditions, and of reform and reconstruction in any of the public services, can only succeed if it is supported by machinery and methods established under sound principles of public administration and adapted to the circumstances of the country concerned" (p. 4).

Carried back into the formal educational process, what does this mean? Do we rely, in accordance with one proposal, on some means of selecting and assigning as technical assistants only those extension directors or public health officers who have shown a real appreciation of the elements and the practice of public administration? Or do we provide as part of the basic training of all specialists a working knowledge of governmental processes? If the Special Committee is right in its view, we do the latter, for those many who may not be

<sup>2</sup> Wallace S. Sayre and Clarence E. Thurber, *Training for Specialized Mission Personnel* (Public Administration Service, 1952), 85 pp.

assigned abroad will thus be able to make a greater contribution at home.

Granting this, how do we proceed? Is it useful and sufficient for the specialist to be exposed to generalities, or is it necessary to adapt these principles to the specialty, as Herman Finer has just done in *Administration and the Nursing Services*?<sup>3</sup> It is this kind of problem that requires specific attention and careful analysis, for its resolution may markedly affect our future capacity for technical assistance, both abroad and at home.

#### V

THE challenge of Point Four will be met—by researchers who will fill the large gaps in information, by teachers who will revise and improve curriculums offered to potential tech-

nical assistants, by administrators who will devise differing patterns to accommodate to varying circumstances. In their respective efforts, especial recognition will need to be given to short-term improvisation where longer-term effort has not been completed, and to the vital importance of pushing aside the harassments of day-to-day crises to institute work which has only long-term effect.

But the challenge will be met more quickly and more surely if new devices are found for bringing all of these forces together into a more articulated planning process. Social scientists need to follow the example of industrialists and engineers in shortening the lead time in the entire process of production. Older, more leisurely ways are a dispensable luxury when the stake is the defense of freedom in the world.

\* Macmillan Co., 1952. 333 pp.

## Resources and the Nation's Future

By Ernest A. Engelbert, University of California, Los Angeles

**RESOURCES FOR FREEDOM:** Volume I, *Foundations for Growth and Security*. Volume II, *The Outlook for Key Commodities*. Volume III, *The Outlook for Energy Sources*. Volume IV, *The Promise of Technology*. Volume V, *Selected Reports to the Commission*. A Report to the President by the President's Materials Policy Commission. Government Printing Office, 1952. Pp. 184, \$1.25; 210, \$1.50; 43, \$0.50; 228, \$1.75; 154, \$1.25.

"Has the United States of America the material means to sustain its civilization?" With this fateful question the President's Materials Policy Commission begins its five-volume report to the American people. Nor is this query merely an eye-catching introduction, for no public document of our generation has dealt with the long-range future of the United States in more significant terms. The title-scanning reader should not be misled by the word "resources," for this is no conventional work on conservation. Rather, it is a study of national growth and the national economy that has profound implications for every aspect of American life.

Of all American traditions, none has been more dominant than the belief that the United States possessed the material means to push its civilization forward continually. Abundantly blessed with natural resources and greatly endowed with inventive capacity, we as a people have moved forward from an agricultural society to become the greatest industrial nation on earth, supremely confident that we could overcome by new discoveries and technology any major shortages of raw materials. To be sure, as we reached the stage where the rate of exploitation could be measured in terms of available resources, national recognition of the need for conservation programs took shape. But the conservation movement in the United States, for all its progress and vitality, never seriously undermined the popularly held concept of national self-sufficiency. Despite ever-accelerating consumption of raw materials during the twentieth century, there was a great lag in public recognition of the rapidly changing resource position of the United States vis-à-vis the rest of the world; we still clung to the belief that our country could provide for itself.

It took World War II with its intensified production and its disruption of foreign supplies to dramatize the fact that the United States had built an economy that was no longer self-sustaining. Despite continuing advances in the use and development of the nation's domestic resources, this country by the time of World War II had become the greatest importing nation of the world for most raw materials, and for a number of strategic minerals was completely dependent on foreign sources of supply. Nor did the conclusion of world conflict greatly alleviate the situation. The continued rise of production, new obligations for foreign aid and assistance, and the specter of long-term cold war combined to serve notice that the American people urgently needed to abandon some of their traditional concepts and take a new approach to national growth and the development of the nation's resources.

It was in this atmosphere that the President's Materials Policy Commission (hereafter referred to as PMPC) was appointed in January, 1951, to study the nation's long-range materials position and formulate policies dealing with it.<sup>1</sup> The Commission was instructed to study the policies and practices of both government and private industry in this field. It assembled a small staff, recruited largely from universities and governmental agencies, to undertake the report. The work of the staff was augmented by consultants and by special studies undertaken for the Commission by United States government bureaus, by agencies associated with the United Nations, and by several private companies. Much of the data was gathered through questionnaires which were sent to private firms and government agencies and through conferences and interviews with key people.

The PMPC report appeared in June, 1952. Unlike many government studies which receive little or no public recognition, this document was immediately heralded by the nation's news agencies, though most of the stories featured the more sensational aspects of national re-

sources trends without revealing the basic significance of the study. The significance of this report lies not so much in alarming statistics of resources shortages, which indeed other studies have at least partially uncovered, as in its distinctive approach to the problem of resource use and development. Before dealing with this approach, however, a brief summary of the subject matter covered by the report appears in order.

## II

**T**HE entire scope of the PMPC study is covered in Volume I, which contains the Commission's conclusions about policy objectives together with seventy-eight specific recommendations. Volume II through V constitute supporting staff studies and working papers. Though the report is entitled *Resources for Freedom*, it does not attempt to deal with all aspects of resource use and development. Resources are considered primarily in terms of types and amounts of materials, both raw and processed, which this nation needs if its economy is to advance. With this distinctive focus, the report surveys materials which originate from both renewable and nonrenewable resources, including minerals and metals and their derivatives, forest, plant, and agricultural products, fuels, building supplies, and other items indispensable to an industrial society. The Commission states at the outset that three fundamental convictions conditioned the study: first, the belief that national growth would continue; second, the belief that the system of private enterprise is "the most efficacious way of performing industrial tasks in the United States"; and third, the belief "that the destinies of the United States and the rest of the free non-Communist world are inextricably bound together." Within this frame of reference the Commission in general studied materials in terms of (a) their availability within the United States and the free world, (b) the technology associated with their use and development, and (c) some of the economic and political factors which determine their production and trade. The first volume, in particular, is well organized and written. The over-all report is generously illustrated with charts and graphs, and the last four volumes also give documentary references and bibliography.

<sup>1</sup>The Commission consisted of William S. Paley, chairman of the board, Columbia Broadcasting System, who was chairman of the PMPC; George R. Brown, executive vice-president, Brown and Root, Inc.; Arthur H. Bunker, president, Climax Molybdenum Co.; Eric Hodges, magazine editor and author; and Edward S. Mason, dean, Littauer School, Harvard University.

Of specific resources, minerals and metals are given the most extensive treatment in the report, a survey so excellent, indeed, that no other comparable study exists. The Commission emphasizes minerals not only because they were the most neglected area of resources studies, but because minerals, metals, and rare earths were viewed as the most critical elements for maintaining an industrial civilization. The field of energy receives almost equally prominent attention. Here again this report pioneers by dealing simultaneously with all major prospective sources of energy in relationship to total energy needs and production requirements.

Forest resources are dealt with primarily in terms of the use and development of wood products; only brief attention is paid to some of the more general aspects of silviculture, though some of the Commission's most specific recommendations do concern forest management practices. Agricultural resources are treated from the point of view of the capability of agricultural lands to produce food and raw materials for industry; food supply and the details of farm policy were regarded as outside the scope of the Commission's assignment. The Commission acknowledges the work that has been done by the President's Water Resources Policy Commission and considers land-bound water resources almost wholly in terms of hydroelectric power and industrial water pollution; ocean waters are studied from the point of view of potential mineral production, with minor attention to marine production of plant materials with industrial usefulness. The volumes also include studies on rubber, technology, and building. The building study is a case analysis of the use and waste of materials in the building construction industry which leaves no doubt that this activity ranks high in the category of America's technologically most backward enterprise.

Over one quarter of Volume I and much of Volume V are devoted to appraising the resources position of the United States in relationship to the rest of the free world and to an evaluation of the measures which should be taken to promote the technological and economic development of resources of friendly nations for the purpose of assuring general economic stability and security. The govern-

ment's international trade policies and the programs for promoting public and private investments abroad come under careful scrutiny. From the point of view of immediate action, the Commission's recommendations for breaking down trade barriers and for undertaking measures to develop new supplies of resources abroad are probably the most important of the entire study.

Throughout the report strong emphasis is placed upon adequate research and trained manpower as the keys to new discovery and improved technology. Some major gaps in existing data and knowledge are pointed out. The Commission expresses grave concern over the lack of federal support of basic research and the inadequate coordination of scientific research programs. It strongly recommends that the National Science Foundation should be recognized as the top policy-making agency in this field and given sufficient appropriations to operate effectively.

The organizational and administrative aspects of resource development and control are not treated by the PMPC on any over-all basis. However, the Commission finds that the federal government is not effectively organized for the collection of data and the review of materials programs. Among the outstanding organizational changes which the Commission proposes are the following: that a single federal agency should be designated to formulate and review energy policies and programs; that a single agency should be designated to promote and coordinate materials research and development activities; that a permanent agency should be created to deal with overseas programs of resources development; and that the National Security Resources Board should be strengthened to make it, in effect, the supreme planning agency for all materials policies and programs.

The report deals with resources primarily from a national focus; regional and local considerations receive scant recognition, though a few changes in state and local programs are proposed to bring them into line with national policy. The report pays considerable attention to various aspects of private enterprise for resources development, such as taxation and investment, but does not treat the over-all role and responsibilities of private enterprise in

this area. Nor does the report deal directly with the educational programs that are necessary to broaden public interest and understanding, though its arresting volumes will do much to make the public conscious of the resources problems which this country faces.

### III

**F**AR reaching as are the PMPC conclusions and recommendations about materials policies, the deeper significance of this study rests in its approach to the problem of national growth, which is distinctive in three major ways. First, this study recognizes, as no previous resources study has done, that the demands of a twentieth century technology and economy call for a new orientation to the development of national resources. Studies to date have analyzed the availability and adequacy of resources primarily in their *natural* state and setting, rather than in terms of their transformation and convertibility to other materials and products. This report reverses the procedure and assesses the possibilities of national growth in terms of the types and quantities of materials necessary to sustain and nurture an industrial civilization. It recognizes that the great advances of chemistry, engineering, metallurgy, and other sciences have, through substitutes, synthetics, recycling, and other technological developments opened new vistas for resources use. The PMPC study clearly gets away from the agrarian bias which has heretofore characterized so much of our outlook and policies for resources development in the United States.

The second unusual aspect of the PMPC report is its assessment of resource needs and requirements upon the basis of demand projections for materials which are computed to the year 1975. The projections are predicated upon the assumptions of an expanding economy and a rising standard of living. The accuracy of the projections is, of course, open to question, but in general the Commission used figures somewhere between the maximum and minimum demand forecasts. This approach again contrasts with that of most other studies, which have viewed resources largely in terms of *present* availabilities and *existing* problems. Needless to say, the report exhibits no patience with those conservation doctrines which refuse to

recognize that only through the use of resources does the economy expand. The PMPC study is dynamic in outlook and definitely more in keeping with the spirit of American growth and development.

Finally, this report is significant because it shatters the illusion that the resources of the United States can be appraised, used, or developed solely within the perspective or framework of our national economy. Other studies have evaluated United States resources almost wholly within a national frame of reference; most national resource surveys have been confined to the country's boundaries. This has led to some unrealistic conclusions about the nature and expansion of the American economy. The PMPC report leaves no doubt that hereafter the strength of America's position must be evaluated in the light of the international availability of resources and this country's ability to work out mutually satisfactory arrangements with other nations to supply our deficits.

Though the PMPC report is a carefully framed document, the shifts in concepts which it makes will not be easily accepted by the American people. Some of the conclusions and recommendations of the Commission relate to extremely controversial issues. Some industries, for example lumbering and mining, are already opposing some of the recommendations which restrict their rights of exploitation. A large segment of the American public will object to the recommendations for programs of foreign aid or for repeal of such legislation as the "Buy American" Act. Conservation groups who are dedicated to the preservation of nature will be hostile to the emphasis which the report gives to technology and industrial development. Some of the peoples of other countries, as well, may interpret this report as a rationale for new forms of imperialism.

Among the scientific professions, likewise, the report will meet criticism. Some representatives of both the social sciences and the natural sciences will feel that the concepts of "growth" and "economic costs" have been overstressed. Particularly among the biological scientists the opinion seems likely to prevail that renewable resources were not treated adequately from the point of view of ecology and resource relation-

ships. Many economists and others will find fault with the assumptions and methodology that were used to make the economic projections. Still other social scientists will complain that the report deals too largely with *national* policies and problems, and that the resources objectives have been unduly formulated from the "top down" rather than from the "bottom up." To this chorus will be added the voices of engineers, mineralogists, chemists, and others who are skeptical of technical evaluations which the report makes.

But all of these objections notwithstanding, the chief barrier which the report must hurdle to win popular acceptance is national psychology. Strongly ingrained traditions and beliefs about America's resource wealth are, short of catastrophe, not easily changed. Except in wartime, the average American has not yet experienced any real deprivation attributable to a national shortage of raw materials. Until the public feels directly the impact of changing resource-use patterns, public opinion will resist new concepts and policies.

Moreover, people in the United States have not perceived the full significance of the

change in frontiers that has taken place in this country over the last half-century. Simply put, the old frontier was made up of land and natural resources circumscribed by national boundaries. The new frontier lies in the realm of technology and communications conceived on a world-wide basis. The connecting bridge is man and his ideals of achievement. The average American has adjusted to the transition of frontiers on a technological basis but has not yet completed the adjustment on the ideological front.

The United States has entered a new and different stage of national development. For those who have viewed the flowering of American institutions and democracy as essentially a product of American soil and means, the shift from a "have" to a "have-not" nation in terms of resources is of profound significance. If American growth is to continue, the eventual acceptance of the basic philosophy and objectives of the President's Materials Policy Commission Report is inevitable. Scholars of our generation urgently need to study what the ultimate impact of the new frontier will be upon American ideals and institutions.

## Metropolitan Studies

By Victor Jones, Wesleyan University

**A FUTURE FOR NASHVILLE**, by the Community Services Commission for Davidson County and the City of Nashville, 1952. Pp. 201. \$2.00.

**PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT FOR THE GOVERNMENTS OF ATLANTA AND FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA, by the Local Government Commission of Fulton County**, 1950. Pp. 104.

**METROPOLITAN COUNTY; A SURVEY OF GOVERNMENT IN THE BIRMINGHAM AREA**, by Weldon Cooper, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Alabama, 1949. Pp. 165.

**FINAL REPORT**, by the Committee on Metropolitan Problems of the Civic Advisory Council of Toronto, 1951. Pp. 53.

**ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS IN A METROPOLITAN AREA; THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION**, by Geddes W. Rutherford. Public Administration Service, 1952. Pp. 63. \$2.50. Special Publication No. 61.

**GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS**, by Betty Tableman. University of Michigan Press, 1951. Pp. 203. Michigan Governmental Studies No. 21.

**THE CHICAGO-COOK COUNTY HEALTH SURVEY**, conducted by the United States Public Health Service. Columbia University Press, 1949. Pp. 1317. \$15.00.

**THE PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY REGION**, by John C. Bollens. Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, Berkeley, 1948. Pp. 162. \$2.00.

TEN years ago, Thomas H. Reed pointed out in this *Review* that "there is no more metropolitan government . . . than there was in 1930."<sup>1</sup> Certainly there is little more metro-

<sup>1</sup> "Home Rule for Whom?" *2 Public Administration Review* 171 (Spring, 1942).

politan government now than there was in 1942. There are, however, many more published and unpublished studies of government in metropolitan areas—official survey reports, doctoral dissertations, prize-winning essays, and monographs.

### I

ONLY three of the studies reviewed here, those by Bollens, Rutherford, and Tableman, are the work of individual university scholars. The Nashville and Atlanta studies are official reports of commissions created by the Tennessee and Georgia Legislatures. Cooper's study of the Birmingham area is based upon memorandums prepared under his direction for the Alabama Legislative Advisory Commission on Jefferson County. *The Chicago-Cook County Health Survey* was made by the United States Public Health Service. The report on Toronto, although not prepared by an agency established by formal governmental action, is the result of essentially the same procedures that characterize the work of the state legislative commissions in Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee.

Diagnosis, prescription, and prognosis (to use the terms of *The Chicago-Cook County Health Survey*) are made by a group. The research staff (also a group) undoubtedly plays a dominant role in developing, if not in formulating, the scope of the inquiry and the conclusions and recommendations. But they are modified, verbally at least, by group discussion and decisions. All but Tableman are seeking solutions to problems in a particular metropolitan area. This gives an immediacy and a sharpness to the reports which are seldom found in studies of the metropolitan problem. However, the aspects of the metropolitan community that members of a local group involved in public affairs will consider relevant depends on their identification of the problems of a particular metropolitan area, their conception of the proper role of government in solving these problems, and their awareness of the politics of support and opposition to their recommendations. The words of the Fulton County Commission might have been written by any of the other commissions: "In not recommending either one government or joint government at this time, the Commission is not passing judg-

ment on their intrinsic merits. It has considered them not in the abstract, but in terms of how they would help or hinder the people of this area to take the immediate steps toward government improvement that are now needed" (p. 34). This is to be expected of an official survey group. Many important questions, however, go unasked and, of course, unanswered.

### II

THE Birmingham and Nashville reports discuss the scope, organization, administration, and financing of each important function of local government in the respective metropolitan areas. A brief introductory section precedes the main part of each report. Cooper concludes his report with a discussion of alternative proposals for dealing with metropolitan problems and of their usefulness or acceptability in the Birmingham area.

The Atlanta and Toronto reports, on the other hand, are less descriptive.<sup>2</sup> They are designed to develop persuasively the arguments for the principal recommendations in each report. The material is organized on the basis of the major aspects of the problem to be solved and of the proposal for its solution.

The major recommendations in these four reports involve annexation of territory to the central city and the readjustment of city-county relationships. The survey reports in Atlanta, Birmingham, Nashville, and Toronto recommended that the urbanized area adjacent to the central city be annexed to it. In Birmingham, Nashville, and Toronto incorporated municipalities as well as unincorporated territory would be included in the annexation; in Atlanta it was recommended only that the unincorporated urban fringe be annexed. Birmingham and Atlanta have annexed large suburban areas since the respective commissions reported to their Legislatures. Birmingham attempted to annex its incorporated suburbs but the proposition was voted down in each of them.

The failure of Birmingham to annex its incorporated suburbs indicates one of the limita-

<sup>2</sup>The Civic Advisory Council of Toronto published in 1949 and 1950 two sections of a *First Report* that contained descriptive and analytical data on the metropolitan area.

tions of annexation as a device for reducing the number of local governments carrying on the same activities in the same area. In Atlanta with only three incorporated suburbs in the immediate suburban area and in Nashville with only two, the problem may not appear to be serious. In many middle-size and in most large metropolitan areas, however, annexation can be used for little more than straightening boundary lines. In fact, incorporation is recognized as the most effective defense against the threat of annexation. Two Virginia counties have recently incorporated themselves as cities to avoid annexation to adjacent cities.

The Atlanta report also recommends the extension of the boundaries of the city of Atlanta by order of the Superior Court upon petition of the city or of a designated number of inhabitants and property owners in any unincorporated territory contiguous to the city. The court is to order annexation if the territory in question meets certain standards of location and density or assessed valuation. Apparently the court would exercise none of the discretion and judgment that the special annexation courts in Virginia bring to bear upon the issues in annexation proceedings in that state.

Most commentators recommend the Virginia annexation procedure. We need a careful examination of this device to determine whether judicial process is the desirable way of resolving the conflicts of interests which are frequently involved in annexation disputes. Annexation by judicial process should be compared with the administrative enlargement of local government boundaries in Canada and England.

### III

"**U**RBAN areas should be under urban governments and rural areas should be in a county." This maxim of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is the principle which guided the Local Government Commission of Fulton County in developing its Plan of Improvement: Annex all urbanized territory to the city, provide for the almost automatic annexation of other territory as it becomes urbanized, transfer all "municipal functions" from the county to the city, and leave to the county all "rural" and "area-wide" functions. The plan is now in effect by legislative action. The city, of course, will govern the area annexed

to it. If the inhabitants of any county area wish city services they can secure them only by arrangement with the city. The county has transferred its "urban" functions of police and fire protection, refuse collection and disposal, inspections, parks and recreation, and airports to the city. The city's public health functions are transferred to the county which continues to administer the courts, public welfare, and the offices of the county agent, sheriff, coroner, ordinary, and surveyor and the almshouse. Planning and zoning are conducted jointly by the city and county.

If the proposals of the Community Services Commission are carried out, the resulting allocation of functions between Nashville and Davidson County will be similar to that between Atlanta and Fulton County. Davidson County apparently has not gone so far as had Fulton County in assuming urban functions.

Neither the Birmingham nor the Toronto studies would reverse the trend toward developing the county into an urban unit of local government. Cooper shows in chapter after chapter that Jefferson County for fifty years has been assuming new functions in its own name, or jointly with Birmingham and other municipalities, or as administrator of federal-state programs. Tableman cites examples from many metropolitan areas of county assumption of urban functions. (pp. 24-32 and Appendix A.)

The Atlanta report gives four reasons (pp. 18-26) for reversing this trend. (1) The county duplicates municipal activities in an awkward and inefficient manner because (2) it is organized to function as a unit of rural government. (3) "The result is that many people [in the city] are paying for what they do not get and many others [outside of the city] are not paying fully for what they do receive." (4) If the county provides municipal services to unincorporated areas the residents will resist all efforts to expand the city limits. "A city that cannot grow is destined to become a dead city."

All of these are real problems; to list them is another way of stating the problem of government in metropolitan areas. The decision not to build up the county as a metropolitan government may well be the correct one for the Atlanta area. I doubt that similar solution would be wise (it would not be possible with-

out an extensive annexation to the central city) in most metropolitan areas.

We need a good study of the urban county as a functioning, and as a potential, urban government. Surveys, official and unofficial, and studies of the county slight the adjustments being made to urban and metropolitan pressures.<sup>3</sup> Of the works reviewed here, Cooper's study of Birmingham is truly a study of a metropolitan county not yet organized to carry its new administrative and political load.<sup>4</sup> The immediate objective of the Legislative Advisory Commission was lost when an enabling amendment to the Constitution to permit consolidation of Birmingham and Jefferson County was defeated at a statewide referendum. The long-range effect of Cooper's study, both locally and throughout the country, will probably be to direct attention to the potentialities of the county as an urban government and to the need for reorganization to enable it to realize its potentialities.

Cooper did not consider his proposal for a consolidated city-county as providing a "federal" type of metropolitan government, but certainly it would have the essential feature of that kind of organization. Certain functions are assigned to an area-wide government and others are left to existing or to reconstituted municipalities (p. 145). One of the alternative proposals for the Toronto area is to create a metropolitan county with the metropolitan functions of assessment, arterial roads, public transportation, planning, housing, water supply and sewage disposal, public health, public welfare, police and fire protection, parks and recreation. Municipalities as now constituted would have jurisdiction over all other local functions (pp. 36-44).

#### IV

*The Chicago-Cook County Health Survey* was directed by the U. S. Public Health Service and most of the professional staff were affiliated with the service. "The United States Pub-

<sup>3</sup> See Paul W. Wager, *County Government Across the Nation* (University of North Carolina Press, 1950), 817 pp. The county is not discussed as an urban government and only four counties in metropolitan areas are included among those described.

<sup>4</sup> See George W. Bemis and Nancy Basche, *Los Angeles County as an Agency of Municipal Government* (The Haynes Foundation, 1946), 105 pp.

lic Health Service, through the Director of the Chicago-Cook County Health Survey, assumed the leadership in and the responsibility for the findings and recommendations" (p. xix). An advisory committee appointed by the mayor of Chicago and the president of the Cook County Board of Commissioners and six technical consultant committees appointed by the chairman of the advisory committee helped to formulate policies, reviewed staff reports, and advised in the interpretation of the survey findings. "The recommendations, therefore, do not represent solely the opinions of the United States Public Health Service, but rather the judgment of a group of recognized local experts together with that of the United States Public Health Service personnel" (pp. xix).

The survey, reported in a volume of over 1,300 pages, touches every aspect of public health in our second largest metropolis. The survey shows constant awareness of the division of responsibility for the public health of the big city among many units of local government and among various agencies within particular governments. It is an inventory, with each item evaluated, of public health needs, of progress toward goals, of cross-purposes, of co-operation, of local governments unable to finance adequate public health programs, of some governments unaware of the problems, and of others insensible to their responsibilities. No unit of government received a clean bill of health. It is clear, however, that many suburbs are less desirable than Chicago itself as places to live. This survey will undoubtedly be used as a precedent and as a guide for health surveys and other surveys of particular functions in the larger metropolitan areas. "The Chicago-Cook County Health Survey was unique in its comprehensiveness, the size and diversity of the population included in the area surveyed, and the multiplicity and complexity of the health problems involved. As a result, the survey program was largely a pioneering effort which had to be developed *de novo*" (p. xv).

It is unfortunate, therefore, that the survey recommends the creation of a new special district to provide an integrated water supply for the metropolitan area without weighing alternative schemes. At least, there is no evidence in chapter 4 that the survey staff considered

alternatives to the creation of a special district. The only alternative discussed in the chapter is the clearly unsatisfactory system of municipal "cooperation" under which the city of Chicago is required by statute to supply water to municipalities within the Chicago Sanitary District. Experience in Detroit under a similar, though not compulsory, system of "cooperation" is cited to support the finding. The Massachusetts Metropolitan District Commission and the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission are discussed as examples of an integrated system in other metropolitan areas. The Sanitary District of Chicago and the Chicago Transit Authority are cited as local precedents for this form of organization.

Given the force of institutional habits, similar recommendations are likely to be made in other public health surveys. The role of other federal agencies in urging or inducing the creation of special districts or authorities, such as soil conservation districts and housing authorities, is well known. Now comes the President's Water Resources Policy Commission with the recommendation that "the States and the Federal Government should encourage the formation of metropolitan water districts to develop and transmit necessary water to meet in the most economical way the requirements of a group of communities when those communities are dependent upon the same source of water supply or when existing water supplies prove inadequate."<sup>6</sup>

We need an intensive study of special districts and authorities. Do their alleged, and often asserted, advantages and disadvantages hold up in theory and in practice? To what extent are the proponents of special districts and authorities motivated by considerations that have nothing to do with metropolitan aspects of local problems? The professionalism of many groups of specialists has been tied up with special interest groups powerful enough to take important activities out of reach of the periodic determination by the community of how its limited resources will be allocated.

<sup>6</sup> President's Water Resources Policy Commission, *A Water Policy for the American People* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), I, 184. The commission, like the Public Health Service, only cites examples of the existence of special districts and authorities (pp. 181-83). It is incorrect to refer to most of these special districts as "associations of communities."

This movement appears to be akin to the pressure for the creation and protection of independent regulatory commissions, autonomous agencies such as state highway departments, government corporations, and the multitude of independent boards and authorities in city and county governments. Metropolitan authorities and special districts should be studied in this context.

## V

THERE is no satisfactory study of special districts, although every author of a book on local government in metropolitan areas makes many assertions about their desirability or undesirability. Of the eight volumes reviewed in this article, those by Rutherford, Tableman, and Bollens, in addition to *The Chicago-Cook County Health Survey*, give considerable attention to special districts.<sup>6</sup>

Bollens believes that the only feasible form of metropolitan government in the San Francisco Bay Area is the large special district. He believes that the principal objections to special districts are the excessive number of elected officers and the pyramiding of new governments upon other governmental taxing units in the same area. These objections would be overcome, he believes, if the large special district were governed "by representatives chosen by city councils and the county board . . . from among their own membership" and if the district budget had to be approved by the councils of its constituent units. He thinks it unlikely that such a board "will become involved in the high degree of friction sometimes existing between elected boards" (p. 123). An examination of the experience of county boards composed of elected township supervisors might be relevant to this hope. Likewise, his belief that a special district so organized would not lay tax upon tax in the same area is too sanguine. "If the district pos-

\* The proposal of the Toronto Civic Council that, as an alternative form of metropolitan government, the urbanized area be consolidated with Toronto and that a metropolitan authority be established with jurisdiction in the city and in the fringe areas over planning, housing, arterial roads, public transportation, and major recreational facilities does not call for the creation of a special district. Any governmental unit responsible for five such important functions would be a general and not a special government.

seses the tax levying power, directors will likely consider the over-all revenue needs of the cities, counties, and this administrative district of the area. It seems certainly true that if the district budget must be approved by individual governing boards, such as city councils and county boards, which have director representatives, careful consideration will be given to intelligent fiscal management" (p. 125).

Tableman also considers special districts to be "expedient, short-term solutions . . . an easy immediate way of handling urgent needs" (p. 56). She has listed 103 metropolitan special districts in 57 metropolitan areas. She has collected and classified detailed information about the area and population of 38 special districts in the United States and Canada, their functions, mode of creation, financing, organization, directors, and employees. These data are discussed in chapter 4 and listed in detail in Appendix B. Their use in the Detroit area is discussed on pp. 108-116.

Only Rutherford, the United States Public Health Service, and the President's Water Resources Policy Commission recommend special districts as the best way of meeting at least the metropolitan problem of immediate concern to them. Government agencies, charter commissions, pressure groups, technicians, and professional groups will continue to recommend and try to bring about the establishment of special districts or authorities. Until this type of organization is viewed in the context of a broad theory of metropolitan community organization—until it can be evaluated in terms of its consistency with what we want government and other community agencies to do—nothing more can be expected from official agencies or from scholars than our present parrot-like way of praising or condemning them.

## VI

RUTHERFORD'S study of the Washington, D. C., metropolitan area is his evaluation of the success of planning and service agencies in solving some of the problems of the area. He makes a sharp distinction, with the aid of a dictionary, between coordination and integration. By coordination he means the facilitation of "the exchange of ideas," . . . "a concinnity of planning programs among equals"

(pp. 19-20, 59). He claims to approach his study without "a complete scheme for metropolitan integration based on *a priori* concepts. . . . It is believed that this procedure is justified on the ground that the nature of the problem should condition its solution; that an empirical approach should be founded on the *ad hoc* situations that may arise" (p. xiv).

The contacts among the "planning" agencies in the area and between them and federal, state, and local "operating" agencies are classified by Rutherford as (1) informal methods ("telephone calls, exchange of letters, press releases, informal conferences, and the loaning of the [National Capital Park and Planning] Commission's staff"); (2) coordinating committees; (3) parallel action; (4) financial and other types of agreements (largely under the Capper-Cramton Act); (5) extraterritorial jurisdiction. Examples of each type of coordination are taken from the fields of planning, of zoning, and of "public services" (water supply and drainage and sewerage, streets and highways, public utilities, public safety, and public health). The examples are few and briefly described and even when they are called case studies they give little information about, much less insight into, relationships between people who carry on similar or different but related activities in various governmental agencies of the Washington metropolitan area.

Case studies such as those prepared under the direction of Harold Stein bring to the surface the wide range of factors influencing decision-makers and the manner in which the participants organize themselves and others, within and without a formally recognized structure, to secure or to prevent action. Herbert Kaufman's "Gotham in the Air Age"<sup>7</sup> is the first case study in metropolitan government. I hope it will not be the last.

Rutherford, furthermore, largely ignores the activities of all governmental agencies in the area except special planning agencies and a few special districts with operating responsibilities. Montgomery County, Maryland, and Arlington County, Virginia, are in themselves developments in metropolitan government as significant as the National Capital Park and

<sup>7</sup> In Harold Stein, ed., *Public Administration and Policy Development—A Case Book* (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1952), pp. 143-97.

Planning Commission. The author is not to be criticized for limiting the scope of his study, but he gives an unreal picture of policy-making when he ignores congressional committees, federal executive agencies, general local governments, and state agencies operating out of Baltimore and Richmond.

## VII

**N**ONE of the works reviewed, except that of Bollens, shows much awareness of the politics of metropolitan areas. The authors of the official reports on Atlanta, Birmingham, and Nashville, and of the Toronto report must have been sensitive to the forces in the community that might support or oppose their recommendations. The process, often an unconscious one, of identifying the anticipated reactions of the community is never disclosed in reports by official groups. More intimations of this aspect of the staff-commission deliberations are found in the Atlanta report and fewest in *The Chicago-Cook County Health Survey*. Case studies of the making of these surveys (including the work of Cuyahoga County Charter Commission) would be useful to future surveyors, to students of the policy-making processes, and to the political scientists who call themselves students of metropolitan government.

We know very little about why and how influential civic leaders, local officials, party officials, state legislators, and the electorate have opposed or supported the various schemes for reorganizing local government in metropolitan areas. The reformers have always had

scapegoats—usually politicians “with vested interests in the spoils of public office.” Sometimes certain business interests, or labor leaders, or an indifferent electorate have been blamed for the defeat of a proposed reorganization. But our knowledge of the politics of such movements is based upon newspaper stories and upon articles and news notes in periodicals.

We need a thorough study of the symbols used in integration campaigns,<sup>8</sup> of the interests involved in various ways of organizing the metropolitan community (and its subdivisions), of the resources of the community for changing special interests into a “general” interest, and of how suburbanites who ordinarily identify themselves with the metropolitan community suddenly shift into an intense identification with the suburb if the corporate integrity of the suburb is threatened. What is the psychology of these “loyalty” shifts? What political forces invoke them? What social forces reinforce them?

Before we can understand this aspect of the problem we must supplement the administrative and structural studies of metropolitan communities with studies of the metropolitan organization and relationships of attitude and opinion-forming agencies. Most important would be a study of the formal and informal organization of the major political parties in the metropolis.

<sup>8</sup> Some of the material for two metropolitan areas is presented in rich detail in two recent unpublished doctoral dissertations: J. Steele Gow, Jr., *Metropolitics in Pittsburgh* (University of Pittsburgh, 1952) and Charles D. Goff, *The Politics of Governmental Integration in Metropolitan Milwaukee* (Northwestern University, 1952).

# Contemporary Topics

Compiled by Public Administration Clearing House

## Report of Health Needs Commission

The fifteen-member Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation appointed by President Truman in December, 1951, issued the first volume of its report on December 18, 1952. A second volume, devoted entirely to problems of financing the recommended program, was issued in February, followed by three volumes presenting supporting statistical information and excerpts from the voluminous panel discussions and public hearings.

The main recommendations of the report were as follows:

1. Extension of voluntary prepayment plans to include physicians' services (within the framework of group practice); nursing service at home; expensive drugs and appliances; and limited dental care.
2. Federal grants-in-aid, which would be matched by the states, to bolster prepayment plans.
3. Creation of a department of health and security with Cabinet status.
4. Creation by Congress of a twelve- to eighteen-member permanent federal health commission for the continuing study of the nation's health status, to make an annual report to the President and the Congress.
5. Federal grants for aid to medical educators, medical research, and local health services, for hospital construction, and for pilot studies in organizing medical services on a regional basis.

All fifteen commission members signed the report, but three members—Walter P. Reuther, president of the CIO and the United Auto Workers; Albert J. Hayes, president of the International Association of Machinists, AFL; and Elizabeth S. Magee, general secretary of the National Consumers League— appended a joint statement in which they criticized the commission for its failure to recommend adop-

tion of a compulsory plan in which participation by all states would be mandatory.

The recommendation for establishing a department of health and security also failed to secure unanimous approval. Dean Joseph C. Hinsey of Cornell urged further study on this question. Dr. Evarts A. Graham, Washington University, St. Louis, and Dr. Russel V. Lee of the Stanford University Medical School, agreed that a department of health should be established but question the desirability of including in it the additional functions suggested by the commission.

## Joint Accounting Improvement Program

The fourth annual report of progress under the Joint Program to Improve Accounting in the Federal Government has been issued by the Comptroller General. As in previous years, the report is organized in two sections: Part I, General Developments, and Part II, Accounting Developments in Individual Agencies.

The section on General Developments includes a report of savings made possible through increased utilization of punch card checks. At the time this project was undertaken, 64 million out of the total of approximately 300 million checks drawn on the Treasurer of the United States were being issued on the conventional paper check form. During the past year, the following agencies have scheduled or planned for conversion to the use of fully punched checks subject to test in certain instances and availability of equipment:

Agency	Number of Accounts	Number of Checks Annually
Post Office Department	23	5,400,000
Department of Air Force	18	6,300,000
Department of the Army	41	14,700,000
Department of the Navy	27	5,500,000
Tennessee Valley Authority	1	720,000
	110	32,620,000

The report estimates that the conversion of these accounts involves potential savings of approximately \$764,000 per year.

#### Presidential Advisory Commissions

Announcement on December 29 of the appointment by the then President-elect of an Interim Agricultural Advisory Committee, headed by Dean William I. Myers, College of Agriculture, Cornell University, to aid the incoming Secretary of Agriculture in shaping national farm policies marked the first formal action in line with the intention frequently expressed by President Eisenhower during the campaign to bring to bear on government policies the advice and experience of expert and lay citizens. The appointment of a bipartisan federal agricultural commission was specifically mentioned in the Republic national platform and President Eisenhower reiterated this pledge in a major farm speech at Kasson, Minnesota. The appointment of other advisory commissions was foreshadowed in more general statements at various times during the campaign.

The use of presidential advisory commissions has been common ever since the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. Presidents Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt, and Truman established such commissions fairly frequently.

Presidential advisory commissions are generally set up to do special jobs, and they are usually expected to conclude their work with recommendations for action, whether these recommendations can be carried out directly by the President or whether they are submitted to him as a basis for proposals of his own to the Congress.

The President's authority for establishing advisory commissions to aid in the development of proposals for legislative action is generally considered to reside in Art. II, Sec. 3 of the Constitution which provides that the President "shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient."

There is no regular fund at the disposal of the President to cover the expenses of advisory commissions. This means that the President must either obtain specific congressional sup-

port through an appropriation for each advisory commission or find other sources of money. In a few instances, advisory commissions have been financed by private contributions.

Since 1940, and especially in the years after World War II, the President has generally used his Emergency Fund to meet the expenses of advisory commissions. The appropriation language for the Emergency Fund limits the use of the fund to making provision "for emergencies affecting the national interest, security, or defense." The view has been expressed on various occasions by members of Congress individually and also by the Appropriations Committees that this limits the use of the Emergency Fund to the financing of advisory commissions related to specific emergencies, but Congress has never written such an explicit limitation into the appropriation language for the Emergency Fund.

#### Administrative Studies Center

A new Center of Administrative Studies has been established at Columbia University for research into long-range problems of government administration. The aim of the center is to advance basic thinking about fundamental concepts of administrative behavior and administrative processes.

The center may occasionally engage in projects of a survey type, but this is not its fundamental purpose and it will undertake special activities of this type only when it appears that the research involved will contribute to the center's long-range purpose.

John D. Millet, professor of public administration at Columbia, is director of the center. Staff for the center will be drawn primarily from graduate students studying for the Ph.D. degree in the university's Department of Public Law and Government.

#### Conference on Comparative Administration

A report of the Conference on Comparative Administration, convened by Public Administration Clearing House at Princeton last September, has been published and distributed to those who participated in the conference and to other interested persons in universities, re-

search institutes, government offices, and foundations.

The conference was called to consider problems arising out of the expanded role of the United States in international affairs and the consequent increase in the number of American officials who must deal directly with administrators in other countries or with problems at home that require understanding of foreign administrative processes. Subjects on the agenda included (1) the present status of comparative administration teaching and research in American universities; (2) university programs, such as area institutes, in which training and research in comparative administration might be expanded or developed; and (3) materials available in universities and the government for research and teaching.

The report of the conference, which was of an exploratory nature, indicates areas of agreement among the participants, identifies some of the more urgent problems, and suggests possible approaches to their solution.

The conference agreed that current teaching of comparative administration was too limited in the number of countries it covered, in its prime concern with structure, and in its lack of attention to process.

The conference considered the relationship of comparative administration to integrated area programs, to curriculums in public administration, and to departments of political science. Linkage with area programs, it was agreed, offered the student in administration a flow of material about the society and aid in overcoming language difficulties by association with others studying or speaking the same language. Basically, the study of comparative administration should be grounded in political science.

Existing materials for research were found to be scant and largely descriptive. A number of proposals were made for identifying and making more readily accessible documents and studies directly focused on administrative problems and processes. The production of new materials in monographic form was urged as a prime necessity.

It was suggested that more effective use might be made of the Fulbright Act to stimulate exchanges which would yield material for research and teaching. Better use of foreign

visitors was also suggested as a means of gaining insights into administration abroad.

A limited number of copies of this report is still available from the New York office of Public Administration Clearing House, 45 E. 65th Street, New York 21, N. Y.

#### Overseas Personnel

Problems associated with the selection and training of personnel for overseas assignments are receiving the continuing attention of a wide variety of interested groups.

The permanent Interagency Committee on Area and Language Specialists established by the Office of Defense Mobilization (see Spring, 1952, *Review*, p. 150) has approved a report prepared by a special subcommittee setting up standardized areas and related language groups which have been developed to meet the requirements of all federal agencies employing substantial numbers of personnel overseas. Adoption of these standardized categories is an important step in arriving at realistic estimates of the probable needs of all federal agencies for area and language specialists.

A related study, carried out by the Special Survey Committee, also established by ODM, is attempting to discover through a group of established area centers in universities how successful they have been in placing their students in appropriate overseas assignments.

Another important development in this field is the publication of a *Preliminary Report on the Research Project on Selection Methods for Overseas Employees*—a project of the Civil Service Commission, jointly sponsored and financed by the federal agencies mainly concerned with overseas personnel management.

The object of this study, which is to be completed in the fall of 1953, is to identify characteristics that are related to successful adjustment overseas and to develop effective selection methods for finding the people who meet these specifications. The *Preliminary Report*, released in December, presents an analysis of data secured from "returnees" and a detailed description of the overseas phase of the program which involved on-the-spot interviews in Paris, Vienna, Salzburg, Wiesbaden, Manila, Okinawa, and Guam—areas selected on the

basis of agency recommendations as likely to be most fruitful for the purposes of the study.

On the basis of the information secured from these and other sources, a number of tentative findings are presented. Between now and the presentation of the final report, various validating tests will be carried out and additional analysis of the results will be continued.

Outside the government, the Board on Overseas Training and Research, established in 1952 to assist the Ford Foundation in formulating programs and carrying out activities dealing with American resources and needs for citizens well-informed on international problems, has announced a second series of foreign study and research grants to American college graduates for studies of problems concerning Asia and the Near and Middle East. Cleon O. Swayzee, formerly chief of the Division of International Labor and Social Affairs of the Department of State, was appointed last November as director of research for the Board. Members of the Board are Gordon Gray, chairman, John S. Dickey, Alvin C. Eurich, John W. Gardner, Edward R. Murrow, Milo R. Perkins, and Carl B. Spaeth.

#### **International Civil Servants' Discussion Group**

A Discussion Group of International Civil Servants has been organized at the headquarters of the United Nations. Its purpose is to provide a forum for the presentation of papers and for discussion of the basic concepts of international administration and problems arising out of the development of an international civil service. It is not concerned with the questions that engage the staff associations of the United Nations agencies, such as conditions of work and provisions of employment contracts. Martin Hill of the Office of the Secretary General is chairman of the organizing committee.

The group holds monthly meetings which have initially attracted about fifty participants from all departments of the United Nations and from the liaison offices of the Specialized Agencies, including men of the rank of Assistant Secretary General.

The first discussion, on "Human Relations in International Administration," was opened by Dr. Brock Chisholm, director-general of the

World Health Organization. His Excellency Th. Aghnides, chairman of the International Civil Service Advisory Board, opened the second discussion, on "Standards of Conduct of the International Civil Servant." Other subjects discussed have been: "Selection of International Civil Servants," by Emile Giraud of the Legal Department of the United Nations, long in the Secretariat of the League of Nations; and "Education for International Civil Service," by Sr. Benjamin A. Cohen, Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations in charge of the Department of Public Information.

Interest has been expressed in the formation of a similar discussion group in Geneva to bring together international civil servants in the various organs of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies with offices there.

#### **University Contracts for Technical Assistance**

The Mutual Security Agency is encouraging the use of contracts between American universities and foreign governments to facilitate technical assistance training overseas. These agreements generally provide that the American university will furnish from three to ten professors for a considerable period for work in a local university to teach, help revise curriculums, plan expansions and improvements of libraries, laboratories, etc. Two local professors work with each American. For the first year, one of them works with him day by day, while the other obtains additional special training on the campus of the American university. During the second year, these two associates reverse their roles. By thus utilizing the full resources of the American universities, the Mutual Security Agency believes that it can offer a more useful program to the countries it is aiding than it could by merely enlisting the services of independent, highly qualified individuals as members of its staff.

In Southeast Asia, contracts are now either in operation or under negotiation between the University of the Philippines, the Taiwan Engineering College, the Taiwan Teacher Training College, and Taiwan National University in Formosa, and Chulalongkorn, Siraraj, and Kaesetsart Universities in Thailand, on the

one hand, and with Cornell, Michigan, Purdue, Columbia, Washington University (St. Louis), and Oregon State College, on the other. These contracts cover the fields of agriculture, public administration, engineering, business administration, teacher training, medicine, and public health.

#### Exchanges of Social Welfare Training

The United Nations and fifteen European countries have worked out an inexpensive "barter scheme" to increase the professional training of social workers and take advantage of each country's most highly developed social work theory and practice.

The countries concerned contribute by granting board, lodging, and training, offered by a social welfare administration, to professional social workers from other member countries. In return, social workers of the first country are able to take advantage of training opportunities offered by any of the participating nations. To administer this scheme, the United Nations maintains a clearinghouse in Geneva which keeps records (the unit of account being one week's board, lodging, and access to training) of opportunities offered and utilized in all the member countries. If the trainee cannot pay travel costs, the United Nations also contributes all or part of the trainee's transportation expenses. Neither training fees nor maintenance costs, however, are charged to the United Nations budget. As a result, the scheme costs the United Nations only the small expense of maintaining the clearinghouse and some transportation costs. Moreover, the cost to the countries concerned is also insignificant. Yet, by the end of 1952, it was expected that nearly 300 social workers would have benefited by the opportunity for learning new techniques, exchanging ideas, and discussing common problems with specialists and organizations in other countries.

#### Standardization of Caribbean Statistics

International organizations have been concerned with the standardization of international trade statistics for a number of years. Since 1900, improved classification systems and patterns for the presentation of data have been advanced by the publication of a number of

regional and international systems such as the British *Board of Trade List*; the League of Nations *Minimum List of Commodities for International Trade Statistics, 1938*; the *Standard International Trade Classifications*, (S.I.T.C.) issued by the Statistical Commission, United Nations, 1951; and the Benelux system.

With the postwar growth of regional planning and development activities, special attention has been focused on the problem presented by the noncomparability of statistics and trade data issued within a single region. In the Caribbean, for instance, three international and six national classification systems were in use at the end of the war. Accordingly, the Caribbean Commission (composed of the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and the United States) has been studying these divergences, both to analyze the systems in current use and to survey the possibility of developing more uniform practices.

In 1950 the commission convened the Caribbean Trade Statistics Conference. This conference emphasized the value of using the United Nations S.I.T.C. and made thirty recommendations for achieving greater uniformity of classification, definition, method, and time of publishing data. The conference report was circulated to all territorial governments, together with a *Digest of West Indian Trade Reporting*, a comprehensive tabulation showing, first, the extent of the present divergences among Caribbean territories in the preparation of statistics of quantity, weights, and measures in trade data; and, second, the widespread tendency to group many commodity items into "unquantified blocs," thus preventing the computation of accurate trade indexes.

Since the commission first turned its attention to the problem, Jamaica has adopted the League of Nations *Minimum List*, and Trinidad and Tobago have revised their system in accordance with the UN's S.I.T.C.

#### Pan American Congress of Architects

The 8th Pan American Congress of Architects met in Mexico City October 19-25, 1952. The main themes for discussion were continental, national, regional, and urban planning, with reference to the architecture of homes,

hospitals, and university cities. The meeting's objectives were to correlate ideas and accomplishments, looking toward the solution of some of the social problems of the Americas. The American Institute of Architects and the Department of State cooperated in presenting an exhibit of planning and contemporary architecture in the United States.

The American delegation to the congress, under the chairmanship of Glenn Stanton, president of the American Institute of Architects, included fifteen persons. Four members of the delegation were from the staff of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs; one represented the Public Health Service; and one the Housing and Home Finance Agency. Others were architects from Dallas, Atlanta, Detroit, Chicago, Houston, New York, and Buffalo.

The Pan American Congresses were initiated in 1920 to enable architects from all the American nations to consider problems of education, ethics, and the relationships of architects to contemporary civilization.

#### Public Administration Meetings in Turkey

The International Institute of the Administrative Sciences will hold its 9th Congress in Istanbul, Turkey, September 2-10, 1953. The tentative agenda includes two general sessions on the administration of economic undertakings.

The Committee on Administrative Practices will spend two sessions each on the following subjects: problems in the conduct of economic development programs; personal performance and ethics in government; case studies in the conduct of technical assistance programs; and the identification and correction of administrative deficiencies.

The Scientific Committee will devote two sessions to international administrative jurisdiction, one to international administrative tribunals, two to grants-in-aid as a technique of administrative direction, and three to the training of public (including international) employees.

Plans are now advanced for the establishment of an institute of public administration for Turkey and the Middle East at the University of Ankara, following up on discussions conducted by a working party of Turkish experts and United Nations specialists in Ankara

last summer. Dean Emery Olson of the University of Southern California headed this mission. Professor Gunnar Heckscher, director of the Social Institute, Stockholm, who stopped off to attend the recent meeting of the IIAS Bureau on his way to Turkey, is now in that country on behalf of the United Nations to advise on plans for the new institute.

#### New IIAS Study

*Taking Over a New Executive Post* is the title of the latest report (No. XIII) in the series being issued by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences under a contract with the United Nations. Although the title and the timing of the release of this study by John D. Young might suggest that it was written with a new president of the United States in mind, the foreword makes it clear that the 26-page bulletin is offered to the many civil servants all over the world who are called upon to take over executive posts in their own governments or in the growing number of international agencies being established.

The major portion of the study is directed to the executive who is taking over a going concern which is a sufficiently important part of the total government structure and program so that the political environment is a major concern to the new executive. Suggestions in this section cover the period when the new executive knows he is to have the new job but before he officially accepts responsibility; the first few days in the new position; the first few weeks; and the point, during the first month or so, when decisive action begins on a broad scale.

Later sections deal with the special problems associated with an executive post in a new agency and with the assumption of an executive post as a result of promotion from within the same organization unit or agency.

Copies of the report may be secured from Public Administration Division, Technical Assistance Administration, United Nations, East 42d St., New York City.

#### Performance Budgeting in Cities

The Municipal Finance Officers Association and the American Public Works Association have cooperated during the past year to pro-

vide financing and direction for a survey of current budget practices in cities.

The survey covered all cities in the United States having a population over 250,000 and a selection of cities in both the United States and Canada in the smaller population classes. Each city was asked to fill out a questionnaire and to provide copies of budget legislation, estimate forms and instructions, the budget documents, annual financial reports, tax levy ordinances, long-term public improvement programs, and other pertinent publications.

Analysis of the information received shows that there has been a definite and rapid shift within the past three years toward performance budgeting. During this period the budget documents in twelve cities have been radically revised with the emphasis of budget presentation based on activities, projects, and services performed in contrast with the previous practice of including data only on objects of expenditure.

The survey also indicated that in nearly all medium-sized cities the annual budget has become the basic financial programming and control device. This finding is considered of particular significance in the light of the fact that the majority of even large cities did not operate on a budget basis thirty years ago.

As an outgrowth of the joint MFOA-APWA survey, a new MFOA budget manual is being issued which incorporates the latest developments in performance budgeting.

The new MFOA manual is designed to give general guidance to cities wishing to change to the performance type of budget and to contribute to the effective use of this device in cities already having it. Emphasis has been placed on explaining techniques for analysis of operations and establishment of criteria for determining expenditure requirements on performance data.

The general manual is to be supplemented by a series of case studies demonstrating the application of performance analysis techniques to each major municipal activity. The first of these case studies has been completed by the budget research staff of the city of San Diego, and several cities having management research staffs have accepted assignments for the current year to undertake case studies on other major activities.

#### LaGuardia Award

The second annual LaGuardia Award for outstanding achievement in municipal affairs was presented on December 13, 1952, to Edward G. Conroy, director of the Bureau of Governmental Research, San Antonio, Texas.

The award was made in recognition of Mr. Conroy's extensive and successful leadership in the campaign to secure adoption of council-manager government in San Antonio and his initiative over a long period in the improvement of municipal administration in that city.

The recipient of the award is chosen by an advisory panel from nominations made by the National Municipal League. Members of the panel making this year's selection were: Paul H. Appleby, dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University, who cabled his vote from New Delhi, India, where he was at the time engaged in special studies; Ralph J. Bunche, 1950 Nobel Prize Winner and director of trusteeship of the United Nations; L. P. Cunningham, city manager of Kansas City, Missouri, and recipient of the 1951 LaGuardia Award; John S. Knight, publisher of several newspapers including the Pulitzer prize-winning *Miami Herald*, the *Beacon Journal* of Akron, Ohio, the *Chicago Daily News*, and the *Detroit Free Press*; and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt.

#### Maryland Highway Report

Development of new cooperative relationships between state and local governments in Maryland with respect to the administration of highways is recommended in a special report of the Highway Research Board of the National Research Council, based on a study of legal authority and existing administrative practices.

This pilot study of intergovernmental relations in matters affecting streets and highways ties in with the over-all study of this subject which was started two years ago under the joint sponsorship of the Council of State Governments, the National Association of County Officials, the American Municipal Association, the U. S. Conference of Mayors, the American Public Works Association, the U. S. Bureau of Public Roads, and the Automotive Safety Foundation (see Winter, 1952, *Review*, p. 67).

The report recommends that the state roads commission consolidate responsibility for encouraging and establishing the pattern of desirable state-local and interlocal cooperative relationships in a single staff unit to deal with the counties and cities, and that local boards and equivalent bodies delegate adequate powers of negotiation to the administrative heads of their highway or street systems.

Under the plan recommended in the report, local construction and maintenance standards would be developed cooperatively; the classification of highways and streets would be re-examined and revised as necessary; and effective long-range planning and programming would be assured. Technical assistance would be furnished by the state, and interlocal cooperation would be encouraged.

A special problem in Maryland is the existing dual system of local rural road administration, under which the state roads commission is presently managing the road systems of eleven counties.

The report recommends that the dual plan be continued for the present, since it would create hardship if some of the state-operated counties were forced to take over their own work now, but that counties should assume responsibility for their roads as they are able, so that eventually all local rural roads are under county management.

#### District of Columbia Reorganizes

The government of the District of Columbia is undergoing a reorganization which is without parallel in its history. While reorganization of federal departments and agencies is not unheard of in the nation's capital, major change in the structure of the municipal governing body is unusual.

The District of Columbia acquired its present form of government in 1878, when its population was about 165,000. By 1950, the number of district residents had grown to more than 800,000, with a total population for the metropolitan area of almost twice that figure. To keep pace with the increase in population over these many years, the district government just "grewed." It added units here and there as needs arose, so that the number of individual agencies over which the Board of Com-

missioners had various degrees of control grew from 10 in 1878 to about 100 in 1952.

The district government has been the subject of numerous comprehensive studies of organization during the past twenty-five years. Among the studies conducted were one by the Brookings Institution (1929), and one by Griffenhagen and Associates (1939). In December, 1951, the district's Board of Commissioners approved a reorganization plan which contemplated the consolidation of almost 100 of the existing departments and agencies into 15. This plan was submitted by the President pursuant to the provisions of the Reorganization Act of 1949, and was approved by the Congress as Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1952.

The plan itself, as proposed and as approved by the Congress, represented a charter to reorganize rather than a mandate to reorganize in a particular way. The basic purpose of the reorganization is to consolidate the activities of the departments and agencies in such a way as to produce a basic simplification and improvement of the government of the District of Columbia and to enable the Board of Commissioners to exercise necessary and proper controls over the policies, programs, and operations of the government.

One of the immediate organizational developments growing out of the reorganization plan was the establishment of a Department of General Administration, headed by Schuyler Lowe, under which are centralized all of the key administrative management activities of the government. Henry Hubbard, former executive vice chairman of the Federal Personnel Council, was appointed director of the newly constituted Personnel Office of that Department. The Management Office of the Department, headed by W. Kenneth Holl, is responsible for the implementation of the reorganization plan and the formulation of recommendations for action by the Board of Commissioners to translate the objectives of the Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1952 into action.

Between October 31, 1952, when the initial staffing of the Management Office was accomplished and June 30, 1953, which is the target date for the completion of the reorganization, the personnel of the survey staff will concentrate their time and efforts on intensive surveys

of the departments and agencies affected by the reorganization to achieve the best type of organization consistent with the plan's objectives and the needs of the city.

#### Statewide Civil Service Restored in Louisiana

A statewide civil service system has been re-established in Louisiana by an amendment to the state constitution.

An earlier civil service law was repealed by the state legislature in 1948, but the voters approved the new amendment by a margin of more than five to one.

One of the provisions of the new amendment calls for the appointment of a five-member state civil service commission from a panel of names submitted by the presidents of five state colleges and universities. This commission appoints the state personnel director, who is under civil service.

The existing civil service system of New Orleans is embraced in the new constitutional provision which requires establishment of a civil service system in all cities above 250,000 population. Under the constitution, two of the three members of the New Orleans commission are appointed by the state civil service commission.

#### Urban Redevelopment

Thirty-two states now have enabling legislation for urban redevelopment, according to the National Association of Housing Officials.

In its newly issued *Housing and Redevelopment Directory 1952-1953*, the association notes that, generally, three types of local agencies are authorized by states to do the redevelopment job: local housing authorities, separate redevelopment agencies, and the cities themselves. Legislation in Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, and West Virginia permits all three types of agency.

In Illinois and New Jersey, redevelopment powers may be granted to either local housing authorities or special redevelopment agencies.

Twenty-three states specifically designate local housing authorities as slum clearance agencies, thirteen states authorize special redevelopment agencies, and twelve states grant cities power to undertake redevelopment projects.

During the past two years, five states and two territories passed enabling legislation for urban redevelopment: Delaware, Maine, Nebraska, North Carolina, West Virginia, Alaska, and the Virgin Islands.

There are no redevelopment laws in fifteen states: Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming.

Although there is no enabling legislation in Texas, San Antonio's new city charter specifically provides the municipality with urban redevelopment powers.

#### Annual Municipal Congress

Metropolitan areas in the United States will face "economic blight and political, cultural, and social bankruptcy" unless municipal officials assume leadership and demand that immediate steps be taken to solve the problems of their communities. This warning was issued by the American Municipal Association at its annual Congress in Los Angeles in December.

Effective and practical methods of solving problems created by enormous growth and expansion in the metropolitan areas have given way "to guesswork and to piecemeal, expedient, and short-sighted solutions," the association said.

The organization called for vigorous action by the agencies of government most directly affected by the problems of the metropolitan areas.

The association established a Committee on Metropolitan Areas to undertake a comprehensive research program of the major problems of metropolitan areas. The committee was directed to draft a program designed "to strengthen local municipal government in metropolitan areas and solve the problems created by growth, overlapping governmental jurisdiction, and existing laws."

In a resolution on temporary defense housing in cities, the association said that "federal standards, including density of population, provision of adequate play space, off-street parking and other matters related to reasonable living, should be evolved and applied to those projects which are to continue for the duration of the emergency."

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